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I. Introduction: Purpose and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Background: Conflict Stifles High Development Potential. 1

The Diola: A Long Suffering Minority. . . . . . . . . . . 2

New Signs of Hope for a Peaceful Settlement. . . . . . . . 3

End of the Guinea-Bissau Crisis Helpful. . . . . . . . . . 4

Forces Against Peace and a Daunting Rebuilding Job. . . . .5

Ethnic and Administrative Divisions Complicate Recovery.. .6

High Cost of Conflict and Importance of the Casamance. . . 8

Tiny Casamance of Huge Importance to Senegal’s Development 9

III. USAID/Senegal Country Program Strategy. . . . . . . . 10

Mission’s New Country Program Strategy (1998-2006). . . . 11

Role of Special Objective within Mission’s Strategy. . . .12

IV. Mission Strategy for the Casamance . . . . . . . . . 14

Critical Assumptions for SPO Achievement. . . . . . . . . 14

Potential Special Objective Activities. . . . . . . . . . 16

Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . .19

Mission Management of the Special Objective. . . . . . . .20

V. GOS Contributions and Other Donor Activities . . . . 21

VI. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix 1: Administrative Divisions of the Casamance

Appendix 2: Preliminary Results Framework

Appendix 3: Illustrative Activities and Performance

Indicators

Appendix 4: Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan

Appendix 5: List of Contacts

Appendix 6: List of References Consulted

This strategy paper provides the rationale for conducting on an exceptional basis USAID-funded activities in Senegal’s Casamance Region. This region has been adversely affected by 17 years of armed struggle. Security concerns obliged USAID to terminate the implementation of its regular program in parts of this region in December 1997. Recent advances toward settlement of the Casamance conflict strongly suggest that providing special assistance now is timely, needed and appropriate.

The proposed three-year, $10-million strategy is viewed as supportive of the peace process and responsive to the needs of the Casamance population. It is also viewed as laying the groundwork for a progressive transition to the implementation of USAID’s regular program in this high potential region. This approach is in accordance with the Agency’s goal of mitigating the negative impact of crisis situations and helping re-establish the conditions for political and economic development.

This strategy takes into full account USAID/Senegal’s approved Country Strategic Plan for the 1998 to 2006 period and was elaborated in consultation with a broad spectrum of government, non-government organization, donor and civil society representatives. Also, numerous secondary sources were consulted. Field visits to the Casamance Region contributed heavily to the final content of this strategy. This strategy also profited from many discussions and reviews within the U.S. Mission in Dakar.

II. Background: Conflict Stifles High Development Promise

The natural higher development potential of the Casamance Region has been thwarted by a long history of resistance to central authority. Located in the southern most part of Senegal, between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, this isolated region has experienced a different history than northern Senegal and its socio-cultural make-up varies markedly from that of northern Senegal. The Lower Casamance (basically the area around the regional capital of Ziguinchor) is the least Islamized region of Senegal with a high proportion of the population practicing some form of animism. This contrasts markedly with the high level of islamization that northern Senegal has known. The population of Senegal is reported to be 95% Muslim.

The Diola: A Long Struggling Minority

The Diola represent about 60% of the population of the Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor Region) and almost all of the rebels who have been fighting against Government of Senegal (GOS) troops since the outbreak of the conflict in late 1982. Most of these rebels are believed to come from a relatively small percentage of the 502 villages in the Ziguinchor Region. Rebel groups are organized in several fronts under their own commanders. These commanders have been known to conduct armed incursions without the knowledge and authorization of the top leaders of the rebel movement. This fragmentation of the rebel movement is making it harder to achieve peace.

Depending on their location, rebels are reported to use neighboring Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia as refuge areas and sources of arms and logistical support. The swampy nature, many water ways and heavy vegetal cover favor guerilla activity, and the porosity of the borders make the flow of people and goods across them hard to control. These conditions have helped preclude the GOS’ costly attempt to achieve a military solution.

This 17-year struggle is the most recent phase of passive and sporadic armed resistance to outside control that is more than 300 years old. Earlier phases of this protracted struggle involved resistance against Portuguese invaders and French colonial troops, who were often composed mostly of northern Senegalese recruits. There is an historical tendency on the part of the native Casamance population to resent Senegal’s northern majority, i.e. the Wolof ethnic group. And, on the other hand, there exists a traditional disdain by northern Senegalese groups for the Diola people.

These traditional ethnic stereotypes and biased perceptions have much of their basis in a classic conflict of people of very different origins. The Diola and other groups of the Ziguinchor Region are forest people with a very different universe of values and beliefs than northern Senegalese, who originate from the vast arid zones of the Sahel and the Sahara. These perceptions, and the ethnic and territorial divide they reflect, will be hard to overcome. Bringing these groups together in a peaceful manner that endures long enough to allow significant development to occur in the Casamance will be a challenge.

There are several positive signs that the current phase of this struggle may be coming to an end. For the first time since the start of the current Casamance conflict in 1982, Senegal’s president, Abdou Diouf, met on January 22, 1999 with Abbe Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, the Secretary General for many years of the rebel movement (MFDC – Movement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance), founded in 1944. Diamacoune has been under house arrest for years in Ziguinchor. Following this meeting, President Diouf, Senegal’s president since 1983, and Diamacoune called for an end to hostilities and a peaceful settlement.

This meeting was followed by private discussions between GOS officials and MFDC leaders, and between different factions within the MFDC. This process was supported by a trip in May 1999 to Ziguinchor by Senegal’s Prime Minister,Mamadou Lamine Loum, who announced an urgent assistance program for the Casamance Region in the amount of nearly $185 million over a five-year period. Just prior to this, on April 23, the Prime Minister, convened donor representatives and appealed to them to provide on an urgent basis assistance to the Casamance.

Delays in the Casamance peace process have been caused by differences among MFDC leaders and perceived lack of sincerity on the part of the GOS. Some hardline MFDC leaders want to continue to fight for an autonomous or independent status for the Casamance, while other leaders want to end this protracted conflict and work with the GOS to rebuild the Casamance. A few hardline MFDC chiefs are calling for the creation of an "Empire of Gabou" that would bring the inter-related people of Guinea-Bissau, the Casamance and The Gambia together in a single nation.

The internal MFDC talks hosted in Banjul June 21-25, 1999, by the President of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh (a Diola, born in the Casamance), have helped to resolve these differences among MFDC leaders and pave the way for peace negotiations with the GOS. The final communiqué of these talks reaffirmed Abbe Diamacoune as the MFDC Secretary General and called for him to proceed as quickly as possible with peace negotiations with the GOS. This communiqué also called for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Senegalese armed forces from the Casamance.

