This annex explores the nature and causes of actual or potential conflict in Kenya and proposes what USAID and the USG might do to help the country avoid or mitigate violent conflict. It assesses the likelihood of substantial conflict during the planning period of this ISP. The Mission’s primarily concern is for the stability of Kenya and the well being of the citizens who suffer from outbreaks of localized violence. Secondarily, conflict may affect the security of USAID staff residing in Kenya or interfere with implementation of USAID’s assistance programs. Finally, conflict of Kenyan origin has consequences for Kenya’s neighbors, and the reverse is also true. Before committing substantial resources to a long-term program of development assistance, it is important to assess the risks of conflict and to determine the risks of both continuing and discontinuing assistance.

It is widely recognized that conflict is an inherent part of modern, complex society, especially when interests are organized and self-seeking. Conflict is more intense when interests seeking fulfillment or redress meet stubborn resistance. The latter situation is generally more likely when resources are scarce or where contesting parties view their efforts to advance or maintain the status quo as zero-sum affairs.

Conflict can take many forms, some violent, others not. People find that their ideas, their preferences, their interests vary from those of their neighbors every day. Those ideas, preferences, and interests are in conflict, but they are normally either sublimated or acted upon and resolved in peaceful ways. The means of resolving daily conflict include negotiation, compromise, and reliance on institutions like village councils, courts, or the police. Violence often reflects the failure of institutions to allow for the pursuit of particular interests. Sometimes, e.g. in southern Sudan, it may continue unabated without institutional response or transformation.

Conflict, violent or not, may be restricted to local groups without wider intention or impact. But conflict can also aim at and involve national-level issues and participants. In still other cases, actors beyond national borders are engaged, either indirectly, through proxies, or directly.

The impact of violent conflict varies greatly, according to several factors, including: its duration, the number of people involved and their geographic location, the resources (especially weapons) at the disposal of competing parties, and their various perceptions of the stakes.

Prior to the imposition of pax Britanica, the part of East Africa that was to become Kenya was the scene of periodic conflict. Such groups as the Kwavi-Masai were notorious for attacks in the Rift Valley against both fellow Nilotic pastoralists and Bantu cultivators. At the coast, the most memorable perpetrators of such raiding were the Seguju, who sometimes ate their victims. While the coastal strip suffered from the successive conquests of the Portuguese and the Omani Arabs, the interior witnessed none of the kingdom or empire-building through conquest that occurred in Uganda.

The British established their colony over a considerable period, punctuated by violent resistance from such groups as the Nandi and the Giriama and smaller revolts from the Kamba, Taita, and others. Subjugation was accomplished by 1920, except in the Northern Frontier District, which remained in a special security category right up to independence.

The British took steps to contain conflict, such as employing the main Mombasa-Nairobi road as a de facto no-man’s land separating the feuding Kamba and Masai. And the post-conquest colonial period was largely peaceful, with one important exception that became a household word: Mau-Mau.

This rebellion, beginning in 1952 and lasting nearly five years, was actually a combination of two bitter struggles. The first was against the British, to recover land lost to the White settlers and, by extension, to bring British rule itself to an end. The second was an intra-Kikuyu affair, wherein those who had gained most from their association with the colonial state and economy were targeted by those who had been on the losing end. Nevertheless, with the end of the Mau-Mau and subsequent efforts to address land access and agricultural development issues in Central Province, much of the tension within the Kikuyu population had been diffused by the time the British flag was lowered.

Kenya was relatively peaceful and stable from independence in 1963 until the early 1990s. This absence of violent conflict was characterized by:

• The absence of an active secessionist, rural guerrilla, or urban terrorist movement (at least since the dissipation of the "greater Somalia" shifta war in northeastern Kenya during the mid-1960s).

• The infrequency of assassinations of major government or other public figures (notwithstanding several notorious cases that originated within the government, the repercussions of which the government was able to control).

• The relative willingness of members of different ethnic and racial groups to live together, both in rural areas, where people interact in more collective terms, and in urban areas, where they interact largely as individuals (with the main exception of parts of northern Kenya, where pastoralism has been traditionally associated with livestock raiding).

• The absence of class-based violence stemming either from urban labor unrest (over wages or the availability or prices of essential consumer goods) or from rural divisions between the landless poor and the landed gentry.

• The general security of persons and property, so that business could be conducted and financial and material assets created and utilized with sufficient confidence in the future.

• Tight government control of Kenya’s economic and political systems, leaving limited space for competition and conflict.

