ࡱ>    !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWRoot Entry F :DTXWordDocument CompObjnal power may, in the longer term, serve to relieveand thereby reduce or eliminate the risk of more, longterm, violent conflict which may otherwise be likelyoccur. It is, therefore, a subject matter of extremeand high uncertainty, particularly when the aim of ouris active intervention to prevent, mitigate orthose conflicts which appear most immediate.x In order to appreciate this complexity, one might begin byand analyzing the general phenomenon according tosubcategories in terms of these initial variables:    1. underlying causes. immediate goals of contestants. identity/number of (actual or potential) participants. means/instruments at the disposal of combatants and those actually employed a. level of intensity/cost to participants, local bystanders, society as a whole, and others further afieldb. proximity to major urban center(s/key areas of economic activity. results/impact (for both participants and others, and for the wider physical environment as well as human populations) X h  X   x Clearly, simply assembling the data regarding particularin these terms can be a daunting task. ? ! <   ? " <  Categories of Political Conflict: Actors, Arenas and Goals  x Next, with regard to the parties/contexts of conflict(whether violent or not, but here, probably the latter), we couldthe following: " t'  0*((X/h " Ԍ ԙ    Xx P 1. conflict for control of the state leading to possible orstate disintegration (also a possible result ofintervention which destroys a state structure butnot replace it);(# Xx P 2. conflict over control of the state when the state is andvery much intact;(# Xx P 3. conflict in which the state is the main protagonist, when,example, it is attempting to impose its will on society;could be a region, political class, ethnic or religious, or other entity, but the defining factor is that theitself is a party, and those occupying it are usingcoercive instruments to bolster its grip over society;(# Xx P 4. conflict between societal elements themselves with the statea neutral bystander, partisan but uninvolved observer, orbe peacemaker.(#x Any of the above conflicts could embody:. the competition for some specific resource(s), whether material or symbolic, and/or:. the expression of hatred based on communal and/or other cleavage(s) but with no material goal in mind. X h  X   They could also be planned, longterm campaigns led by a, well organized leadership, or more spontaneous andoutbursts.x Calvert has noted two broad categories of overt (andviolent) conflict: (a) revolutionary and (b) subrevolutionary, with the latter consisting of any or all of thein terms of its concrete manifestations:    Щ demonstrations and strikes riots, whether organized or spontaneous terrorismh   Its key characteristic is that whatever level of violence may(as in the US urban riots of the 1960s, and so far, in thein Northern Ireland or in the Basque region of Spain),political change lies beyond its reach (1983:16264). " ' 0*((/h " Ԍh   x Within the former, revolutionary, category, there areleading to overthrow of the ruling elite which may ornot also involve large scale socioeconomic transformation.(but not always), such transformations require greaterof violence to effect them. They can also generally beto structural contradictions in society, as between, for, feudalism and capitalism as opposing modes of, or more mundanely, between propertyowning andless classes. In such cases, they need not depend upon, ethnic, or religious differences which may arise withingiven type of economic system, and which may certainly be asin their manifestation, though leading to no suchtransformation. (And here it shoulܥe# ,l,l 5(TDS5 MS Sans Serif Symbol0Courier NewWPCA   2   B   J Z Courier #| x    2x 6X @ `7X@HP LaserJet 4 I HPLAS4.PRS 4x   @   \$q{X@    2   6   F Z [  X  #| x   Courier Courier Bold HP LaserJet 4 I HPLAS4.PRS 4x   @   \$q{X@ ? x x x , 2x 6X @ `7X@D ? x x x ,  )x   ` 7X   103  $ $ ~      ! " # T M  2$h ';' -  = K2KN _ _ ^[  ]  _  U 7;         2   ?    \\  \\\\  \\\\  \\\\  \\\\  \\\\  \\\\  \\\\  \\    T  T  T  T  ?  <     `COMING TO GRIPS WITH CONFLICT' T  P A (MAINLY AFRICANBASED) CONCEPTUAL GUIDE ? @ <   T   T  T  T  T  T  T  Lt BY T  T  T  T  ?  <     THOMAS P. WOLF  T  T    T  (X D/G ADVISOR  USAID MISSION TO KENYA T  T  T   26 SEPTEMBER, 1996 T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T   @   @ *  tL   ؃*     P                   "   # "  ? <      Purpose of the Paperh     x `Conflict' is a subject matter fraught with conceptual andchallenges, as well as with potentially tragic. Most immediately, the term's imprecision means thatutility may be severely restricted without more specificand subdefinition.x This short paper explores some concepts related to thistheme in an attempt to provide such preliminary. It also briefly summarizes several discussions inacademic literature on conflict in Africa. It does notthe causes of or possible interventionresponses tocaused by natural or other nonpolitical factors, even ifcatastrophes may, in themselves, contain conflicts of their(with whatever `politics' may be involved in such). ?  <  General Aspects of Conflict: What Does The Term Mean?x To begin with, conflict may be violent, or not. Indeed, itoften the case that nonviolent conflict, possibly involvingstakes and emotionallycharged contestants, acts as afor actual fighting. One should also remember thatforms of `violence' need not involve conflict, where theof oppression are not in a position to resist or fight. These may include political (or ordinary) prisoners, asas members of the public generally who suffer at the handsthose in possession of the state's coercive instruments. (There may be other actors involved here besides the state, of.) ? % <   x Likewise, in certain circumstances, such bloodless (or even, if somewhat bloody) conflict may take on a kind ofor even ritual character, again serving to reduce the " '  0*((/h " likelihood of more spontaneous, noninstitutionalized conflictis more likely to be violent and, when so, on a much greater.x More generally, certain forms and incidents of conflictgive rise to reconfigurations in the landscape of economicpoliticd be noted thatvery violent and well organized revolutionary efforts do notsucceed.) ?  <  A. Issuesx x Conflicts, especially those of a violent nature, inevitablybasic questions about the political community. Many couldasked, reflecting all of the various factors mentioned above. core questions about the appearance and impact of violentmight include the following:     a. When is it a result of the failure of corruption to bridge distant socioeconomic categories? Xx P b. When is it part of the transition to more genuinely ? @ <  competitive politics, or a generally less conflictual?(# Xx P (# c. When does it give rise to (or inhibit) a more active/direct political role of the military? d. When does it result primarily from foreign/international influence/pressure/involvement rather than from local forces? Xx P (# ? ' <   Xx P x P x P e. When, regardless of its origin, is it likely to acquireas well as simply national dimensions?(# " '  0*((/ " Ԍ f. When can it be expected to continue unabated barring outside intervention or mediation?. Key Variablesx In terms of wider social, political and economic impact, thedeterminants of impact would seem to include the following:. the type and abundance of weapons and other conflictusable resources at the disposal of combatants;. the proximity of the conflict area(s) to major urban center(s);. the level of disruption of economic activity/capacity of the population to feed itself/survive;. the numbers of actual/potential combatants involved;. the will of public authority (and/or the international community) to intervene so as to prevent, control or stop the conflict. ?  <  ViolenceIgniting Situations ?  <  h   x Given the many varieties of conflict, as well as thein which they occur, it is impossible to generalizewhen and where violence is most likely to erupt. Evena specific conflict category, the great number ofat work would often make prediction little more thanwork, especially because the category of `violence' itselfso many particular variations.x Nevertheless, there are certain general conditions whichtended to foster such outbreaks which might serve here asfor particular situations. Political violence, then,be said to be more likely to occur where:     Xx P (# " t'  0*((X/ " Ԍ 1. a regime or an important element of a regime feels seriously threatened (for whatever reason) and calculates that without employing force against an opposing group (either within the or outside) it may well lose power, access to some resource, or worse; Xx P 2. a section of society has sought to protect its material orintegrity without success, and concludes only throughdramatic action can it possibly bring to bear enoughto be heard;(# Xx P 3. hopes for improvement in a situation (economic or political)been dashed (for example, hopes for political mobilityeconomic gains, or hopes for the implementation ofagreed if highly contentious compromise betweengroups) leading to widescale disillusionmentfrustration;(# Xx P 4. a leading personality, hero, or symbolic representive of agroup or movement is killed, taken into custody,otherwise victimized, leading to a more spontaneousof grief and anger;(# Xx P 5. conditions are so desperate and the perceived rewards of aonslaught against those in power or controllingresources are so attractive, that violent, however uncertain of success, is worth a try;(# Xx P 6. the honor or reputation of a group or community has been soor threatened that only a violent reply is vieweda means of repairing it, regardless of the probablein winlose terms;(# Xx P 7. a stable standoff between contending groups based on someof balanceofpower is destabilized by the introductionnew resources available to one side only, or by the losssignificant resources by one side only (which couldexternal support, finances, superior or additional, and so on), making aggressive action attractive tonewlyadvantaged party.