ࡱ> .0+,-q &Ibjbjt+t+ &:AA.=H #] $P|`Gph5vpޥ$ %G'G'G'G'G'G'G$RHFJlKG0,F5"KGr " h~"rrr. ZR%Gl^l lj l%GrrV/h"%Gr X վD.E  Staying Engaged Program Strategy for USAID in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Table of Contents  TOC \o "1-3" I. Executive Summary  PAGEREF _Toc457313768 \h 5 A. Background and U.S. Interests  PAGEREF _Toc457313769 \h 5 B. The Proposed USAID Program  PAGEREF _Toc457313770 \h 5 Health, Population and Infection Diseases  PAGEREF _Toc457313771 \h 5 Democracy and Governance  PAGEREF _Toc457313772 \h 6 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity  PAGEREF _Toc457313773 \h 6 Program Management  PAGEREF _Toc457313774 \h 6 II. Context  PAGEREF _Toc457313775 \h 7 A. Introduction  PAGEREF _Toc457313776 \h 7 Opportunities  PAGEREF _Toc457313777 \h 8 Constraints  PAGEREF _Toc457313778 \h 9 Programmatic Conclusions  PAGEREF _Toc457313779 \h 10 B. Principles of Engagement  PAGEREF _Toc457313780 \h 10 Positive Engagement  PAGEREF _Toc457313781 \h 10 Broad Participation  PAGEREF _Toc457313782 \h 10 Community Mobilization  PAGEREF _Toc457313783 \h 11 Strategic Linkages across Sectors and Programs.  PAGEREF _Toc457313784 \h 11 Flexibility  PAGEREF _Toc457313785 \h 11 Improving US-Congo Relations  PAGEREF _Toc457313786 \h 11 III. USAID Congos Strategic Plan (12-18 Months)  PAGEREF _Toc457313787 \h 12 A. Scenarios  PAGEREF _Toc457313788 \h 12 Scenario A: Status Quo  PAGEREF _Toc457313789 \h 12 Scenario B: Hard-Won Stabilizing Negotiations  PAGEREF _Toc457313790 \h 12 Scenario C: Sudden Stabilizing Negotiations  PAGEREF _Toc457313791 \h 12 Scenario D: Accelerated Disintegration  PAGEREF _Toc457313792 \h 13 B. Program  PAGEREF _Toc457313793 \h 13 Figure 1: USAID/Congo Program Framework  PAGEREF _Toc457313794 \h 14 Health Sector (IR1)  PAGEREF _Toc457313795 \h 15 Democracy and Governance Sector (IR2)  PAGEREF _Toc457313796 \h 17 Natural Resource and Environmental Management (IR3)  PAGEREF _Toc457313797 \h 20 Economic Growth Sector  PAGEREF _Toc457313798 \h 22 Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)  PAGEREF _Toc457313799 \h 23 IV. Management and Resources  PAGEREF _Toc457313800 \h 25 A. Context  PAGEREF _Toc457313801 \h 25 B. Staffing  PAGEREF _Toc457313802 \h 25 USAID/Congo  PAGEREF _Toc457313803 \h 25 USAID BHR and Contractors  PAGEREF _Toc457313804 \h 26 USAID/Washington  PAGEREF _Toc457313805 \h 26 CATEGORY  PAGEREF _Toc457313806 \h 27 C. Resource Requirements  PAGEREF _Toc457313807 \h 27 D. USAID/Congo Transition Management Issues  PAGEREF _Toc457313808 \h 30 Programmatic Restrictions: CORE Program  PAGEREF _Toc457313809 \h 30 Procurement/Contracting  PAGEREF _Toc457313810 \h 30 Agency Reporting Requirements  PAGEREF _Toc457313811 \h 30 Other Management Issues  PAGEREF _Toc457313812 \h 30 E. Monitoring and Evaluation  PAGEREF _Toc457313813 \h 31 Annex A: USAID Program: 1997-1999  PAGEREF _Toc457313814 \h 32 Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)  PAGEREF _Toc457313815 \h 32 Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)  PAGEREF _Toc457313816 \h 32 Health Activities  PAGEREF _Toc457313817 \h 32 Democracy and Governance (DG) Activities  PAGEREF _Toc457313818 \h 33 Environment Activities  PAGEREF _Toc457313819 \h 33 Annex B: Acronyms and Abbreviations  PAGEREF _Toc457313820 \h 34 BACKGROUND ANALYSIS PAPERS: Available from CDO 1: Fact & Figures on Congo 2. Crisis Mitigation Considerations 3. Crisis Accelerators, Decelerators & Indicators 4. Partners, Customers & Other Stakeholders 5. DG Assessment 6. Health Assessment 7. Environment Assessment  I. Executive Summary A. Background and U.S. Interests The Democratic Republic of the Congo is home to roughly 50 million people and borders nine other countries. With vast mineral, agricultural and water resources, the country holds enormous potential to serve the needs of its own citizens and influence the stability of much of the rest of Africa. However, the Congo is in crisis. The ongoing conflict not only denies Congos citizens the benefits of its own resources; it has spawned instability across the continent and threatens U.S. interests in the subregion. Immediate U.S. objectives in Congo are: A peaceful, negotiated end of the war Institutionalization of democratic processes The rule of law and respect for human rights The economic reconstruction of the country Longer-run objectives include: Internal reconciliation and democratization Stopping the underlying regional conflict that fuels instability and insurgency across Africa The realization of the countys economic potential The reduction of global threats from infectious diseases The protection of its globally important environment and biodiversity Instability fueled by the ongoing conflict and the stalled democratic transition, combined with a plethora of legislative sanctions specific to the Congo, require flexible program implementation and management. The proposed strategy posits three political/military scenarios that could grow out of the current crisis. A modest CORE program with short-to medium-term democracy, justice, health and environment objectives is proposed with an enhanced CORE scenario kicking in if the conflict suddenly ends and the government launches a democratic transition program. The CORE program is designed to respond flexibly to changing scenarios and accommodates a surge in program implementation should the environment permit. Active collaboration and partnership between USAIDs Africa Bureau and the Office of Transition Initiatives is presumed. B. The Proposed USAID Program All proposed programs promote two principal themes: Fostering, promoting and supporting engagement among elements of Congolese society, institutions and government Reinforcing Congos impressive, but thinly stretched, human capital Health, Population and Infection Diseases This program will fight childhood diseases such as polio and measles, stem the transmission of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections and build the governments surveillance and service delivery capacity. The proposed program health budget is $5.3 M in FY 99 and $8.0 M in FY 2000, which will be programmed through the Global and Africa/SD Bureaus. Democracy and Governance The CORE program will heighten the capacity of Congolese civil society to promote dialogue with government and other key actors and aggressively and actively participate in Congos democratic transition when the opportunity arises. It will also support the administration of justice and rule of law. The CORE program is $2.0 M of DA and $6.8 ESF funds in FY 99 and $2.0 M of ESF in FY 2000. Four activities will be funded through a mission budget transfer to the Global Bureaus Democracy and Governance Center. In addition, OTI is requested to fund specific small democracy grants, and to prepare to expand activities rapidly should conditions warrant. Environmental Protection and Biodiversity This program will combat the severe environmental health problems in Kinshasa and other large urban centers by supporting community groups to execute environmental sanitation programs. A modest effort to preserve the rich biodiversity of Congos tropical forests will be started in FY 99 with expansion in FY 2000 to $2.0 M. Conditions permitting, the CORE Plus program proposes additional funds for the health and environmental programs and the initiation of economic growth activities for FY 2000. The mission believes the funding proposed for FY 99 will provide sufficient early surge capacity should a scenario shift occur this year. Program Management The CORE program will be managed by a workforce of three OE-funded USDH staff (Director, Program Officer, GDO) a Program funded TAACS health officer an OE-funded USPSC Executive Officer, one local hire position, 3 FSN professional staff and 5 FSN support staff. OTI will provide three USPSC staff and 6 FSN professional and support staff. The program is implemented by U.S. organizations funded through NGOs and central mechanisms to minimize field staff time devoted to administrative functions. An enhanced scenario will require a modest addition of USPSC staff, particularly to support the expanded environmental and economic growth programs. II. Context A. Introduction The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) straddles Central Africa as the third largest country on the continent. Its tremendous ecological and human diversity and immense base of natural resources includes oil, copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, timber, and exceptional biodiversity. 77% of the country is forested and this rainforest and massive river system are among the remaining lungs and arteries of the global environmental system. Nine countries border it and shifting alliances both within and across its borders position the Congo as a key partner or a key threat to US interest in Africa. From a political perspective, it sits astride the continent as a block and battlefield of regional political developments. The sudden removal of Marechal Mobutu Sese Seko with the arrival of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL), backed by neighboring states, resulted in the emergence nationally and internationally of hope for a new and better future. The resurgence of war in August 1998 has largely dashed these early hopes. The war is the most immediate obstacle to a democratic transition, economic development, and accountable governance. Yet even under present circumstances there remain significant opportunities for the US to positively engage with the Congolese people in the pursuit of mutual interests. Compared to the situation at Independence, when the country boasted a handful of university graduates, there is today significant, dedicated human capital. Excellent development partners can be found in key Governmental, NGO and private sector arenas. At the same time, the entire country is suffering form the effects of isolation from the surrounding dynamics of modern regional and global development. The ADFL swept into power so rapidly that little opportunity existed to develop national policy goals, or to engage with the vast majority of the Congolese people. Senior levels of government are filled