Discreet talks between key GOS ministers and MFDC leaders, and among top MFDC officials, continued during the month of July in Banjul. Hardline commanders of MFDC battle fronts who were not able to attend the June 21-25 talks were able during these talks to meet for the first time in several years with the MFDC Secretary General, Abbe Diamacoune. The July 24-25 segment of these talks enabled the MFDC to confirm who holds its top military command positions. This is viewed as an important step toward formal peace negotiations between the GOS and the MFDC. It is thought that the GOS is eager to complete negotiations before its February 2000 presidential elections.

The recent settlement of the conflict in neighboring Guinea-Bissau also creates better prospects for achieving peace in the Casamance. The civil war in Guinea-Bissau ended in May 1999 with the overthrow of President Nino Vieira. Both he and the new strongman of Guinea-Bissau, General Ansoumane Mane (born of a Diola mother in The Gambia), exchanged accusations about arms and drug trafficking with the Casamance. In this regard, it is worth noting that General Mane participated in the June 21-25 talks and it is reported that he may be ready to help control hardline MFDC commanders.

It is believed that General Mane wants to clear his name and, accordingly, the new regime in Guinea-Bissau will make it more difficult for Casamance rebels to operate from Guinea-Bissau territory. Moreover, it is hoped that the government of Guinea-Bissau will help settle the Casamance conflict as part of its own political reconciliation and reconstruction process. This hope was bolstered on July 20, 1999, when the roads between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal were officially re-opened.

The Gambia government has also shown an interest in a Casamance settlement. It is estimated that Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia harbor thousands of Casamance refugees. Refugees, together with the internally displaced population (IDP) of around 25,000, represent a large part of the total population (estimated at 504,000) of the Ziguinchor Region. A priority activity of any assistance strategy for the Casamance must include assisting with the return of this displaced population to their homes.

Keeping the sub-regional context in mind is important when searching for a solution to the Casamance conflict. Supporting the resolution of the Casamance conflict is an important part of bringing peace and stability to the sub-region, which includes Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Preventing dissident elements in the Casamance from solidifying connections with rebel movements in these countries is important to sub-regional stability.

Unfortunately, there are forces working against peace.

Up until June 25, 1999, sporadic armed clashes continued to be reported between hardline MFDC elements and Senegalese troops. Since this date no reports of armed clashes have been received. These armed clashes are concentrated in areas between Ziguinchor and the Guinea-Bissau border. These are also the areas where the number of mine victims is reportedly the highest. In any event, the situation on the ground appears to be calming down as the GOS and MFDC prepare to begin peace negotiations.

Some deaths and injuries continue to be reported (thousands are alleged to have been killed or injured since the inception of the conflict in 1982). There is the fear that the personal interests of some MFDC combatants and their backers and involvement in arms, drug and/or cashew nut trade will make them reluctant to lay down their arms. The lack of viable employment opportunities for many of these MFDC fighters, who have been living off armed rebellion for years, adds to this reluctance. Also, some rebels have committed atrocities in their home areas and this makes it hard for them to return home.

Disarming and rehabilitating these rebels (estimated from several hundred to a couple of thousand) back into society will need careful attention. At the same time, the safe return of refugees and IDPs from dozens of villages in the Casamance will also be important components of re-establishing conditions for economic development. These returnees will need assistance and food as the next planting season will not be until next May. (The rainy season occurs in the June-September period.)

Moving displaced populations back to their homes in some areas will be complicated by land mines, which have allegedly been placed by both sides of the conflict. Several cases of mine injuries are reported monthly at the Ziguinchor hospital. Demining these areas and assuring the displaced populations that it is safe to return to their homes and fields will, therefore, be an important assistance activity. Progressive demilitarization of the Casamance will also be important to the restoration of stability in the region.

When addressing the assistance needs of the Casamance it is important to keep in mind the socio-cultural complexity of this region. The area around Ziguinchor and west toward the Atlantic Ocean is the most ethnically diverse region in Senegal. The majority ethnic group, the Diola, is highly decentralized, with no history of central traditional authority. A traditional Diola’s life is centered around his or her village, and language dialects and customs can vary from one village to another.

In general, Diola are very individualistic and do not like to be dependent on others from outside their village area. They are sensitive to, and disturbed by, the progressive "wolofization" of their home area that has occurred over the past several decades and to the ownership of land by outsiders and the State. Past GOS actions that allowed northern Senegalese to obtain land and fishing rights in the Casamance are among the grievances of the MFDC.

Each Diola village has its own local councils which, inter alia, are in charge of community welfare and development. This strong history of local village development councils must be taken into account when designing assistance activities for this region. In this regard, the effective application in the Casamance of the GOS’ decentralization policy, which was adopted in 1996, will help with the re-establishment of peace in the region.

The GOS decision in 1984 to divide the Casamance Region into two administrative regions, Ziguinchor and Kolda has, perhaps, simplified the ethnic composition of official administrative divisions. This decision effectively made one region out of the Lower Casamance and another, much larger region out of the Middle and Upper Casamance.

In the Middle Casamance (the area around the town of Sedhiou) the Mandingo is the dominant ethnic group. The Fulani and the closely related Toucouleur ethnic groups dominate the Upper Casamance (the area around Kolda town). This 1984 decision basically separated the Lower Casamance, home of the Diola people and the rebel movement, from the more peaceful departments of the original Casamance Region (See Appendix 1 map). The MFDC states that its fight is for all of the original Casamance region.

While security conditions in some parts of the Ziguinchor Region may preclude the immediate implementation of activities, the Kolda Region readily offers an environment conducive to the conduct of activities under the Special Objective. The economy of this region has been badly affected by the conflict and many IDP’s are residing in the region. Activities in this region would be undertaken to the extent possible in close concert with selected regular program actions. These activities would, inter alia, serve as an example of what could be done in parts of the Ziguinchor Region if security conditions were improved.

It should be noted that current U.S. Embassy travel restrictions for official Mission staff cover all the Ziguinchor Region and the far western parts of the Kolda Region, beginning along a north-south line running through and including the town of Sedhiou. At present, any official road travel to the Casamance requires the clearance of the Ambassador. Flying or taking the hydrofoil boat directly to Ziguinchor town does not require the Ambassador’s clearance.

Another statistic that distinguishes the Ziguinchor Region is its school enrollment rate of over 90%. This high rate is surpassed only by Dakar, Senegal’s capital city. (Senegal’s overall enrollment rate is 58% and its literacy rate is 31%.) The high enrollment rate is attributed to the value the Diola and other groups in the Casamance attach to education, and the work over many years of Catholic missionaries. Unfortunately, around 200 schools have been damaged by warfare and need to be repaired.