(#h   x x Undoubtedly, additional `tinderbox' contexts could be addedthis list, as could sets of circumstances leading to ? " <  particular outcomes of conflicts between contesting parties.of Conflict in Africa ? H& <  h   x Turning more specifically to conflict in Africa, Zartman has " t' 0*((X/h " identified six basic historically specific categories (1985:1216).x The first is that of decolonization power struggles, whenof violent and nonviolent means had to be taken upthe quest for independence. Notwithstanding some major(Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, etc.), the transition towas, in general, remarkably peaceful, reflecting theof focus in metropolitan domination from political tocontrol.x The second category takes in immediate postcolonial effortsnew regimes to achieve consolidation, if not complete national. These were efforts to bring to heel regional,, ideological or personal forces which resisted state. For the losers, at least their leaders, exile wasthe only survival option (1985:12).x Zartman's third category of conflict is that of "liberation" (1985:13), including such efforts as that of UNITA in, of Polisario in Morocco, and the FLNC in Zaire.x The fourth category concerns conflicts over illdefined. These examples of more formal, international strifeborders or specific (usually very small) pieces of land arein the following cases: between Burkina Faso and Niger,Ghana and Togo, Libya and Chad, and Uganda (under Amin)Tanzania.x The fifth category involves those conflicts which arise from"structural rivalries", in which certain African states, havinga certain degree of consolidation of power, attempt totheir influence outward in regional terms, and even beyond(1985:1415). Examples here are the rivalry between Morocco and, and, in less bipolar fashion, the efforts of such " '  0*((/h " states as Nigeria, Sudan, and South Africa (both pre and postapartheid). Such outward aspirations need not lead to conflicta violent nature, but do, nevertheless, engender tensionson evolving, if still nascent, differences of `national'.x Zartman's final category of conflict is that which stemsthe impact of foreign interests, specifically with regard toexpanded capacity of military forces in Africa. Writing whenwas, he linked these primarily to Cold War rivalry. Thisthe issue of whether, and on what terms, external forces(old or new) retain (or will acquire) the capacity and interestaugment such forces in the present and future.x An alternative treatment of the sources and types ofin Africa is that of Chazan et al (1992). They havethat since independence, "the focus of conflict...hasshifted from disputes over political boundaries toover political values."x Beyond this, however, they contrast five types of conflictterms of the principal organizing actors and the degree oflinkages to deeper reaches of society. These are:    Щ elite conflicts factional conflicts communal conflicts mass conflicts popular conflictsh   x x Because the authors' primary concerns are (a) the extent toparticular types of conflict threaten the integrity of theand (b) the connection between such conflict types andgeneral sets of societal characteristics related todifferentiation, ethnic pluralism, forms of political, and so on, they are not so interested in the moresituations which actually ignite violence, or in " '  0*((/h " measures which might be taken to predict, prevent, mitigate orthem. Likewise, their focus is almost entirely onrather than international factors. Given the generalof formal warfare in Africa at this latter level, suchis not misplaced. Nevertheless, there are many cases ofstate violence which do cross borders, so that this categoryviolence should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, forpurposes, the distinctions they make at the nationalare useful.. Elite Conflictsx x Elite conflicts rarely become broadly violent, even ifassassinations may occur. They also rarely threatenestablished political order, since they take place basicallythe "haves" who have a vested interest in preserving thequo. Much of this type of conflict, therefore, isrestrained, occurs out of open view, and has little linkage to either the urban poor or rural masses. It is, however, that in situations of natural or political(famines, heads of state assassinations, etc.) thesetake on broader, deeper forms, as they may also in the facegeneral economic mismanagement, especially where there is a, selfconfident business class. Generally, however, suchare highly personalized and fluid, reducing theof their escalation.. Factional Conflictsx Factional conflicts are those which, though based upon andby elites, extend outward into society as/supporters are recruited and rewarded for the basicof their patrons. Such conflicts are said to abound "inpluralist and administrativehegemonic regimes where eithersocial organizations have flourished and/or where " '  0*((/h " elaborate patronage networks have thrived" (1992:193). These aregenerally more common in those countries where partycompetition was especially intense during theto independence.x Such conflicts occur primarily over the narrow question ofto power, but in divided, plural societies, they can feedethnoregional conflict where such disparities are, and where consciousness about relative advantage andincreases. Class appeals as a basis formay also occur, but these embody some danger, sinceleaders are inevitably part of the betteroff segment