with a mix of people with extraordinarily different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives. There is a plethora of citizen, church, private sector and local government institutions. These individuals and institutions have kept people and social systems alive despite ever-increasing constraints imposed by central government mismanagement of the economy, war and overall deterioration. They provide an opportunity for USAID to positively engage through CORE activities that may help lay the basis for a peaceful transition to democracy, improved health and economic recovery. The question is whether the diverse players on both sides of the current conflict and their external partners can negotiate and assume responsibility for power sharing and the construction of an open economy. One example of the difficulty is that the war in Congo has to date involved 12 countries agendas related to six separate disputes. If such stable progress in governance is made, there will truly be a basis for substantial investment in sustainable economic and social improvements. The USG needs to be positioned through its proposed CORE program over the next 12 18 months to assist if this opening occurs by moving quickly into a CORE Plus Program. Any scaled-up engagement will be made possible through the internal partnerships formed under the CORE program. There is no other positive response but engagement. Further isolation in the Congo will only make the problems worse and increase the threat to U.S. and African interests. There is widespread conviction that the war has stalled a fragile transition process that aimed to end the autocratic rule and economic deterioration that characterized the Mobutu regime. There is Congolese consensus that political transition hinges on continuing the constitutional review and electoral processes. Unfortunately, many sound governance policies (e.g., currency policy) initiated or promised over the past two years have been rescinded or counteracted. Some recognized progress has been made, with respect to security conditions, traffic control and policing. The provision of basic social services (health, education, public transportation, welfare) was long ago assumed by NGOs, churches and private individuals and they have largely been able to withstand the pressures of Kabila regime. The Kabila Government has been unable to reach agreement with the multilateral donors on debt repayment or rescheduling because it does not acknowledge the debt arrearages inherited from the previous regime. Without an agreement with the IMF, donor balance of payment and structural adjustment support is blocked. However, assistance exemptions exist in Child Survival, HIV/AIDS and the environment sectors, which permit USAID to work with government. OTI funds permit USAID to work with government institutions. Despite the fact that the Congo is a country in crisis, engaged in violent armed conflict, which has to date resulting in the loss of the eastern third of the countrysix of eleven provinces much remains possible. Opportunities 1. The Strength of Civil Society. The absence of a responsible state stemming from the Mobutu era resulted in a dynamic, organized, and motivated network of organizations and individuals that have succeeded in meeting critical social needs. The non-government sector remains keenly interested in the transition process and provides a basis to help build capacity to engage in a peaceful democratic transition. 2. A Consensus on Priority Needs has been articulated by Congolese people at conferences held during the past year, which brought representatives of both sides in the conflict together to discuss national priorities: Maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo Self-rule Economic regeneration Provision of basic social services A decent, fair and law-abiding society Latent Government Capacity. Within government there are networks of sympathetic officials with whom civil society can partner. There is a cadre of Congolese with strong technical expertise and the political will to implement sound public policies and programs, particularly in health, environment, human rights and public works. Local communities for the first time in decades are increasingly able to work with the local, responsive administrative structures. Security Improvement. There is general consensus that public security has improved in the non-war affected areas of the country since the end of the Mobutu regime. Opportunities exist for SADC to take leadership on resolving issues in the Congo. As a SADC member, the Congo has many potential links to Southern Africa in terms of markets for resources and sources of investment, technology and democratic practices. Constraints Conflicting Interests of Regional Actors Engaged in the Conflict. The intervention of outside actors in the Congo conflict has created a high degree of instability, insecurity, and economic devastation. There is a strong and growing conviction in government-held territories that the war is driven by outside actors backed by Western governmentsparticularly the USand that the international community is actively seeking to destroy their country. Lack of Institutional Mechanisms for Citizen Representation. The mechanisms for dialogue and responsive governance that linked citizens and officials at the national and regional level(s) two years ago were never very strong and there have been attempts to dismantle them or replace them with what appear to be pseudo-participatory mechanisms controlled by the government. Limited Capacity. The capacity of government authorities on the one hand and civil society organizations or political actors on the other to engage in policy dialogue or develop targeted public policies adapted to modern regional and global dynamics is minimal. The question of capacity cannot be de-linked from the question of political will. However, the former can be addressed programmatically whereas the latter must continue to be assessed and addressed through diplomatic channels. Eroding Government Legitimacy. The two-year transition timetable presented by President Kabila in 1997 has been suspended following the outbreak of civil war on August 3, 1998. The proposal for a national debate may represent an opportunity to allow key Congolese representatives to partake in a negotiated peace process or simply a stopgap measure to maintain the illusion that a participatory transition process is still an objective of the current government. It is a response to the diminishing level of support for a regime that has not made progress towards greater openness and prosperity. (Congolese characterize the current environment as le blockage.) Abuse of Authority continues to subvert the rule of law in the Congo. The rule of law system fails to effectively protect and defend the rights and liberties of citizens within the various legal processes. As salaries go unpaid, corruption in the form of rent seeking is returning, and non-judicial security forces conduct arrests and detention, exercising police functions without oversight or accountability. The security forces, carrying out the orders of any official who could claim authority, used arbitrary arrest to intimidate outspoken opponents and journalists (State Dept. Country Report 1998). Military and other non-judicial entities interfere in the daily affairs of Congolese citizens. Deterioration of Quality of Life. Eroding socioeconomic and environmental conditions mean that people are focused on basic needsfood, health, and physical survival. Programmatic Conclusions The crisis in the Congo may be lessened in the short-term through targeted programs that build on existing human and organizational capacity and strengthen linkages between the state and civil society. Sharing or decentralizing power through an inclusive national transition process based on a peace settlement, economic and social recovery, a constitutional development plan and electoral process represents the only viable path to stability. The security interests of regional actors who ultimately seek stability on their borders and a strong regional economy need to be met. Those actors who seek to satisfy their personal political and economic aspirations at the expense of Congolese citizens will continue to be spoilers in this process without effective action by civil society and the international community. B. Principles of Engagement The strategy proposed for USAID revolves around a set of critical CORE activities corresponding to priority objectives in the context of the current situation (Scenario A below). Movement along pathways to alternative scenarios will be monitored and the program expanded (assuming availability of resources), narrowed or re-targeted accordingly in the next 12-18 months. Six approaches/principles are proposed to guide the implementation of CORE activities in order to mitigate the current crisis and lay the basis for the future. Positive Engagement USAID should target its programs to mitigate Congos political, social and economic crisis through positive engagement of Congolese citizens, state institution and appropriate non-Congolese partners at the local levels including Kinshasas quarters. The purpose of this approach is to meet critical health needs, promote stability and widen awareness and partner networks while sustaining the narrow but significant political space for civil society and government authorities to restart the stalled transition process. Broad Participation USAID should promote broad-based participation in political processes to the extent possible. To this end, opportunities for inclusive dialogue such as the National Debate and the Pan-African Child Demobilization conference will be supported. Community Mobilization USAID should continue to support the community mobilization and local governance activities begun by OTI, PSI and IFES. These activities should be expanded and include environmental awareness and economic recovery as circumstances permit. Strategic Linkages across Sectors and Programs. CORE activities should be designed to complement each other so that synergies can be created and the widest possible