The Casamance owes much of its higher development potential to its more tropical environment. It enjoys the highest rainfall level (around 1,200 mm annually) in Senegal and its many water ways and access to the sea offer rich fishing resources. The Casamance was also a major producer of rice, the major staple of the Senegalese people. (Senegal imports 50% of its food needs.)

The Casamance continues to be the center of forest product, fruit transformation and fishing industries. Most of the firewood and construction lumber used by the rest of Senegal comes from the Casamance. The Casamance is also a crossroads for trade with neighboring countries and has some of the largest traditional markets in Senegal. The Casamance was a major destination of tourists to Senegal. These rich agricultural, fishing, trading and tourism activities have been greatly diminished by the conflict.

It is estimated that the conflict has cut agricultural production by 50%. All fruit transformation industries have been closed. Many of the 16,000 employees working in the tourism industry have been dismissed. Urban services are stretched to the limit due the influx of IDPs. Health services, once among the best in Senegal, have declined considerably. In view of these dire conditions, it is not surprising that there is an upsurge in psychological trauma cases at the Ziguinchor hospital.

As the Casamance is potentially Senegal’s richest region, its economic importance to Senegal is obvious. The high economic losses to Senegal of the Casamance conflict are compounded by the cost of maintaining several thousand soldiers in the Casamance. The high cost of this GOS military presence in the Casamance consumes scarce resources that are badly needed to help address the many daunting development challenges facing Senegal. Without a peaceful and stable Casamance Region, Senegal is a much poorer country.

While the Ziguinchor Region comprises only 7,301 square kilometers, or about 3.7% of total Senegalese territory, and about 6% of the total population, its economic importance to Senegal is much larger than its size would indicate. This has become even more the case with the increasing aridity of northern Senegal. Declines in rainfall and the lower profitability of peanut production, Senegal’s third highest, after fishing and tourism, earner of foreign exchange, have added to the critical importance of the Casamance to Senegal’s overall development.

The increased dryness of the rest of Senegal has also contributed to the movement of people and their livestock toward the Casamance region. The arrival of these newcomers to the region has resulted in increased competition for scarce resources. The relatively lower rainfall levels in recent years in the Casamance have added to this problem. This competition is often cited as contributing to the conflict.

Negative environmental consequences of this increased pressure on some of Senegal’s few remaining forest areas have also been reported. The deliberate burning of the bush by military and rebel forces has also contributed to environmental degradation. Land tenure and use issues have also been sources of conflict, particularly between native Casamance people and the GOS.

In any event, Senegal’s development prospects will depend to some extent on the re-establishment of peace and stability in the Casamance. Doing this will entail a better appreciation of the concerns of the Casamance population and changing some hard attitudes and perceptions that all sides to the conflict have for one another. It will also require undertaking activities which restore hope to a conflict weary population who have long since despaired of any improvement in their situation.

Senegal has benefited more than most countries from donor

assistance since gaining its independence in 1960 from

France. The 35-year history of the USAID Mission in

Senegal makes it one of USAID’s most long-standing

development assistance efforts in the world. Yet, Senegal

remains overwhelmingly an impoverished country.

Quality of life indicators rank Senegal 158 out of 174

countries on the UNDP’s 1998 Human Development Index.

Senegal is a resource poor country with few good

development options. Its population is mainly rural,

involved with subsistence farming, and illiterate. Average annual per capita income hovers around $550. Marine fishing, tourism and peanut production are its major foreign exchange earners. Peanut production has, however, now dropped to 50% of its pre-1960 level.

As noted earlier, the primary school enrollment rate is near 58% and the literacy rate is about 31% (both these statistics are much lower for women). The infant mortality rate is 139/1,000 for children under five years old, and life expectancy is about 50 years. Maternal mortality is high, between 800 and 1,200 per 100,000 live births. The total fertility rate is also high, an average of 5.7 children per woman. The high dependency ratio is rising.

Rapid population growth (2.7% annually) and the youthful structure (one-third under the age of 10 years) of the population make it difficult to prevent further declines in these key development indicators. Already prolonged drought and population pressures have degraded substantially Senegal’s limited natural resource base. These factors support the thesis that Senegal can expect to experience social disturbances in the years ahead as its population doubles from about nine million to near 18 million in the year 2025. These somber statistics, and Senegal’s present and projected impoverished condition, increase the heavy burden posed by the Casamance conflict.

Mission’s New Country Program Strategy (1998-2006)

Beginning in 1998, the USAID Mission embarked on a new eight-year Country Program Strategy (CSP) which follows a demand-driven approach to help address Senegal’s daunting development challenges. Under this CSP, the pursuit of the USAID Mission’s goal, "Sustainable Economic Development through Broadened Social, Political and Economic Empowerment" is supported by activities that aim to achieve the following three strategic objectives (SOs).

SO1: Sustainable increase of private sector income generating activities in selected sectors.

SO2: More effective, democratic, and accountable local management of services and resources in targeted areas.

SO3: Increased and sustainable use of reproductive health services (child survival, maternal health, family planning and STI/AIDS) in the context of decentralization in targeted areas.

Implementation of this regular program in the Casamance would be of great assistance to establishing a durable peace, security conditions permitting. Already, the conduct of this regular assistance program is possible in most of the Kolda Region. The prospects for increased improvements in security in the remaining areas of the Casamance are sufficiently good that the Mission expects to be able to extend, on a progressive and selective basis, components of its regular program in the months ahead.

SO1 target zones include both the Kolda and Ziguinchor Regions. As soon as conditions permit, SO1, in addition to its regular activities, may be exploring ways to increase trade between various parts of the Casamance and to get agricultural transformation industries in the Ziguinchor Region going again. Also, some effort may be undertaken to study how the Ziguinchor port could play a more important role in terms of developing the sub-region. This could include looking at Ziguinchor’s potential as an import-export center for the sub-region.

SO2 is poised to work, as elsewhere in Senegal, in the important area of decentralization, helping, inter alia, to raise the capacity of local governing councils to fulfill their mandate. SO3 is ready to begin work in the area of maternal care. Much more can be done as soon as the prime contractors for these SOs are hired and they are free to work without restriction in all parts of the Casamance.

The Mission is currently in the process of contracting implementation agents for activities under its private sector SO1. The Request for Proposals stipulates that the Casamance be given specific attention. Similar contracting for implementation agents for the other two SOs will follow shortly. The Mission estimates that 20% (about $4 to 5 million) of its regular annual program will be devoted to activities in the Kolda and Ziguinchor Regions. Every effort will be made to ensure that activities funded under this SPO will facilitate to the extent possible the conduct of the Mission’s longer-term strategic objectives.