of. The key point, however, is that as long as economicis taking place, there will be an adequate supply ofto feed into this type of political competition; whenbegins to shrink (or even when its per capita rate of increase) tensions, between both elite rivals and their mass may surpass the ability of existing social andstructures to contain them. In such circumstances,simple demand for access to spoils may evolve into pressuresa change of government, or (especially if such demands are) simply lead to an increase in criminal activity,more or less devoid of any specific political content.x For its part, those commanding the state apparatus mayany of the following by way of response: (1) incorporatingmost vocal opposition critics into their ranks; (2) wideningparticipation through political reform; and (3) crackingon their main protagonists. This latter option may involvemere exercise of repressive instruments, or take the moreform of a military coup which replaces the civilian. With regard to the particular type of political, relevant here is Janowitz's reminder that:  ` `     " t' 0*((X/ " ԌThe "takeover" of power by the military innations has generally followed theof efforts to create democratictype; the military has tended not tothe single massparty civilian[1970:145].  ` ` ` `      ` `  h   x Finally, it is noted that such strife often reaches its peakelection time, when "gains are assessed, scores settled,alliances reformed" (1992:195). Longer term, while theof one elite group by another may often enhancesystem stability by facilitating a rotation of access tospoils, frequent regime changes in the context of fallingof living may easily degenerate into more serious andstruggles for power.. Communal Conflictsx Communal conflicts, by their very nature, pose more dangeroverall stability by penetrating deeper into the fabric of. In this sense, they may challenge not only a ruling, but state power itself. Even if very few secessionhave developed in Africa (including Katanga in the, Biafra in Nigeria, and that of southern Sudan), and onlyhas led to the creation of a new state (Eritrea), thesemay still be of considerable threat to order, andmuch suffering and material destruction. Some of theones have been/are: Liberia, Angola, Somalia, Zimbabwe,, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda.x Two ethnic configurations have characterized most of these: (1) the existence of several large, geographicallygroups, or; (2) a dominant group and a highly cohesive,distinct minority, usually more socioeconomicallythat the former (such as the Ibo in Biafra/Nigeria, thein Zanzibar, the Tutsi in Rwanda, and so on). " '  0*((.h " Ԍx Most communal conflicts in Africa have been ethnic in, but these have often been fueled by religious differenceswell. How quickly such conflicts are subdued depends upon thecoherence of the state, especially its military, and theof regional isolation and selfsufficiency of thecommunity. External support can also play a major roleinaugurating and sustaining them, though in fact such support,it has come, has generally been directed to the existingin its effort to quell such disruptions. Due to thesensitivity of nearly all African states regardingintegrity, such antipathy towards centrifugalis not surprising (cf the OAU Charter). Only in(where Eritrea won independence) and in Angola (whereforced a negotiated settlement) did a government achievethan total defeat of the insurrection, even if those in ChadSudan continue, if sporadically. x Chazan et al cite three patterns in the course of theseconflicts: (1) escalation and eventual military(northeast Kenya in the early 1960s and Biafra; (2), vacillating conflict (Chad and Sudan); and (3) thecapture of the state by ethnicbased insurgents (Liberia,, and Somalia in 1991, before the state's collapse).x The authors likewise point to several strategies employed byregimes to prevent or mitigate such conflicts: (1) theof some form of federalism with greater or lesserof regional and/or communal administrative autonomy; (2)use of the state to foster national integration throughand indoctrination (including national language), making use of values and cultural symbols to achieve; and (3) communal balancing through some form ofrepresentation in both the main politicaland the higher reaches of the economy over which thehas some control, often referred to as "ethnic arithmetic." " '  0*((/h " Here it is noted that while "this method of dealing with ethnichas not...been particularly successful", it is also true"[i]gnoring ethnic divisions has not helped them to" (1992:202). Finally, all in all, African leaders havequite successful in containing such forces, even if theylie not too far below the surface of everyday life,where feelings of relative deprivation coincide withgeneral economic decline.. Mass Conflictsx The most striking fact regarding mass conflicts in Africa isthey have been so rare. It must be stressed here, however,the term "mass" refers not to the numbers of people involvedany particular uprising or series of violent encounters, but, to those violent eruptions which constitute conteststhose who would effect a rapid, complete and permanentof the structure of