group of stakeholders brought into the process. Significant attention has to be paid to pan-national linkages that can accelerate the Congos adaptation to modern regional and global dynamics. Flexibility Implementing mechanisms must be highly flexible to target critical opportunities to unblock the stalled political transition and alleviate socioeconomic bottlenecks. These activities could make the difference between crisis and stability on the one hand, or catastrophe on the other. Improving US-Congo Relations USAID programs should also demonstrate to Congolese society that the USG is a willing partner to support peace, stability, economic recovery and a peaceful democratic transition. III. USAID Congos Strategic Plan (12-18 Months) A. Scenarios The Congo political situation is complex, unstable and not readily predictable. This fluid situation presents a serious challenge for USAID program design, planning and execution. Specifically, the challenge is to create a program that will deliver development/transition results within the constraints of the status quo, but flexible enough to respond to events as they unfold --to be able to seize unforeseen opportunities. To assist planning and to provide surge capacity for at least a modest response to significantly changed circumstances, the development of scenarios is necessary. USAID can monitor certain key indicators that would allow early warning for the deployment or redeployment of program resources as the political context shifts. The following four scenarios pertaining to political, economic and social developments in the Congo have been developed as tools for presenting strategic programming options. The implications of each scenario for specific activities are spelled out in more detail in sections below. This section is meant to give a general description of each scenario and its implication for the overall program. These scenarios are of course approximations of possible future paths; we cannot predict the messy complex reality that will almost certainly ensue, or the timing of transitions. Scenario A: Status Quo This scenario is based on extended stalemate between the current military players in the conflict. While this scenario is not likely to remain static, it is essentially characterized by continued fighting in the east with the current government remaining in power in Kinshasa. PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS: CORE PROGRAM. Key activities in health (child survival, HIV/AIDS, polio), strengthening democratization, human rights, judicial and transition processes and environment. Scenario B: Hard-Won Stabilizing Negotiations A cease-fire agreement is negotiated between parties to the conflict and implemented with support by regional actors, possibly with support from the international community. Under this scenario, there would be no immediate government partner. PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS: CORE PLUS PROGAM. The country is in the early stages of a transition but the Brooke Amendment remains in force. The USAID program will stress support to positive moves by parties toward common agenda. Food security will be an important concern as will expanded health interventions. Economic growth activities would be developed but less aggressively than under scenario C. Scenario C: Sudden Stabilizing Negotiations A change in key actors or orientations of parties to the conflict, a military victory, or a major new peace brokered. A negotiated settlement establishing a cease-fire, transitional military and political institutions and stabilizing measures including the departure of uninvited troops from Congolese territory and disarmament of rogue elements in the conflict. Under this scenario the US would have a clear, viable government partner. PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS: CORE PLUS, PLUS PROGRAM. The USAID program goes into maximum effort to capture opportunities to move to a positive transition and beyond. A CORE Plus Plus program would entail the expansion of CORE activities as well as a broader examination of possible assistance. Agreement would be reached with Bretton Woods institutions and a country-specific waiver of the Brooke Amendment would ease direct US engagement with the government in Congo. Economic growth activities would be fully developed and implemented (a new IR). The missions health portfolio would expand into reproductive health and broader child survival initiatives. The mission DG portfolio would also expand to support constitutional development, an independent electoral commission, political party development and elections. The environment program would move activities into presently inaccessible areas of the country. Scenario D: Accelerated Disintegration If peace negotiations do not progress satisfactorily, military victory remains elusive and control of urban areas breaks down, an increasingly chaotic situation could ensue that precipitates the dissolution of Congolese military, political institutions and territory. PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS: CORE MINUS. US mission is evacuated or only essential staff remains in Kinshasa. The USAID program emphasis will shift to humanitarian and relief interventions. Crucial communications links from the outside to partners in the Congo would be maintained through modern communication mechanisms while continuing key strategic activities in support of MPP goals and US national interests where possible. B. Program USAID/Congo proposes to work in three sectors (health, democracy/governance, and environment) within the Scenario A: CORE program. This program will be expanded to include an Economic Growth sector under Scenarios B and C. The following chart depicts the program structure (Fig 1: Program Framework). The program has an overarching Strategic Objective (SO). Each sector program (Intermediate Result) contributes to the SO, which stresses building participatory processes. The sector programs comprise sub-sector activity clusters that represent how the program will be functionally organized. The proposed activities within each sub-sector are described below. Figure 1: USAID/Congo Program Framework GOAL: To promote positive engagement in a successful transition to a stable nation with increasingly broad and equitably distributed benefits from improving social, environmental, economic and political conditions.     Health Sector (IR1)  Health Sector Results Statement: Key health problems addressed with emphasis on redevelopment of public structures for public health and citizen participation. Overview The rationale for working in child survival, STI/HIV/AIDS prevention and infectious diseases in Congo has not changed since the return of USAID in 1997. If anything, due to on-going conflict in the region, the health situation has worsened. Reliable health statistics are unavailable and national statistics give only a partial view. With an estimated 10 million people under 5 years old, infant and maternal mortality rates are unacceptably high. UNICEF estimated infant mortality at 128/1000 live births, child mortality is estimated at 207 and in 1990 maternal mortality was 870/100,000 live births. Half the population of the Congo is under 18 years of age. Children and youth are the future of the country but are currently at risk of current epidemic and sexually transmitted diseases. By contributing to global issues of immunization, infectious disease and HIV/AIDS prevention, USAID will make a difference under any political scenario in terms of giving the youth a greater opportunity to survive and contribute to their society. Initial interventions in these critical areas will lays the groundwork for future strategies, policies and service delivery focusing on sound management principles, community participation and partnerships with NGOs and the private sector. The CORE health strategy will provide a solid foundation for a transition to a more comprehensive maternal, child and reproductive health program with potential for greater results and impact when the situation improves (Scenarios B and C). Health is a good rallying point for communities. The health sector strategy will emphasize working with communities to help them define their problems and needs and to access assistance and resources required to resolve their problems. In addition, as a neutral sector, health can help lay the groundwork for involvement in a participatory process, which focuses on individual and societal rights and responsibilities. Community mobilization and improved governance in the administration of critical health services links health activities to those in environment and democracy/governance. One of the keys to sustaining health services is to assure that community associations and organizations have the capacity to work with health care providers in the management of health care services, establishment of operational policies, response to public health crises and the reinstitution or improvement of services and institutions. The MOH through its health reform program is committed to having communities actively participate in the management of the health system. To achieve this in the long run, communities will be involved through participatory approaches such as community assessment and diagnosis to identify existing beliefs and practices related to immunization and STI/HIV/AIDS transmission. These studies will form the basis on which strategies for intervention as well as joint ownership will be built. Activities proposed in the health sector under the current scenario focus on critical global issues (polio, infectious diseases) where there is significant need in Congo and in which USAID has a comparative advantage. They will provide key inputstraining, planning, regional and international connectivityin child survival, infectious disease control, and STI/HIV/AIDS prevention and will contribute to greater community participation in health care as well as the rehabilitation of health service delivery systems. They will also include cross-sector components such as activities to improve environmental health in urban areas and to improve participation and