Role of Special Objective Within Mission Strategy

The Mission’s approved CSP notes that the Casamance Region presents an ideal implementation environment for the pursuit of all its SOs. The GOS also recognizes the high potential of the Casamance and acknowledges that realizing this potential requires more effort to implement the Decentralization Law of 1996. The elected local and regional councils are also calling for the greater autonomy offered under this law. Donor assistance will be helpful to strengthening the political will and providing the additional resources required to move fully forward with these important changes in governance mechanisms.

It is intended that the implementation of this SPO, in close collaboration with regular program assistance, will help create conditions favorable to ensuring the "will" needed to resolve what is essentially a political problem. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for peace and stability to be achieved in the Casamance without external assistance. The assistance provided under this SPO represents the U.S. contribution to the Casamance peace and rehabilitation process.

It is important that USAID not neglect at this critical juncture peace and rehabilitation needs of the Casamance region. USAID’s contribution at this time is not only critical to the people of the Casamance but is also important in terms of maintaining stability in the sub-region and in Senegal, the most important francophone partner in sub-Saharan Africa for the U.S. This SPO represents, therefore, for a variety of reasons, a good investment of USAID resources.

The successful culmination of this interim Casamance Recovery Program is required not only to open the way for the renewal of development progress in the Casamance, but is essential for the achievement of Senegal’s overall development potential. As stated in the foreword of the Mission’s CSP, Senegal is at an economic, political and social crossroads. An essential part of making it through this crossroads is resolving the Casamance conflict.

It will be difficult to consider Senegal’s development prospects as good as long as the Casamance conflict simmers. This is especially the case in view of the relative higher potential of the Casamance. This SPO calls attention to the Casamance crisis and attempts to obtain the additional resources needed to respond appropriately and supplement those resources being provided for the implementation of the Mission’s CSP. This is in accordance with the high priority the U.S. government places on conflict resolution in Africa and is responsive to USAID’s planned regional strategy for West Africa.

IV. Mission Strategy for the Casamance

The Mission’s objective for this Casamance Recovery Program Strategy is: "The Re-Establishment of Conditions for Economic and Political Development in the Casamance." To achieve this SPO, the Mission envisions undertaking activities under three key intermediate result areas. These areas are:

· Increased Economic Activity

· Increased Local Capacity

· Reconciliation and Peace Sustained

These key intermediate results and the kind of sub-results that would contribute to their achievement are depicted graphically in the preliminary results framework presented in Appendix 2. Accompanying this framework in Appendix 3 is a presentation of illustrative activities and performance indicators. These two appendices represent the current conceptual underpinnings of this SPO strategy.

Critical Assumptions for SPO Achievement

There are a number of critical assumptions with regards to achieving SPO results. Important among these are:

· Strong GOS and MFDC commitment to negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict will continue.

· Under current security conditions, USAID and others can now implement important assistance activities that enhance the prospects for peace.

· Other countries in the sub-region, notably Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia will play a supportive role in terms of helping with the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Casamance.

· The return of the vast majority of rebels to their homes will be welcomed by their respective communities.

It is expected that the full implementation of this SPO will benefit directly about 200 villages in the Casamance with nearly 120,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the regional capital of Ziguinchor with an estimated 200,000 residents should also benefit greatly from the activities undertaken to achieve stated SPO results. Overall, the entire population of the Ziguinchor and Kolda Regions, estimated at nearly 1.1 million, will be positively affected by the achievement of SPO results.

The implementation of this SPO will require maintaining a large degree of flexibility in order to respond in a timely manner to assistance needs as they arise. Management and security factors also oblige adopting an implementation strategy for providing assistance to the Casamance that depends upon NGOs and contractors for its execution. While the process followed to elaborate this strategy revealed a number of activity areas where USAID assistance would be helpful, other opportunities for a more effective use of USAID resources may be identified as a peaceful political settlement is pursued.

It is important to note that among the principal complaints of the people of the Casamance is the assertion that not enough development resources are provided to the Casamance and that they do not have enough say over the use of the resources that are provided. These grievances underscore the importance of involving grass-roots organizations in the programming of funds provided to implement this SPO. This involvement means that the exact nature of the assistance provided under this SPO is likely to shift some (but not a lot) during the life of the program. Such shifts in program content may be required so that the people of the Casamance are genuinely the "owners" of activities receiving funding under this SPO.

Currently, the Mission has identified in collaboration with representatives of various organizations in the Casamance a number of activities where USAID assistance would be highly useful. These activities reflect what the people and their representatives in the Casamance have expressed as their assistance needs. An illustrative list of these activities, and the estimated funding levels (FY 1999-2001) associated with each, follows. While it is hard to place a an absolute value in terms of impact on any of these activities, an attempt was made to list these activities in a relative order of priority.

Obviously, the exact number of these activities, and the extent to which each is undertaken, are subject to the availability of funds and the specific requests received from prospective implementation agents. Under current security conditions, all these activities can be implemented. Only the very unlikely outbreak of significant, widespread and prolonged clashes between the GOS army and MFDC rebels would interfere with the implementation of most of these activities.

Potential Special Objective Activities

Activity Amount

Refugee/IDP Return Assistance $1,000,000

Ex Rebel Reinsertion/Vocational Training 500,000

Peace and Reconciliation Talks 300,000

Local Conflict Resolution/Civil Society 650,000

Saltwater Incursion Prevention 2,500,000

Sesame & Other Cash Crop Production 750,000

Grants/Capacity Building for Local NGOs 750,000

Credit and Savings/Micro Lending 750,000

Micro-Projects 1,000,000

Demining Activities & War Victims Care 1,000,000

Evaluations and Audits 200,000

SPO Management 600,000

Total: $10,000,000

It is expected that U.S. NGOs will implement most of these activities under cooperative agreement arrangements that respond to unsolicited proposals. If appropriate, the implementation of some activities may require utilizing pertinent Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs). One of these IQCs might be the new Integrated Water and Coastal Resources Management IQC. It is thought that demining activities will require contracting with organizations specialized in this area. Also, organizations specialized in conflict mediation and resolution may be required for some peace and reconciliation components.

Although the agents USAID will select to implement these activities or others will depend on the outcome of appropriate assistance and procurement procedures, a number of U.S. NGOs have expressed an interest in assisting USAID with the implementation of this SPO. Important among these is Catholic Relief Services (CRS). CRS is already working in the Kolda Region and wishes to extend its operations and start new activities in the Ziguinchor Region. CRS has already carried extensive discussion with local NGOS and other groups in the Ziguinchor Region and its proposal is in an advanced stage of preparation.