power in society, and those whoto preserve the status quo. Since structures of power areon economic relations, such conflicts are generally of acharacter (as in Ethiopia in 1974), or of an anticolonial(Angola, Mozambique, etc.). The lowerlevel wars ofliberation in Rhodesia and South Africa (and during theperiod, in Kenya), had an ingredient of such elements,due to the arrival of independence under African rule throughnegotiation, never achieved their full fruition.x Indeed, the study of conflict in Africa must grapple withreasons why examples (so far) of this type of uprising are soand far between. Here, such factors as (1) the generalin Africa's historical legacy of a dichotomy betweenaristocracies and landless peasantries directly dependentthem; (2) the multiclass character of much of the upwardlymobile population; (3) neocolonial economic relations which, bywealth, have stunted the development of national class " '  0*((/h " cleavages, especially that between capital and labor, sincerates are so high (making trade unions very weak),more highlyskilled workers are often considered as belongingthe privileged elite; (4) the relative isolation of urban,elements from rural masses; (5) ethnic, coupled with a consciousness that often tends toopportunity and misfortune in ethnoregional, ratherclass terms; and (6) the general absence of internationalwith its concomitant encouragement to nationalism, butcan undermine the credibility of a particular regime in theof military defeat, have all served to militate against theof conflicts of this type. Nevertheless, the growingbetween `haves' and `havenots' has laid the basis for anumber of eruptions, as was the case in Ghana andFaso, for example. But often such lashing out aims to(or results in) not the genuine transformation of society, butthe simple replacement of one set of opportunistic eliteby another. In general, however, `mass rumblings' ratherrevolutionizing conflicts have been the rule. Yet, lookingthe future, Chazan et al point to a hidden potential here:  ` `    ...[T]he possibility of revolutionary changebe greater in the stronger states on the(Nigeria, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire),center consolidation has taken placeclass distinctions have begun to appeara consequence of factional disputes[1992:204].h  ` `    5. Popular Conflictsx This final form of conflict differs from the previous fourone crucial way:  ` `    ...[I]t need not be directly concerned withaccess to the center (elite ordisputes) or with changing thecenter or altering its forms " t'  0*((X/ " (communal and mass conflicts) but is oftenwith creating a distance betweenformal [state] domain and individual, local communities, and specificgroups [Chazan et al, 1992:205].  h  ` `    x responses thus reflect a desire to minimize vulnerability tointerference and control, aiming to create some realmautonomy against the intruding forces of officialdom, distant, or `modernization' in general.x Such confrontations have emerged in situations where patronclient linkages have broken down, or where particular groups in, such as women, have been systematically excluded frombenefits officiallyrecognized membership in society. Such failure of state structures to incorporate is morefound among rural groups, who may suffer the intrusionstate power without sharing in its benefits, or where theof such benefits through `development' is seen tocommunity identity. Due to the lack of effective power,protest often takes the form of religious cults and otherrevivalist movements based on indigenous structures,, and beliefs. Songs, other art forms, jokes and secretand expressions may be other manifestations of thisto disengage.  x Some such activities take on a more overt politicalthan others. For example, the imposition of harsh`reforms' has, on occasion, produced a backlash ofprotest, as in Zambia during 19867, accompanied by.x Often, however, the primary outlet is economic activityis itself often of a violent nature. This is so because,its nature, such defensive, retreatist behavior is often, violating state rules if not actually threatening them. " '  0*((/h " Gangtype warfare for the control of contraband trade orcrossborder marketing opportunities (Davidson,:213), or (more usually hitsquad type) assassinations andattacks on individuals, usually related to intragroup, are all part of this more disorganized form of. So, too, is even less organized violence, where simpleand theft, not of a largescale, wellorganized basis,the motivation of individuals and small bands acting onown, rather than large groups. Given the `right', these actions can, nevertheless, take onproportions in the cumulative sense.x Due to their often peripheral, selfprotective, often`hidden' or underground nature, African states have not found itto control let alone stamp out such popular expressions. of their very nondirectly confrontational and oftennature, coopting such rejectionist groups by buyingoff their leaders is rarely feasible. Some governments,, have sought to ignore such protests as much as, admitting their inability to terminate them. Othersresorted to heightened levels of autocratic brutality,where such hostile withdrawal threatens to rob theof access to important economic resources (such as theNigerian executions of the Agoni environmentalistprotestors, fighting against the exploitation of their land bypetroleum interests).x Notwithstanding the general nonpolitical vocabulary of such, however, the implications for politics are profound. Atlevel, such popular protest:  ` `    ...has underscored disintegration andtrends in many African political. When taken together, acts ofconfrontation may reveal the outlinesa hidden deep politics in situations wherepolitical organization is not " '  0*((/ " endowed with a vision based on an integrativeof values...