governance in the delivery of all components in rural and urban areas. There are existing USAID programming mechanisms through which these can be effected and continued even if the situation deteriorates. In addition, they provide an opportunity to build a foundation for future interventions while revitalizing past US investments. Scenario A: CORE Program in Health IR1.1: Child Survival Enhanced Polio eradication through national immunization days in both government and rebel-held areas Rebuild and strengthen routine immunization through a decentralized health delivery system Infectious disease control and prevention (malaria) Improve environmental healthparticularly water and sanitation in urban areas IR1.2: Combating STI/HIV/AIDS Condom social marketing Information and education campaign Improved systems for combating sexually transmitted infections (STI) Operational research Materials development IR1.3: Systems for Health Delivery Rehabilitated Institutional strengthening (MOH and the School of Public Health) through training, strategy development and planning, materials development and operational research Enhance community participation in the management of health care Operational research Scenarios B and C It is proposed that USAID would scale up existing activities to increase coverage and place greater emphasis on systemic health reform, improving the management of and support for primary health care service delivery. In addition, a new results package would be developed to promote reproductive health. Scenario D If the situation deteriorates, USAID intends to continue to work through local partners and OFDA to maintain life-saving health support. Democracy and Governance Sector (IR2) Democracy and Governance Results Statement: Good governance and rule of law promoted with emphasis on multi-stakeholder problem solving Overview The CORE program in the democracy and governance sector will seek to: Support groups continuing to promote a cease-fire and inclusive political transition process Consolidate advocacy efforts by religious organizations, the vibrant NGO community and other civil society leaders Provide access to information that can inform the Congos transition to democratic governance Provide a forum for public-private dialogue Support civic education and outreach efforts to increase citizen participation in the Congos political reconstruction and enhance citizen ability to understand and exercise choice related to Congos political transition Increase civil society capacity to educate citizens and facilitate engagement between Congolese citizens and government authorities  While the equitable resolution of citizen disputes will long continue to challenge the Congolese justice system, the management of inter-citizen dispute resolution is a central impediment to unblocking the transition process and promoting democratic governance in Congo. As a key country in the Great Lakes Congo is an important focus of the US presidential Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI). USAID is developing a GLJI/Congo program in the justice sector that will complement DG activities already underway. It will focus on strengthening civil societys ability to engage in the promotion and protection of human and legal rights. Targeted and general support for civil society organizations, including human rights NGOs, has in other countries proven to have the potential to erode the absolute power of the state, as well as to influence an eventual redistribution of power within the state. The CORE program in the justice sector will seek to consolidate the human rights community both governmental and non-governmentaland provide fora for public-private dialog and partnership on justice and human rights issues. The program will try to maintain trends toward improved public/personal security and identify potential reform elements within formal justice institutions including the magistracy and prosecution. To lay the basis for reaching these objectives and promote good governance and rule of law with emphasis on multi-stakeholder problem solving, the following CORE activities are proposed. Scenario A: CORE Program in Democracy and Governance IR2.1: Democratic Processes and Institutions Strengthened Provide open access to information related to the Congos transitional processes and institutions as well as broader democratic practices and experiences in Africa to allow for enhanced citizen understanding, debate, and engagement with government authorities Facilitate civil society advocacy and efforts to end the current conflict and exercise effective demand for a transparent, participatory political transition process including building bridges between public and non-governmental or private institutions to promote partnership and ownership of transitional processes Public/civic education efforts and increased public participation in civil society organizations to increase understanding and participation in governance at the local, regional and national levels and to promote a culture conducive to peace and democratization IR2.2: Human Rights and Judicial Processes Improved Building bridges between authorities such as formal justice sector officials and institutions and civil society organizations working to improve human rights and rule of law system performance, promoting partnership and joint ownership of a human rights and justice sector reform agenda, to be achieved through direct outreach and targeted sub-grants Generating public demand for improved human rights practices and in rule of law system performance, through public/civic education and increased public participation in civil society organizations Promoting child rights especially the demobilization of child soldiers and care for street children Building capacity through an International Visitor (IV) programs for human rights, media and justice sector leaders in both the governmental and non-governmental sectors Disseminating Congo civil and commercial codes to lawyers, the press, human rights and other interested NGOs. IR2.3: Conflict is Managed or Avoided through Stakeholder Negotiation Public/civic education efforts and increased public participation in civil society organizations to increase understanding and participation in peace processes at the local, regional and national levels and to promote a culture conducive to peace and democratization, to be achieved through direct outreach and targeted sub-grants The OTI Carrefours de la Justice activity, which promotes dialogue between civil society and local and regional justice officials through an innovative, informal platform Political transition grants Scenarios B and C Scale up existing programs in response to emerging opportunities. In particular, USAID expects to support electoral processes, the constitutional development process, political party development and engagement with other civil society institutions and constituents, the actual demobilization of child soldiers and the expansion of civil society capacity-strengthening efforts. In addition, the mission intends to develop an activity with media professional to promote their capacity and objectivity and hence the use of media in enhancing rule of law, human rights and reconciliation. In the event that stabilizing negotiations, either sudden or protracted, result in permission to engage the Congolese government authorities (Scenario C), several additional activities would be appropriate particularly in relation to capacity building in government. Ultimately democratic transition and justice sector reform requires the participation of the formal institutions of the state. These activities will build upon the CORE program. Formal justice sector institutions will require significant assistance to recover from decades of neglect and abuse. Under Scenario C, the following new activities are proposed: Support for an independent electoral commission or administration of local, provincial or national elections Strengthening the capacity of the judiciary, lawyers, and other sector professionals and media professionals through training in targeted sub-sectors (economic justice, human rights.) Selected infrastructure improvements related to the above especially in information technology. Scenario D In the event of accelerated disintegration in the Congo, the DG program will be scaled down or placed on hold. There would be a reduction in mission and expatriate staff and the mission program emphasis will shift to relief operations. DG activities would likely be re-targeted to support local capacity for the promotion and protection of human rights as well as reporting on abuses. Engagement in activities would be maintained between through local/regional partners and technical staff at USAID/W through communications systems. Natural Resource and Environmental Management (IR3) Environment Results Statement: Constituencies for sustainable management of natural resources built with emphasis on community participation Overview The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a flagship country for global environmental concernsfrom its spectacular biodiversity to its immense environmental health problems. Tropical forestry is a sector in which USAID has exemptions to provide assistance in and which is highly relevant to the Congo, which contains the second-largest expanse of tropical rainforest in the world. The insecurity and war places most rural areas of interest to conservationists off limits for the time being. Yet the country is too important to neglect. USAID therefore proposes to support building a constituency for environmental stewardship in the country. Environmental activism is a major arena for community mobilization. It touches on real problems that people face and must resolve as a community. While building participation, conflict-resolution and accountability, environmental activism does not necessarily involve sensitive public political participation. Supporting environmental work is thus a major tool for building civil society while meeting critical needs. Scenario A: CORE Program in Environment The CORE program will focus on planning and coordination of resource management activities as well as encouraging wide participation in creating new and better regulations. Key stakeholders in the process based in Congo are grassroots and neighborhood associations; women; churches and other development institutions; local NGOs; international NGOs; local and national government; Universities and other institutions of learning; the media; and the private sector. The CORE program will generate concrete, visible activities; engage key local actors; and provide benefits to the urban constituencyparticularly through participatory environmental health activitiesand to the rural community, through the reestablishment of agroforestry production and product marketing. By providing concrete social and environmental benefits, the US image will be improved, as measured by media stories. A goal of coordination, initially sponsored by USAID, will be taken up independently by Congolese and the quality of life for targeted Congolese citizens will improve through increased access to potable water, improved sanitation and increased incomes. The current armed conflict poses problems for reform or improved performance in the environment sector. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that meaningful results are within reach of a well-designed and targeted natural resource management program. To lay the basis for reaching these objectives the following CORE activities are proposed. IR3.1: Environmental Advocacy and Awareness increased through Education and Environmental Health Activities Build opportunities for public-private dialogue and partnership on the consequences of both war and peace for natural resource management Develop Preparing for Peace, an expanding forum on the environmental effects of crisis, war and peace Build environmental stewardship by addressing key environmental and environmental health issues Provide grants for urban environmental health activities Support the development of environmental education materials such as Bleu-Blanc environmental magazine and school notebooks that are sold in local markets and produced locally Support cleanup of dangerous pesticides and biological contaminants IR3.2: Environmentally and Economically Sustainable Natural Resource Management (NRM) Activities Undertaken Support agroforestry producer association partnerships with the private sector to restart sustainable production of agroforestry products such as palm oil produced on smallholder plantations in Bas Congo Develop conservation and sustainable resource management small grants program to carry out ex situ and in situ conservation of key species; map logging concessions and other forest parameters; look at connection between deforestation and food security; and provide support for Congolese professionals to attend international training and workshops Carry out food security analyses and small-scale promotion activities with OTI. IR3.3: Environment and NRM Policies Analyzed and USAID Positioned to Assist Rural Areas Review existing NRM regulations, enforcement and practices and assist in preparing appropriate NRM regulations and codes of conduct Assess the viability of national, regional and customary institutions for NRM and strengthen community-based NRM, whether it is around urban erosion or community forestry Commission participatory studies of key topics such as land use/land tenure issues, stakeholders to Congos resources: who are the players and what do they control? Looking at the key players and their struggles over control of important resources in the country, market and non-market outflows of resources, consequences of these struggles for local people and the environment Scenarios B and C Should there be a breakthrough, and either scenario B or C results, USAID having contributed to Preparing for Peace, will be poised to work with national-level actors to head off worst-case scenarios of environmental pillage. Environment activities will commence in provinces now cut off by the rebellion. In addition, Kinshasa-based NGOs and other actors will be able to use information and tools provided through CORE activities to work in other areas of the country. The following additional activities are therefore proposed: Expand conservation and sustainable development activities as indicated by studies carried out in 1999-2000 Provide support for ICCN to evaluate situation of National Parks Concentration of efforts in Preparing for Peace in Kivu Expand environmental health activities jointly with health through the allocation of small grants to environmental NGOs, university departments, and other actors that are actively engaged in anti-erosion, channel dredging, rubbish disposal, revegetation or similar activities. Coordination of these activities through broad coalition of local government officials, university professors, NGO technical specialists. Development of maps to show key problems and progress. Links with media to communicate process and progress. Scenario D Communication systems and technical direction having been put in place through CORE activities may allow activities to continue at some level. In addition studies on land tenure and resource control can be continued as can satellite or ground forest surveillance. Economic Growth Sector Scenario A Start-up activities incorporated under Environment Activities and development of an Economic Growth strategy. Scenarios B and C A USAID Congo priority action will be the development of an Economic Growth IR. This IR will build on activities in all sectors (notably IR2.2: commercial code improvement and economic justice, IR3.2: rehabilitation of smallholder plantations in Bas Congo and food security initiatives, and IR 3.3 policy analysis and reform). Other possible activities in this sector include infrastructure (feeder road and essential market infrastructure) rehabilitation; economic approaches to sanitation and environmental health (already supported by local NGOs such as FOLECO); and assistance to smallholder cocoa or other sustainable agroforestry industries Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) While validating the overall OTI approach and advocating a continuation of OTIs support for local initiatives in the hubs where OTI can still operate (Kananga and Lubumbashi), the strategy assessment encourages OTI to investigate opportunities for similar activities in areas of the country where security is not an issue. In this regard, OTIs recent decision to fund selected initiatives in Kinshasa and its periphery, particularly those relevant to issues of food security, is viewed very positively. The assessment acknowledges that, as in the past, it will also be important for OTI to remain open to opportunities to assist the transition process by funding the participation of key Congolese actors in certain, clearly-relevant international forums. Most importantly, the assessment sees a significant opportunity for OTI to increase its impact by coordinating closely with the USAID Mission to complement activities planned for other program areas and funded from other sources. Specifically, it is felt that OTIs methodology and programmatic flexibility can be particularly useful in addressing one of the key challenges of the Congo transition: promoting more dynamic and productive communications between government and civil society. A well-recognized problem of the transition process in the Congo, confirmed by OTIs experience in the country since the transition began, is the distrust and hostility that has developed over the years between civil society and government. During the Mobutu years, most donors, including USAID, eventually came to recognize the uselessness of working with the former government, given the high level of corruption and low levels of commitment. Donor support was thus shifted, after decades of huge bilateral aid budgets, to civil society, and particularly to NGOs. An unintended result of this shift was the disempowerment of the reform-minded Congolese officials, and the development of a widespread mistrust of civil society by officials at all levels. Civil society came to be equated with organized political opposition and to be seen as a direct competitor for resources. Civil societys relentless and highly vocal opposition to the regime that came to power in 1997 further served to embitter relations. Such a dynamic is clearly counter-productive in the post-Mobutu era when virtually all segments of the society, including many officials at the working level, want to turn their attention to reconstruction and reform. Though there remains considerable confusion at the central government policy level, and indecision combined with mixed messages emanating from the capital, much of regional and local government has, as a result of the change in regime, found the space to begin reconstruction efforts. Many officials saw the departure of Mobutu and the seeming encouragement of local initiative expressed by the new regime as a signal and an opening to begin serious work. They were encouraged to start doing their jobs as they knew they were supposed to do and to try out many ideas for improvement that they have been frustrated from attempting in the past. Though no one would claim that a new ethic touched all of the civil service, it is clear that many have responded to the challenge. There has been a significant resurgence of professionalism, and professional pride. The clearest example is perhaps the police force, which now having regained independence from the military has clearly made substantial headway in developing discipline and effective law enforcement. But evidence of professionalism has sprung up here and there in almost all sectors of the civil service. In this context, it is important that activities funded by international donors, and particularly the U.S., be seen as not providing further support to the disempowerment of reform-minded officials at the local and line-management levels. These interventions should, instead, be structured to encourage civil society to adopt a more constructive approach to dialogue and cooperation with its immediate GDRC counterparts. It will also impose a requirement for close cooperation and