The activities CRS would like to implement include strengthening local NGOs, the provision of credit and savings services to micro-entrepreneurs, and the introduction of the production of sesame as a new cash crop. Providing credit services may involve collaborating with the existing lending activities of ACEP – Alliance pour le Credit, Entreprise et la Production. This would be allied closely to the Mission’s SO1.

CRS is already working with groups in the Sedhiou area of the Kolda Region (Middle Casamance) to produce sesame. The sesame production activity will be based on the success already enjoyed by a similar CRS activity in The Gambia. CRS also plans to extend this activity to Guinea-Bissau. The production of other cash crops will also be explored.

Another important activity CRS would like to undertake is working with members of civil society to achieve peaceful reconciliation of their differences. CRS would like to undertake a number of workshops and meetings that promote dialogue and increased collaboration among divergent groups. CRS also wants to find ways of reinforcing indigenous mechanisms for conflict management and information campaigns that help promote a better understanding and maintain peace.

This CRS activity would also look for ways to reinforce the decentralization process as a means of achieving greater local control over resources. CRS intends on calling upon the services of suitable specialists to help achieve this component of its proposal. An important part of this exercise for CRS and other implementation agents will be taking into account land tenure issues and the management of natural resources. The latter will need to be concerned with the management of forest areas, which have local religious significance as well as economic and ecological importance. It is expected that some proposals received by the Mission will address these environmental concerns.

CRS also proposes to manage a self-help fund for small construction projects that will allow communities to rebuild or repair schools, feeder roads, market places, health dispensaries and other public works. It believes this will help put people back to work while giving visible signs of the benefits of peace. CRS also wants to explore activities that help former rebels rejoin society as productive citizens. This would be coordinated with efforts to assist refugees and IDPs return home.

Other U.S. NGOs have expressed an interest in picking up the implementation of an USAID project that was stopped in December 1997 because of security concerns. This project, The Southern Zone Water Management Project (SZWM, Project No. 685-0295) involves engaging community labor to build polder dikes that prevent the incursion of salt water into aquatic rice fields. (Saltwater incursion is one of the important development limitations in the Casamance.) The original project envisioned the recovery of 15,000 hectares by building dikes in 60 valley areas. When the project was stopped, 22 valleys had been worked, recovering some 10,000 hectares for cultivation.

This important activity will not only help increase agricultural production and improve food security, but will also provide jobs for hundreds of people. The engineering plans from the valleys not yet worked have already been prepared. It is estimated it would cost around $2,500,000 to complete all the work on the remaining 38 valleys. If this amount of funding is not available, a lesser amount would be useful in doing a number of priority valleys. The Senegalese team which worked on the SZWM project is still in place in Zuiguinchor and is prepared to re-commence work as soon as funding becomes available.

World Vision is already implementing a small business lending and support activity in the Kolda Region and is interested in extending this activity, and perhaps others, to the Ziguinchor Region. Other U.S. NGOS active in Senegal which may possibly have an interest in conducting activities under this SPO strategy are: AFRICARE, Appropriate Technology International, Christian Children’s Fund, National Council of Negro Women, Plan International and Rodale International. While OXFAM is not seeking USAID funding, its representative in Senegal welcomes this strategy as being supportive of OXFAM’s three-year activity to promote peace and reconciliation in the Casamance.

In addition to the activities that might be implemented by these NGOs, funds for demining activities are needed. As noted above, it is expected that a specialized contractor would be engaged, in coordination with the GOS and other donors, to conduct this activity. Handicap International in Ziguinchor has already undertaken a demining study and is compiling a list of the locations where mine victims were killed or injured. Consideration will also be given to a request from USAID’s War Victim’s Program to help those who have been injured by mines.

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) will be consulted with regards to the implementation of demining activities as well as other conflict resolution matters. The use of funds available to the Department of State for demining will also be explored. This activity may, therefore, be the object of a separate funding mechanism.

Performance Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation requirements for each grantee and/or contractor will be clearly defined in their scopes of work. This will include a definition of agreed upon results indicators and the requirements for reporting on them and other activity progress factors. To the extent

possible, these results tracking and reporting requirements will be made to coincide with activity performance systems already in place in the Mission. Overall, the Mission will adopt a flexible approach that takes into account changing security circumstances and which can be adjusted as good opportunities present themselves.

The achievement of this Casamance Recovery SPO will naturally mean that the Mission will be able to resume it regular assistance program in the Casamance. This strategy will reach its end point once the regular program is resumed and the special post-conflict needs of the region are sufficiently met.

All implementation agents selected will be responsible for measuring progress toward the achievement of agreed upon results indicators. The definition of indicators and their units of measure will take into account the problem of obtaining reliable data and baseline information in a conflict zone. The information generated by implementation agents will be used to refine and fully develop a Results Framework and Performance Monitoring Plan for this SPO. At this stage, the Mission has elaborated a preliminary performance plan. This plan is presented in Appendix 4.

Mission Management of the Special Objective

The management of this SPO will not require any additional operational expense funds. The Mission will engage a long-term, program-funded USPSC for the management and coordination of all activities conducted under this strategy. The USPSC will be Dakar-based, so he/she can handle liaison with GOS and partners, but will spend a significant portion of his/her time in the Casamance. The Mission also plans to hire a local Senegalese SPO management assistant who will be based in Ziguinchor.

A job description for the recruitment of this coordinator has already been prepared (See appendix 7). Up to $600,000 in funds allotted to this SPO will be used to support SPO management costs. Every attempt will be made to expedite SPO implementation by bringing the USPSC SPO coordinator and his/her assistant on board as soon as possible.

Staffing constraints within the Mission and the special nature and demands of this strategy require the hiring of a qualified professional for this position. In addition to overseeing the implementation of activities funded under this strategy, this USPSC coordinator will work closely with SO Team Leaders to ensure that these SPO activities are well coordinated with the Mission’s regular program assistance activities.

The main tasks of the SPO coordinator include following closely the activities of NGOs, international and local, selected to implement the SPO strategy and to be able to engage quickly specialized assistance as needed through IQCs or other procurement mechanisms. Maintaining close relationships with concerned NGOs and being knowledgeable of sources for needed technical assistance will be key functions of this position. The SPO coordinator will have the lead responsibility for processing unsolicited proposals and for preparing statements of work for the engagement of all services required to implement the SPO. Care will be exercised to keep the number of management units to an essential minimum.