[Chazan et al, 1992:207]h  ` `    x Of greater interest here is the authors' observation that"the closure of exit options", as market relations expandthe state's capacity to penetrate communities increases, itunclear whether such popular protest will more concretelythe state as a target, and in doing so, whether thewill be "a rehabilitation of existing authoritarian state ? <  structures or a broader process of democratization" (Ibid).x Looking out over these various forms taken together, it isthat the causes of political conflict in Africa are, and arise in a mix of multifaceted and changing situations. country and regime type has "invited" its own varieties of, reflecting a particular set of factors. At the same, these five types must not be seen as mutually exclusive,several may exist simultaneously and even contribute toother's vibrancy. Here, case studies are called for whichjust when, and why, certain combinations, and not others,found.x Moreover, even if political instability, civilian, militarysponsored violence (if not armed), and other, notsoovertly political forms of protesteven violence have plagued much of Africa, making politicalelusive, the authors stress that such conflict need notpolitically dysfunctional, "just as fundamental politicaldoes not have to be contingent on an organized opposition(1992:208). ? # <  Conclusionx It is impossible to generalize about conflict. Certainof violence, relating to economic and natural crises, may " '  0*((.h " reach high levels of magnitude without threatening the state. , such as intraelite strife at the heart of state, may engender fundamental changes in regime type orpatterns with only minimal popular involvement.x In both developing theoretical tools to explain or evenconflicts, therefore, and going beyond academic exercisethe far more challenging task of devising strategies toor mediate them, it behooves us to strive for precisionour concepts, and language. Doing so, in turn, should help usask more thoughtfully, understand more thoroughly, and actwisely. "  0*((h " $BIBLIOGRAPHY         ?  <     Xx P Apter, David E., and Rosberg, Carl G., eds., Political ?  <  Development and the New Realism in SubSaharan Africa,, University of Virginia Press, 1994.(# Xx P Chazan, Naomi, Mortimer, Robert, Ravenhill, John, and Rothchild, ?  <  Donald, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa,, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.(# ?  <   Xx P Cohan, A. S., Theories of Revolution: An Introduction, London,Nelson and Sons, 1975.(# ? 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William, Ripe For Resolution: Conflict and ?  <  Intervention in Africa, New York, Oxford University Press,.(# m  CDEHIPV2>Erw#LX   + 7 ]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]87 C O [ g u { w + Y  I }  Z [1k#vB~2b]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]86b  4U$T,.4/mIx'zR2c4D]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8DFL"m&'9?1 h 7!p!!!"K"T"Y"v"""";#t#####$Z$_$$$$ %]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8 %/%0%q%%%%%h&&&&&)'8'}'''#(d(p((( )L)))))))))3*f***+<+Z+++ ,2,4,:,c,w,x,, -M----#.W.]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8W.i...&/U////0I0b000 1B11112e222393m333333"4'4t44444455b5556D6x666687h777788o8]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8o8889Q9999 :L::::D;E;; <B<D<<<<7=o===>M>>>>?H?z?|?????????? @P@@@@(A[AAAAAA B]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8 BUBBBC5CiCtCCCCD=DuDDDEIE}EEE-F\FpFFFF%G]GGGGG-HaHHHHILIIIIJKJJJJ&KVKKKL2LhLLL]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8LMUMMMM.NZN\NbNmNnNoNpNNNNNNO5OSO^O`OfOmOnOoOpOqOrOsOtOOOOOOOOOO(P_PPPP4QHQ\QQQRDRvRRR]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8RSMSSSS#TZTTTUUTUUUV6VmVVVWIWvWWWXOXpXXXYFYYYY.Z_ZZZZ4[e[[[\\\`\\\];]n]]]]^]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8^K^^^^/_b___`B`y```a^aaab?bbccQcccc dRdddd0ekeee f@f~fff*gdgfglgwgxgygzggggg"hIhlhwh]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8whyhhhhhhhhii iiiiiUisiiiiij@jajjjjjjjjjjj3kpkklKllll(mYmmmm6ninvnnn oSoToo]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8oopSpTpppq;qkqqqrBrlrrrsGs{sstNtttt\uquuu vvvv v!v"v2vWvwvvvvwwTwxwzwwwwwwwwxTx]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8TxxxxxyyMyyyz;zqzzz{U{[{{{{2|i||||| }I}}}}~K~z~~~)`"JO1ҁ]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]8dI{Ճ.puԄل5:y~Ɔކ>C]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]"DEDSIK@Normala "A@"Default Paragraph Font@ FMicrosoft Word 6.0 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.69q