complementary in programming between OTI, the USAID Mission, and the various NGO partners also channeling ESF support to justice and rule-of-law initiatives. If programmed and implemented with an eye to such coordination and complementarity, USG support to the Congo will fulfill the basic expectation that the U.S. is committed to helping the Congolese people at all levels to bring about positive change within their society at a time of both great need and great hope. Representative OTI Activities Date Completed Title Location 11/1/97 Repair of War Damaged Schools Bukavu 1/20/98 Provincial Reconstruction Conference W. Kasai 5/25/98 Emergency Road Rehabilitation E. Kasai 9/1/98 Information Dissemination on the Rights of Women W. Kasai 7/29/98 Electrification of Water Pump Station Likasi-Katanga 7/29/98 Rehabilitation of Kamalondo Medical School Lubumbashi 6/11/99 Peace, Democracy and Development Campaign Kinshasa 6/15/99 Electoral Observation Mission to S. Africa Kinshasa IV. Management and Resources A. Context The working environment in Congo is strained. Congo remains an unaccompanied post, permitting only adult dependents. Security restrictions rarely allow staff to circulate outside of Kinshasa. There is considerable anti-American feeling due to USAIDs closure in the early nineties, the subsequent new program scale-down in August 1998 when war broke, and the strong perception that the United States is backing Rwandan and Ugandan invaders in the Congo. The US mission is making a concerted effort to counteract adverse, usually incorrect, media coverage and to increase the profile of successful activities. Given the political and security uncertainty and the fact that legislative restrictions demand program obligations be made largely to NGOs and pragmatically mainly through AID/W mechanisms, the USAID Congo staff will remain small and flexible. The emphasis of in-country staff should be to monitor activities and conditions, coordinate a wide range of stakeholders, and engage segments of Congolese society. B. Staffing USAID/Congo Due to the precarious security situation, repeated evacuations, and uncertainty surrounding resolution of the current crisis DROC has been designated an adult-dependents-only post. It is difficult to recruit qualified staff and tremendous strain is placed on those at post who are separated from their families and working in a fragile environment. Four (4) USDHs were approved for CongoDirector, Program Officer, GDO and Controller. To date, the Director is at post as is a Technical Assistant in AIDS and Child Survival (TACCS)-a CDC Direct Hirewho serves as the mission Health Officer. USDH Program and GD Officers have been recruited and the incumbents will arrive by September. The Controller slot has been placed on hold. REDSO/ESA provides limited financial management support to the mission. As USAID has been unable to establish a government-to-government bilateral program in the Congo, except in health, OE funds are used to support 1 USPSC EXO, 1 FSN Program officer, I FSN Environment/Demobilization officer, I FSN systems manager, I FSN accountant/GSO, 2 secretaries, 3 drivers and 3 guards. In addition, OE funds must be programmed to support TDY costs from AID/Washington. OE resources are acutely strained. The USAID Congo staff should remain small and be prepared to adjust to different scenarios quickly. Should the CORE Plus program take off, existing staff should be prepared to work in the field up to 40% of the time. As mission responsibilities towards existing health and DG programs, the new Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) activities and occasional requests to backstop Congo Brazzaville increase, a few well-placed, additional staff will be critical. Staffing of the CORE Program will minimize USDH and USPSC presence relying on professional and support FSN staff and virtual team members from USAID/Washington. The mission recognizes constraints on OE funds and requests AFR/Bureau assistance in identifying means of using program field support funds to hire key staff until a bilateral govt-to-govt program can be established. Modest increases in the FSN staff are needed immediately as they will need to be trained and placed to implement CORE activities. Should the situation deteriorate and another evacuation of American personnel be required, Congolese staff can maintain a minimum of program activity. If the situation improves, additional FSN will be required to facilitate the management of the proposed CORE Plus program. USAID BHR and Contractors The BHR offices (OFDA and OTI) are fully engaged in the Congo program having begun operations before the mission was re-established. OTIs quick programmatic and disbursal mechanisms are essential to a transition program. Democracy/Governance and GLJI activities are designed to complement, build on and further the OTI Congo portfolio. OTI will continue to play a critical role in identifying targets of opportunity in a fluid and fragile environment. Collaboration and coordination between OTI and USAID Congo will be critical to the achievement of Mission and GLJI objectives. The USAID offices in Kinshasa house the OTI Program, which operates with an independent budget, staff, reporting lines and activities. OFDA relief activities continue in government and rebel-held territories throughout the Congo and respond to emergency needs. An OFDA/USPSC continues to cover eastern Congo while the OFDA regional office in Nairobi covers activities in the west. The Mission feels, however, that better coverage in the west is needed. U.S. hired resident contract staff are implementing D/G (IFES, SCF/UK) and health (BASICS, AIDSMARK) activities in Kinshasa. USAID/Washington The bulk of USAID Congo activities are implemented through Global or Africa Bureau mechanisms and AID/W provides significant technical support. The continued involvement of the Global Bureau on the health and D/G sectors will be essential to planned achievements in the SO which envisages a number of new activities, which will require close collaboration and support. 1999 CORE PROGRAM STAFF: 15 USDH USPSC FSN/PROFESS. FSN/SUPPORT Mission Director Exec.Officer Env./Demob. Officer 3 Secretaries Program Officer **(2/4) OTI *Heath Officer **3 Drivers GDO/DG Officer Local Hire *Local hire DG/GLJI Officer TAACS Account/GSO Systems Manager Program Officer CORE PLUS PROGRAM STAFF: 18 USDH USPSC FSN/PROFESS. FSN/SUPPORT Mission Director Exec.Officer Env./Demob. Officer 3 Secretaries Program Officer **(4/6) OTI Heath Officer 2 Program Assistants GDO/DG Officer Tech. Officer DG/GLJI Officer **3 Drivers TAACS Local Hire Account/GSO Systems Manager Program Officer * Staff not yet hired. ** Not included in Mission Staff Level Table 1: Staffing RequirementsCORECORECORE PLUSCATEGORY199920002001USDH333TAACS111DG/GLJI USDH or USPSC1[Joint CARPE/ Mission Environment Officer][1][1]US Local Hire1FSN OE1097FSN Program33USPSC EXO111Local Hire1[OTI USPSCs][4][3][6]Total Personnel141718 C. Resource Requirements A series of assessments to determine program funding requirements have been undertaken by G/DG, GLJI/G/DG, G/PHN and AFR/SD/PHN, OFDA, OTI, AFR, and an environment contractor. The Congo Strategy proposes the implementation of a critical CORE of activities, which can be expanded or contracted quickly as the context changes. The country team, including USAID, the Embassy, USIS and OTI (with input from OFDA) are working to enhance the synergies between potentially complementary activities in support of shared mission objectives. Resource requirements for the CORE and CORE Plus programs are laid out in the following tables. Table 2: CORE Program Resources Budget Table(000s)199920002001STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1CP LevelMission RequestDraft BPBS LevelRevised Mission RequestIR1 Health 5,3148,0008,0005,2338,5001R1.1 Child Survival2,4003,0003,0002,7003,000IR1.2 HIV/AIDS1,9142,0002,0002,0003,000IR1.3 Health Systems1,0003,0003,0005002,500IR2 DG2,500001,5002,000IR2.1 Democracy2,00000500500IR2.2 Human Rights00 500500IR2.3 Conflict Mgt00500500IR3 Environment01,0003,0002,5003,000IR3.1 Advocacy5001,0001,0001,000IR3.2 Sustainable NRM/Economic Growth5001,0001,5001,500IR3.3 Policy01,000500500Total DA Resource Request9,00011,0008,73313,500HUMANITARIAN AND TRANSITIONOTI1,0002,0001,000OFDA4,000??OTHER RESOURCESTrust Fund*00WVF/DCOF (IR2.2)1,1301,000?1,000?ESF-GLJI (IR2)6,8002,000???*Managed by World Bank Table 3: CORE Plus-Plus Program Resources Budget Table(000s)199920002001STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1CP LevelMission RequestCP LevelMission RequestIR1 Health 5,3146,5008,0006,50011,0001R1.1 Immunization2,4001,5003,0003,0003,000IR1.2 HIV/AIDS1,9142,0002,0002,0003,000IR1.3 Health Systems1,0003,0003,0001,5005,000IR2 DG2,50001,0001,5002,000IR2.1 Democracy2,0000500500IR2.2 Human Rights0500500IR2.3 Conflict Mgt01,0005001,000IR3 Environment01,5004,0001,5004,000IR3.1 Advocacy5001,0005001,000IR3.2 Sustainable NRM5002,0005002,000IR3.3 Policy5001,0005001,000IR4 Economic Growth50001,5003,000Total DA Resource Request8,00014,5009,50020,000HUMANITARIAN AND TRANSITIONOTI1,0002,500?2,500?OFDA4,000 ??ADDITIONAL RESOURCESTrust Fund (ESF)*10,000?WVF/DCOF (IR2.2)1,1302,000?1,000?ESF-GLJI (IR 2)6,8004,000?4,000?