Importantly, the SPO coordinator will also work closely on an ongoing basis with the SPO coordination group in Dakar and the elected Regional Councils for Development in Ziguinchor and Kolda, as well as Rural Councils in targeted areas. At this point, it is expected that the SPO coordination group will be composed of representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture and Decentralization, as well as representatives from NGOs (local and international) concerned by SPO implementation.

Making sure that the activities implemented under this SPO are addressing the priority needs of the Casamance people and that their representatives are involved in the formulation of these activities, are also among the main oversight functions of this position. This will require maintaining close contact with many of the 20 or so local NGOs in the Casamance, religious leaders and the very active and strong village development associations, which involve not only the population living in the village but

members of the village who live elsewhere in Senegal or abroad. Involving the representatives of these various local organizations will, inter alia, be especially important to the peace and reconciliation process.

Among those local NGOs with which relationships should be established are: AJAC – Association de Jeunesses Agricoles de Casamance, CADEF – Comite des Actions de Developpement Fobny, and GPF – Groupement de Promotion Feminine. The actual preparation of activity proposals will require consultation with many of these groups and their collective associations, e.g. CONGAD – Collectif des ONG d’Appui au Developpement and FONGS – Federation des ONG au Senegal. Also of critical importance will be the regional and local development councils that have been elected in recent years in accordance with the Decentralization Law of 1996.

Some donors have remained active in the Casamance Region. But, the unpredictability of rebel and Senegalese military actions has frustrated and delayed the implementation of many of their activities. Since March 1998 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) have co-chaired a donor coordination committee that is convened occasionally by the Prime Minister’s Office.

As USAID has not been active in the Casamance since December 1997, it has not participated on this committee. USAID will become an active member of this committee if and when funds are made available under this strategy. Importantly, a donor coordination committee is also being established under the auspices of the Governor’s office in Ziguinchor and/or under the elected President’s Office of the Regional Development Council (CRD).

While the summary of donor assistance described below may seem substantial, it should be kept in mind that much of donor funding made available for the Casamance covers many years and much of its use has been blocked by uncertain security conditions. It is thought that implementation by USAID of this SPO will encourage other donors to come forth with funds they have for the Casamance and help generate additional donor funding. For example, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has indicated that it will resume assistance activities in the Casamance when and if USAID begins work in the Casamance.

As noted previously, in May 1999, the Prime Minister announced a $185 million program of assistance to the Casamance over the next five years. This ambitious GOS program includes mostly costly infrastructure projects. These include roads, bridges, and a port for Ziguinchor, airport rehabilitation, etc. Some of these projects reflect plans already made by some donors, especially the EU and its member countries. The funding of this program will be heavily dependent on donors and progress made in GOS-MFDC peace negotiations.

One much needed project included under the GOS program, but not yet considered by any donor, is a bridge over the Gambia River (in The Gambia) on the major road from Dakar to Ziguinchor. The major stumbling block to building this important bridge is the continued rejection on the part of the government of The Gambia of GOS offers to construct this bridge and the roads leading to it. As the physical isolation of the Casamance from the rest of Senegal is a major development constraint and contributes to the conflict, building a bridge over the Gambia River and improving the very poor state of the roads in The Gambia are of high importance.

The EU is by far the largest donor funding activities in the Casamance. It has never stopped its regular assistance program in the Casamance and its humanitarian assistance branch, ECHO, has also been active. Also, in addition to its current long list of activities, the EU is planning to start a special assistance program for later in the year. Ongoing EU activities in the Casamance include agriculture, forestry, livestock, health, sanitation, road construction, micro enterprise development, IDP assistance and the training of women. Overall, the total amount budgeted over the past five years for EU activities in the Casamance is about $33 million ($20 million of this is for road works).

Currently, the new and additional activities being planned by the EU for the Casamance include health sector support project ($3 million), phase II of its road rehabilitation project ($22 million), local fishing capacity ($8 million) and support for two professional training centers ($700,000). The EU implements all its work in close collaboration with local development councils. Local Senegalese contractors, European NGOs and local NGOS conduct much of its work in the Casamance.

Most important in the latter case is CARITAS, which is in charge of a EU funding effort for the rehabilitation of some 200 school classrooms. CARITAS is also working with displaced persons and has a program for the social reinsertion of former rebels. CARITAS has been active in the Casamance since 1954 and its ability to use its established Catholic church network in the Casamance has been effectively used by a number of assistance agencies.

Many of the EU member countries are also active in the Casamance on a bilateral basis. These include Germany, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium. France is the most important of these donor nations, having supported some 28 projects in all sectors costing an approximate budget total of $27 million over the past five years. France is currently planning to fund over the coming year $17 million of activities, including $10 million for road improvement work. The execution of some of these activities in the Ziguinchor Region is about two years behind schedule as poor security conditions have prohibited design and evaluation teams from carrying out their tasks as scheduled.

Germany has provided since 1991 about $16 million to help farmer organizations in a variety of activities. Italy has over the last couple of years funded rural development and health activities costing altogether up to $7 million. Belgium has invested about $4 million since 1996 in horticulture, health and agricultural activities. Austria has contributed $2 million since 1996 for various health and education actions. The United Kingdom is planning to begin providing this year up to $15 million for the conduct of activities over the 1999-2001 period in the agriculture, health and livestock sectors.

While the UNDP is active in donor coordination in the Casamance, it does not yet have any funding for specific activities. The World Food Program (WFP) does not have any special program for the Casamance but uses food commodities from its regular program to support school feeding and food-for-work activities conducted by CARITAS and UNICEF. UNICEF has recently become very active in the Casamance and it based an expatriate employee in Ziguinchor in early June 1999. UNICEF has $1.3 million for 1999 to work in the areas of labor intensive activities and school feeding and rehabilitation.

The World Bank does not have any specific activities for the Casamance and intends that this region benefit from its regular bilateral program. The Red Cross, Handicap International and the Italian NGO COPI have some activities in the Casamance. Taiwan has provided assistance for fish and rice cultivation activities. There has also been some limited involvement by Norwegian and Swedish assistance agencies in the Casamance.

The GOS and the other donors most active in the Casamance are eager to have USAID join with them in rehabilitating the region and creating the conditions needed to allow the full resumption of regular assistance activities. Their high interest in USAID’s participation is only partially due to the additional resources USAID will provide. Some donors and GOS officials would also like USAID’s participation so the U.S. will be in a better position to lend its weight to resolving the Casamance conflict. USAID’s involvement in this rehabilitation effort will therefore be more important than reflected by the amount of funds it provides.

The Casamance conflict represents an important constraint to Senegal’s overall development. As long as this conflict persists, Senegal will be unable to benefit from the high natural potential of this region and will continue to expend a disproportionate share of its national budget for military operations in the Casamance. Also, a continuance of the conflict creates conditions that favor increased banditry, marijuana production and arms/drug trafficking. Furthermore, without a cessation in hostilities, the loss of life and property will continue to mount, making eventual rehabilitation efforts even more difficult. The sooner the Casamance conflict can be brought to a halt, the better it will be for all concerned.

Many factors indicate that the time is ripe for USAID to join with the GOS and other donors to put in place assistance activities that support the peace process while coming to the aid of a long-suffering population. The positive conclusion of the June 21-25, 1999, MFDC talks in Banjul has opened the way for serious peace negotiations between the MFDC and the GOS. This hallmark event also represents a signal to donors that the time for the unfettered implementation of assistance activities in the Casamance may be near at hand.

The quicker donors can respond to this changed situation the better the chances for peace will be. It is recommended that USAID be among the first of donors that recognize the importance of this new opportunity and come forth with resources that help Senegal become a peaceful whole again. The approval of this SPO would follow well the May 31 to June 2 visit of Vivian Derryck, USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa, to Senegal. During this visit Ms. Derryck was able to travel to Ziguinchor to meet with Abbe Diamacoune and had an audience with President Abdou Diouf in Dakar. It is important to note that the main concern that President Diouf raised with Ms. Derryck was supporting the Casamance peace process.

USAID’s decision to approve this SPO and provide support for activities in the Casamance will likely encourage other donors to do the same. With USAID/Washington’s approval of this SPO for the Casamance Recovery Program and the prompt allocation of funds for its implementation, USAID/Senegal is prepared to move quickly forward in a flexible, but effective manner.

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: Vivian Lowery Derryck, AA/AFR

FROM: Harry M. Lightfoot, Director, AFR/WA

SUBJECT: Approval of USAID/Senegal’s Special Objective:

Casamance Recovery Program

Your approval is requested for a new Special Objective (SpO) for a Casamance Recovery Program. This SpO will be added to the Mission’s existing Country Strategic Plan and, as such, represents a change in the Mission’s Management Contract.

AFR/DP chaired a meeting to review the Casamance Recovery Program, a newly proposed Special Objective for the USAID Senegal Country Strategic Plan (CSP). The Director of AFR/DP chaired the meeting which included participation by the U.S. Ambassador Designate to Senegal, the DAA/AFR, the Senior Advisor to the AA/AFR for Conflict Prevention, the Director of AFR/WA, the Program Officer from USAID/Senegal, and representatives from BHR/OFDA,PPC/PC,BHR/OTI, G/WID, AFR/WA, AFR/DP/POSE, and AFR/DP/PFP.

The Chair opened the meeting noting that the proposal was clear and understandable. The Director of AFR/WA expressed excitement over the proposal. He noted that, though this was not the first conflict resolution initiative in West Africa, it was important not only to Senegal, but to the region. The Senior Advisor to the AA/AFR noted the Casamance proposal was the best they had seen yet, especially because it was a combined effort by several U.S. Government entities.

The Program Officer from Senegal presented the Program as summarized below.

A major constraint to Senegal’s development is the protracted armed struggle in its southern most Casamance Region, located between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Seventeen years of fighting between Government of Senegal (GOS) soldiers and the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) rebels have adversely affected the people and economy of this high potential region. The conflict has been a heavy drain on the GOS’s national budget.

This year there have been signs that this conflict may be coming to an end. The Mission considers it timely to prepare a special objective for the Casamance region that responds to the critical needs of the population as well as being supportive of the peace process. This SpO is also viewed as critical to laying the groundwork for the progressive resumption of the Mission’s regular development program in the Casamance Region. Mission efforts in the Casamance were terminated in December 1997 when security concerns prompted the Department of State to apply travel restrictions to the Casamance.

On January 23, 1999, Senegal’s President Abdou Diouf met for the first time with the Secretary General of the MFDC, Abbe

Augustin Diamacoune. Following their meeting, both of these men called for peace. On April 23, Senegal’s Prime Minister, Mamadou Lamine Loum, convened donors in Dakar to appeal for assistance to resolve the Casamance conflict and enhance economic development there. On May 14, during a subsequent trip to the Casamance, he announced a special GOS assistance program for the Casamance. These positive events were reinforced with internal talks among MFDC leaders in Banjul in June and July hosted by the President of The Gambia. These talks have helped pave the way for peace negotiations between the GOS and the MFDC.

The SpO conforms to the Agency’s goal of mitigating the negative impact of crisis situations and fits well with the Africa Bureau’s plan to prepare a Regional Strategy for West Africa that places a high priority on resolving crises. Surely this three-year, $10-million SpO is both timely and appropriate from a number of perspectives.

The Mission’s objective for this Casamance Recovery Program Strategy is: "The Re-Establishment of Conditions for Economic and Political Development in the Casamance."

To achieve this SPO, the Mission envisions undertaking activities under three key intermediate result areas. These areas are:

· Increased Economic Activity

· Increased Local Capacity

· Reconciliation and Peace Sustained

U.S. and local NGOs and selected contractors will conduct activities funded by this SpO. The Mission will engage a USPSC and a local program assistant for the overall coordination and management of the SpO. The SpO coordinator and participating implementation agents will work closely with concerned ministries and local development councils in the region. The U.S. Mission in Senegal will establish appropriate evaluation and performance monitoring systems. Illustrative performance indicators, a preliminary results framework and performance monitoring plan have already been prepared for this SpO by the Mission.

The DAA/AFR raised the following important questions: Why did USAID believe it could succeed in bringing peace to the area? How could USAID prove it had succeeded? And why not let other donors who were already in place do the work?

The answers to these questions were all linked to the diplomatic importance of the U.S. in Senegal and in West Africa in general. The French who have made good faith attempts at brokering peace in the Casamance carry too much baggage…colonialism, language promotion, closeness to the current GOS, etc. Multilaterals like the European Union find it hard to get involved in politically sensitive issues. Although other bilaterals like Sweden or Germany can be viable negotiators, as in many places throughout the World the U.S. presence at the negotiating table as facilitator or arbitrator is given a lot more weight than simply the dollar amount we contribute to a solution.

The Casamance conflict is such a case. We know our presence in Casamance will leverage other needed funds. We also know our political standing in Senegal makes us a non-threatening facilitator for both sides, bringing to bear reconciliation skills not currently available. The preliminary monitoring and evaluation plan shows how we will measure our success which we expect will be considerable. These measures can be further refined at the beginning of implementation.