*Managed by World Bank. NB: 2000 CORE PLUS (PLUS) USAID Congo recommends a minimum resource level of US$ 36,500,000: BHR/OTI US$ 2,500,000 DA US$ 20,000,000 ESF US$ 14,000,000 D. USAID/Congo Transition Management Issues Programmatic Restrictions: CORE Program The current legislative restrictions and prohibitions on assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo have an enormous impact on program implementation. These legislation includes: Section 585, FY99 Appropriations Act (Faircloth Provision): No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by the FY98 Appropriations Act may be provided to the central government of the Congo. Section 512 of FY99 Appropriations Act (Brooke provision): Prevents assistance except in excepted or waived situations to countries in arrears for a period in excess of one year on FAA foreign assistance loan repayments. FAA Section 620(q): Prohibits the provision of FAA assistance to countries in arrears on FAA assistance loans for a period in excess of six months. Special Notification: FY99 Appropriations Act requires advance notification of obligation of funds to the Congo, absent special exemption or waiver. Current restrictions will necessitate continued reliance on NGO, Global or Africa Bureau funding will preclude the establishment of a responsive government-to-government bilateral program. Given the current crisis, program implementation needs to be quick, reactive, visible and flexible. There are a number of management issues that if resolved could enhance the responsiveness of USAID. Procurement/Contracting The use of flexible and fast-moving procurement instruments (e.g., local grants, IQCs, G Bureau transfers, umbrella grants and contracts through task orders) is necessary throughout the crisis-transition period. The mission will depend on BHRs fast-disbursing authorities, special exemptions and programmatic flexibility through the next 18-24 months and on NGO, Global and Africa Bureau funding mechanisms and processes. Agency Reporting Requirements It will be many years before Congo might be considered a sustainable development program. Just as emergency assistance operates under special exceptions from normal agency regulations and requirements, the USAID Congo transition assistance program would operate best with modifications and exemptions from normal agency regulations and procedures. USAID Congo reporting would be limited to intermediate results, outputs and activities. The mission would not be required to expend the professional time in developing and reporting on indicators and their links to intermediate results at the Strategic Objective level. Also the burden of general program reporting requirements should be reduced. Other Management Issues Controller and Contracting Needs As of September, the mission should have its approved program and General Development Officer slots filled. However program uncertainty after evacuation resulted in a decision to defer filling the approved controller slot. The mission has already had REDSO/EA recommendations to increase its financial management capacities through the recruitment of another FSN in order to met minimal desirable standards for division of responsibilities. A CORE Plus scenario would probably result in the need to fill the US controller slot. Similarly, a CORE Plus scenario should generate substantially new contracting requirements. There is a need to clarify where such capacities will exist to be called upon rapidly when needed. Security State Department Security has called for a upgrading of security conditions at the Kinshasa Embassy. The mission is presently reviewing with USAID security ITS needs and possible responses for the USAID mission as well. There is a possibility that the mission may have to relocate. This would result in need for additional OE funds as well as probable disruption in the newly installed communication capacity at the present mission offices. OTI/Mission Coordination At present, the OTI program allocates its funds through a highly decentralized mechanism with approval for activities under $20,000 made by its regional representatives, under $70,000 by its country representative and over $70,000 by OTI/W. Plans are to begin merging USAID DA and OTI funded activities and to encourage more strategic cost sharing. DA funds, however, will be used and accounted for according to DA requirements. The mission would like to preserve the OTI decentralization modality but needs to assure proper application and accounting for DA funded activities. It is proposed that OTI and the mission therefore develop a joint approval process for both DA and OTI funds that are being used in a joint program fashion. E. Monitoring and Evaluation When USAID returned to the Congo in 1997, USAID/W recognized that strategy development and reporting systems proscribed in the ADS are not feasible for transition program, especially those just gearing up. However, in-order to keep everyone informed about the evolving context in the Congo and the significant results that are possible even under the current scenario, there is a need for an agreement on principles, general directions and specific objectives. This agreement will facilitate effective application of resources in the face of a multiplicity of differing constraints, needs, promises and expectations. The mission intends to meet quarterlymore often if there are sudden changeswith its partners in Congo to assess the emerging political, economic and social context. Various activity indicators will be reviewed, as will crisis accelerators and decelerators and positive and negative benchmarks of progress in each sector (see supplementary documentation available from CDO). The mission will inform USAID/W of the results of these reviews by email and cable. In addition, on an annual basis the mission will meet with implementing agencies to review results achievement. Once the proposals submitted in this paper are approved, the mission will request technical assistance from a monitoring and evaluation expert to work with partners to incorporate their management systems into the mission reporting structure. To the extent possible, the mission will endeavor to report on results in an abbreviated FY 2002 R4. In the first year it is expected that much of the reporting will remain at the activity level and that it will be largely anecdotal. Annex A: USAID Program: 1997-1999 Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), BHR/OFDA has funded an airlift of IDPs from Kisangani to Bukavu and Goma, seeds and tools distribution, and the repair of water systems and health centers in some of the more damaged areas of eastern and western Congo. BHR/OFDA has provided funds for projects that focused on provision of emergency health and nutrition assistance and agricultural rehabilitation. BHR/OFDA is prepared to respond to immediate humanitarian need in both government and rebel-held territories. Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) The key to this approach is OTIs role as interlocutor for regional and local government, civil society, community groups and the private sector . OTI has attempted to provide resources to assist in the definition and implementation of initiatives at the local and regional levels which: Respond to a broadly-felt need within the community or region as a whole (these needs are often referred to as critical bottlenecks); Provide support to an approach for dealing with these needs that is widely accepted as appropriate and that is, upon examination, feasible and operationally sound. Where the initiative entails a partnership among a local-government entity, one or more civil-society partners, and, appropriate, community members or traditional leaders. Almost all initiatives are supported with in-kind contributions and proposals must have the backing of a broad-based coalition of partners.. OTI staff has thus developed considerable familiarity and expertise with the conditions that officials and organizations face within the areas served by OTI and are able to help identify ongoing issues with which OTI can become involved. These issues may go beyond critical-bottleneck issues and involve OTI in supporting, for example, local peace and reconciliation initiatives when it is clear that there is a danger that local tensions may become serious problems, or where conflict is already present. OTI sees itself as an active, engaged partner, rather than as a passive-funding source. Health Activities Child Survival & HIV/AIDS Prevention USAID has been assisting the MOH/EPI since 1997 in planning and implementing of local and national immunization days throughout the country. Local immunization coverage reached over 95 percent and included measles vaccination. Two rounds of successful national vaccination days were conducted in government controlled areas of the country in December 1998 and January 1999. Vitamin A was administered during the second round. Polio coverage rates were 90.7% for the first round and 91.0% for the second round. USAID is supporting technical, social mobilization and logistics committee who are all involved in immunization planning , education and reporting. Macroplan for 1999 NIDS have been completed and planning sessions were conducted with Provincial Medical Officers, national EPI staff and partner agencies in Nairobi to incorporate rebel held territories in 1999. Technical emphasis in now placed on strengthening routine vaccination services and plans developed in collaboration with district medical officers, has resulted in a preliminary draft of two-year plan for EPI. In 1999, USAID technical assistance will focus on the development of national epidemiological surveillance strategies. HIV/AIDS The Condom Social Marketing has distribution totaled 4,758,591 units at the end of June 1999. Education programs have been launched in high schools and youth clubs in Kinshasa. The education messages use themes to encourage responsible sexual behavior. To date some 46,000 students have participated. TV and Radio promotion/education slots are aired regularly on at least three radio stations and four television stations. In addition, research was initiated with support from the School of Public Health, including the Distribution Survey, the Consumer Profile Survey, the Knowledge Attitudes and Practices Survey. Democracy and Governance (DG) Activities USAID funded the IFES Multi-media Resource Center currently attracts an average of 70-80 visitors per day, comprising mostly civil society activists and academics. It has far exceeded the anticipated 20-25 visitors per day. The Center has two internet stations available to the public and trains people in its use. The Center distributes democracy and elections information to NGOs and the press in Kinshasa on a daily basis and holds community outreach events at least two times per month. Average attendance has been 278 people per session. IFES provides support to the University of Antwerp, Belgium who has brought elements of civil society from eastern and western Congo, as well as representatives of both armed and unarmed opposition together to make recommendations on an inclusive transition and sustainable peace. IFES also works with 25 civil society associations to design a program entitled, Promotion of a Culture of Democracy and Peace, at the grassroots level. By the end of July 1999, 750 peace, democracy and development extension workers in six provinces will have been trained in the use of kits which contain modules, pictures, background text and other necessary materials for adaptation. IFES led a 12-person joint government-civil society training and observation mission to South Africa. The delegation was deployed to three provinces to observe voting procedures in 34 polling stations, meeting with civil society associations, political parties and the Independent Election Commission. After returning to Kinshasa, the delegation launched a joint government-civil society civic education drive in Kinshasa and five provinces to communicate key elements of their newly acquired experience, with a particular emphasis on the need to engage in consensus building around basic legal instruments, including the constitution and electoral law. IFES has implemented a microproject partnership program that provides small sums of aid ($100-$1,000) for civil society projects in the areas of democracy, elections and civic education. As part of IFESs effort to in crease civil society expertise and engagement in the transition process, IFES has worked with civil society partners to organize 10-day civil society election syst4ms training. Environment Activities USAID has completed extensive assessment and planning visits; however, implementation plans were put on hold due to the war. A review of the original plans was undertaken and it was determined that it was possible and desirable to have an environmental program (see assessment in Annexes). Annex B: Acronyms and Abbreviations AAC Amis des Animaux au Congo (Friends of the Animals of Congo) ADS Automatic Directive System AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo AFR/SD USAIDs Africa Bureau/Sustainable Development BERCI Bureau des Etudes, de Recherche et de Consulting International BHR Bureau of Humanitarian Response CDC Centers for Disease Control DA Development Assistance (Fund) DAI Development Alternatives, Inc. DCOF Displaced Children & Orphans Fund DG Democracy and Governance DHS Demographic and Health Survey DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EPI Expanded Program of Immunization ESF Economic Support Fund EXO Executive Officer FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations) FSN Foreign Service National FY Fiscal Year (October 1-September 30) G (USAIDs) Global Bureau GLJI Great Lakes Justice Initiative GDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IEC Information, Education & Communication ICCN Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (Congolese Conservation Institute) IDP Internally Displaced Persons IFES International Foundation of Electoral Supports IMF International Monetary Fund IR Intermediate Result MOH Ministry of Health (DRC) M/OP USAIDs Management Bureau/Operations NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEAP National Environmental Action Plan NGO Non-Governmental Organization NRM Natural Resource Management NIDS National Immunization Day OE Operating Expenses OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OTI Office of Transition Initiatives PASA Participating Agency Service Agreement PCV Peace Corps Volunteer PER Personnel PEV Programme Elargi de Vaccination PLC Plantations Lever au Congo (Lever Plantations) PSI Population Services International PROPRE Kinshasa-based womens environmental NGO PVO Private Voluntary Association RAISE Rural & Agricultural Incomes with Sustainable Environment RCSA Regional Center for Southern Africa REDSO Regional Economic & Development Service Office RFP Request for Proposals SADC SCF Save the Children SPH School of Public Health (University of Kinshasa) SPIAF Service Permanente dInventaire Forestier SO Strategic Objective STD Sexually Transmitted Disease TA Technical Assistance TAACS Technical Assistant in AIDS & Child Survival UMD University of Maryland UNICEF United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund UNIKIN University of Kinshasa UNDP United Nations Development Programme USAID United States Agency for International Development USDH United States Direct Hire USG United States Government USIS United States Information Service USPSC United States Personal Services Contractor WCS Wildlife Conservation Society  Staying Engaged: USAID/DRCs Program Plan PAGE 4 EndNotes There has been no census since 1984 and the Government does not currently have the capacity to generate even basic statistics. Those figures that do exist are therefore open to question, but by comparing socioeconomic indicators one can get an idea of continuing trends (see Annex documents). 1998 asking how citizens judged the new regime compared with the old. The results, which follow show significant regional variation due, in part, to the lack of direct links between Kinshasa and the interior, resulting in different approaches to government administration at the provincial level. KinshasaMbuji MayiKisanganiLumumbashiBetterWorseBetterWorseBetterWorseBetterWorseSecurity60%19%40%24%51%25%93% 6%Justice3828 252628306229Corruption4217171733188016Human Rights25301428 8275437Tribalism4524252635307816 NGOs, particularly religious institutions, provide key social services, notably primary education and health to some 68% and 50% of the population respectively. Public schools have largely ceased to function except where parents have formed cooperatives to support them. The Catholic Church is responsible for 80% of the primary and 60% of the secondary education in the country. Consequently, gross primary enrollment has fallen from 92% in 1980 to an estimated 68% in the 90s (67% female; 89% male), only 56% of the primary school aged children reach Grade 4, and gross enrollment rates for secondary school are 23% with 16% being girls. It is estimated that some 50% of the value of goods taken to market are taxed en route. Further details on proposed activities including proposed mechanisms and implementing partners under each Intermediate Result (IR) can be found in Annex A. Further details on the Results Packages and the analysis on which decisions were based can be obtained from the separate DG assessment update, environmental and health assessments that are available from the USAID/Africa Bureau Country Desk Officer for Congo. Budget and proposed staff levels can be found in the management section.  EMBED MS_ClipArt_Gallery  THE CONGO IS A KEYSTONE COUNTRY The strategic importance of the Congo, the global significance of its resources, and the global threats posted by infectious diseasesCongo is one of the last refuges of devastating infectious diseases such as poliodictate continued positive engagement under all scenarios. THE CONGOS HUMAN CAPITAL IS IMPRESSIVE There is a plethora of citizen, private and local government institutions, as well as trained and motivated individuals. They present an opportunity for USAID to positively engage in a CORE of activities to help unlock a transition. OTI/NISSION COMPLEMENTARITY OTI Congo will have an obligation to ensure direct complementarity between activities that it funds from its IDA resources and those that are funded from ESF sources and that, as a result, remain subject to strictures on their direct use in support of the GDRC. Intermediate Result 1 Key health problems addressed with emphasis on redevelopment of governance structures for public health and citizen participation. IR1.1 Child survival enhanced IR1.2 STI/HIV/ AIDS combated through social marketing IR3.1 Environmental advocacy and awareness increased through education and environmental health activities Humanitarian and Transition Activities USAID CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the lives of citizens by working to meet critical needs, eradicating polio, mitigating environmental destruction and helping to unblock the stalled transition. Intermediate Result 2 Good governance and rule of law promoted with emphasis on multi-stakeholder problem-solving. Intermediate Result 3 Constituencies for sustainable management of natural resources built with emphasis on community participation. IR3.3 Environment and NRM policies analyzed and USAID positioned to assist rural areas IR1.3 Systems for health delivery rehabilitated IR2.1 Democratic processes and institutions strengthened In the CORE Plus Scenario, A USAID Congo priority will be to develop a new IR for Economic Growth that will both build on the policy work begun under IR2 promoting economic justice and best practices and the smallholder sustainable agriculture and agroforestry activities begun under IR3. The CORE program in the environmental sector will seek to create and mobilize the productivity of positive fora for engagement while addressing key environmental, sustainable management and conservation issues. Significant opportunities exist to mitigate the growing crisis of political exclusion by supporting the development of basic governance institutions and non-government organizations that respond to citizen civic and legal needs and interests. The CORE health strategy will provide a solid foundation for a transition to a more comprehensive maternal, child and reproductive health program with potential for greater results and impact when the situation improves (Scenarios B and C). IR3.3 Environment and NRM policies analyzed and USAID positioned to assist rural areas IR3.2 Environmentally and economically sustainable natural resource management activities undertaken IR2.2 Human rights and judicial processes improved IR2.3 Conflict is managed or avoided through stakeholder negotiation IR3.2 Environmentally and economically sustainable natural resource management activities undertaken Strategic Objective The Congolese people are assisted to solve national, provincial and community problems through participatory processes that involve the public, private and civil sectors.  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