The following issues were discussed:

Issue 1: Though we realize funds have been made available in FY 1999, can the OYB be increased over the next two years to accommodate this SpO? (AFR/WA)

Discussion: The USAID/Senegal OYB from 1998 through 2001 is budgeted right now at 11.5 million less than what was approved in the CSP. Though the program has made do with less during start-up of the existing strategy, considerable changes to the strategy will have to be considered if the amounts agreed upon are not forthcoming within the next few years. Though this SpO will be useful even if we have to scramble for funding each year, optimal benefit from the program and the best chance of succeeding in resolution of this conflict will only come to be if USAID can be assured that the requested funding will be available over the three years of the activity.

AFR/DP explained the dramatic situation of the tight budget for FY 2000 and 2001. They suggested we seek other sources of funding, such as ESF. The DAA/AFR understood the difficulty, and agreed that every possible source of supplementary resources should be investigated, but noted that this program, with its regional impact, should be a priority for the Africa Bureau. The USAID/Senegal representative agreed to follow up on availability of funds from other sources.

Recommendation: That the proposed $10 million SpO budget be approved as is, subject to the availability of funds, but that USAID/Senegal seek as many other funding sources as possible to fulfill CSP management contract increase from $23.4 Million to $26.9 Million for FY 2000 and FY 2001. AFR/DP will do their best to reduce shortfalls.

Issue 2: Gender issues are not clearly addressed in the papers. Shouldn’t this be clarified at least during activity implementation? (AFR/DP)

Discussion: Though we recognize that several women’s activities are planned, e.g. the sesame seed program, we found no mention of gender, except for the disaggregation of data mentioned in the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan. There will surely be special concerns/opportunities for women during the Casamance reconciliation process. The SpO should attempt to address them. The Global Bureau’s WID tech contract is a tool by which this problem can be further addressed as the activity starts-up. There are funds available in the WID tech CORE contract to provide required complementary WID services.

Recommendation: Recommend taking advantage of the Global Bureau’s WID tech opportunity.

Issue 3: Is there a duplication of Results Frameworks given the similarities between USAID/Senegal's SO1 and SO2 and the proposed SPO's KIR1 and KIR2? (AFR/DP)

Discussion: The proposed SPO has three Key Intermediate Results, only one of which, KIR3, "Reconciliation and Peace Sustained" represents an area not covered by the Mission's existing Strategic Plan. The other two KIRs "Increased Economic Activity and Increased Local Capacity" are quite similar to SO1 "Sustainable increase of private sector income generating activities in selected sectors" and SO2 "More effective, democratic and accountable local management of services and resources in targeted areas". What is the rationale for restating these objectives at the KIR level, rather than focusing the SpO on peace and conflict resolution and utilizing existing SOs to increase economic activity and local capacity?

The response to this issue is political as well as programmatic. The Prime Minister asked for a "special" effort by donors to provide additional assistance to the Casamance. Increasing the existing SOs provides additional funds, but does not meet the need for a special effort that is readily identifiable as being for the Casamance. The mechanism for working with the existing SOs is also more time consuming and less flexible than the NGO mechanism proposed in the SpO. One participant noted that the separate SpO would make is easier to lobby for funding from different sources. The State Department representative noted that the political aspect of having a separate SpO should not be underestimated. It would pay both psychological and publicity dividends.

Recommendation: That the SpO be approved as is.

OVERALL RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you approve this Casamance Recovery Program Special Objective for USAID/Senegal thereby making this Action Memo an addendum to the USAID/Senegal Management Contract increasing the annual contract amount, subject to availability of funds, from $23.4 million to $26.4 million for FY 1999 and from $23.4 million to $26.9 million for FY 2000 and

FY 2001.

Approve:_______________________

Disapprove:_______________________

Date:________________________

Attachment:

1. Casamance Recovery Program Strategy, Special Objective

Drafted by:AFR/WA:GThompson:08/31/1999:

o:\wapub\senegal\docs\casa actmemo3.doc

AFR/WA:DAtteberry, (draft) Date 8/20/99__

USAID/Senegal/RLA:NFreeman Date _

G:LDobbins, (draft) Date 8/19/99_

BHR/PPE:LLynch (info) Date ___

M/B:SMalinowski (info) Date ___

M/B:JRudasill (draft) Date 8/31/99__

PPC/PC:JO’Rourke (draft) Date 8/31/99__

AFR/AM:BBurroughs (info) Date ___

AFR/SD:JWolgin (draft) Date 8/23/99__

AFR/DP:JSmith Date ___

DAA/AFR:VDickson-Horton Date ___

Appendix 1

· Value of crops exported

· Increase in farmer incomes

Activity: Micro-projects for rebuilding village infrastructure

and Creating Jobs

· Amount of money provided in salaries

· Number of people benefiting

Activity: Saltwater intrusion prevention dikes for increasing

rice production

Indicators: · Number of hectares recuperated for agricultural

production

· Increase in rice production

· Number of farm families working land recovered

Activity: Assisting refugees and IDPs return home

Indicators: · Number of refugees and IDPs assisted

· Percentage of refugees and IDPs able to re-

settle in their villages

· Percentage reduction in amount of aid to these

population groups

Indicators: · Number of NGOs assisted

· Number of NGO staff trained

· Number of NGOs with approved accounting systems

· Percentage of NGOs that achieve their stated

work plan objectives

Activity: Training and social reinsertion of former rebels

· Number of former rebels receiving training

· Number of former rebels with gainful employment

· Number of former rebels returned to villages

Activity: Detecting and removing mines

Indicators: · Number of mines detected and removed

· Number of villages and farms re-occupied

· Number of mine victims assisted

about the danger and possible location of mines

Indicators: · Number of workshops/meetings of civil society

· Diversity of participants in peace and

reconciliation process

· Instances of demonstrated increased capacity to

resolve locally disputes

and population having access to them

Activity: Peace and reconciliation talks between GOS and MFDC

leaders

Indicators: · Number of talks supported

· Contribution of talks to the peace process

· Status level and diversity of participants

· Number of agreements signed by opposing parties

One important measure of achievement will be the resumption of USAID’s regular assistance program in all parts of the Casamance. The ability to implement fully the Mission three SOs in the Casamance will mark the exit from this SPO strategy. Full implementation of the Mission’s regular program will denote that peace and stability have returned to the Casamance region. The progressive and systematic implementation of the regular program will play an important role in sustaining peaceful conditions in the Casamance by improving the economic and social prospects of the regions’s inhabitants. Sustained economic prosperity and the decentralization of the governmental authorities are important to ensuring that peace endures in the Casamance.