This stability began to crack in the 1990’s, however, as the country underwent rapid economic, social, and political change, resulting in increasing competition and conflict. The following phenomena have been significant in the last decade and are still prevalent, and potentially destabilizing, today.

The 1992 and 1997 elections both saw major eruptions of attacks, targeted on groups opposed to the ruling party. The attacks were largely ignored by the security forces and unpunished by the judicial system. Some attacks were aimed at entire communities, while others were aimed at individuals such as candidates, activists, and businessmen-supporters. The violence sometimes provoked counter-attacks.

The appearance of localized, semi-political, largely informal militias first surfaced during the return to multiparty politics in 1992 as part of an effort to counter political liberalization and reform movements through violence. Discussions with Kenyans from different parts of the country, together with media reports, have identified over a dozen of these groups, the most prominent of which is the Nairobi-based Jeshi la Mzee ("Army of the Old Man"). Several of these groups are associated with individual politicians associated with the KANU-B (hardline) faction, but some are associated with opposition politicians.

Large-scale violence has continued in the upper Rift Valley Province, the North Eastern Province, and the Eastern Province. The conflict is based on traditional cattle raiding but now involves far more advanced weaponry and greater destruction, looting, and killing than are characteristic of traditional Kenyan livestock theft.

With instability in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan, and a proliferation of weapons from these conflict zones, banditry and clan warfare along Kenya’s northern borders is on the rise. This instability has been exacerbated by an influx of refugees, who compete with Kenyans for land, water, and public services.

Violent crime (including use of the threat of violence) has increased to the point where it is sapping the strength of the institutions that hold Kenya together and is diminishing Kenyan’s trust in a better future. Large sections of Nairobi are virtually "no-go" areas at night, even for the police. Some robbery with violence is alleged to occur with the complicity of the police and other security forces. Over the last year, the number of carjackings has escalated significantly. Suspected and confirmed criminals are often subjected to mob justice, due to victim fatigue and a lack of faith in the justice system. Human rights organizations have also documented increasing cases of summary executions by police, who are rarely disciplined.

The destabilizing factors behind this escalation in conflict are not hard to identify. These factors have already had an impact on ethnic harmony and economic security, and they have the potential to weaken the stability of the political institutions that have generally kept the peace.

Per capita GDP has declined for most of the last fifteen years, so the Kenyan "pie" has been steadily shrinking. Each year 500,000 new job-seekers enter the Kenyan labor force and compete for 250,000 to 330,000 new jobs. The total labor force is currently estimated at 13 million, three million of whom are unemployed and a large proportion of whom are underemployed. The chronically unemployed understandably have less stake in the preserving the political and economic status quo.

Kenya is now second only to Brazil in the disparity of income between rich and poor. Half the country’s population now lives below the official poverty line, defined as the income necessary to purchase minimum daily caloric requirements. This dangerous polarization is also reflected in the inequitable distribution of land ownership, especially the fertile agricultural land that constitutes less than a fifth of Kenya’s area.

Several factors have contributed to increasing competition for natural resources. Factors include population growth, which has lead to subdivision of holdings and increased pressure on water, forest, and range resources, as well as corrupt allocation practices. The boom in export agriculture, especially of horticultural products, generates much-needed foreign exchange but exacerbates competition for water. All of these factors have led to mounting tension in many areas of Kenya between agriculturalists and pastoralists and between established populations and more recent migrants from other parts of Kenya.

Corruption has been a key way to both acquire wealth and distribute political patronage. Corruption has escalated over the last 15 years, in part due to the efforts of those in power to acquire enough wealth to survive in a more competitive political environment. This "looting" has undermined entire sectors of the economy, caused serious damage to the environment, and undercut the public’s confidence in law enforcement agencies and in the ability and willingness of the judiciary to protect property from violent and nonviolent economic crimes. It has contributed to the increasing disparity of income and wealth distribution, and fed the anger of those who are marginalized and disenfranchised by the economic and political systems.

Kenya’s population growth rate (currently 2.2 percent annually) increases competition for jobs, scarce natural resources (particularly land and water), and social services. Farmers are expanding onto marginal lands previously used for nomadic grazing. Herders are competing for, and over-grazing, land in the semiarid northern half of the country, especially around water sources. In many cases, large families have reportedly subdivided inherited farms into plots too small to support a family.

The impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the social fabric of the nation is difficult to predict. But it will be severe and could become destabilizing. One adult in seven is infected. With adults in their most productive years falling victim to the disease, the emotional and financial strain on surviving family members is mounting. At the same time, the number of AIDS orphans is exploding. The costs of caring for the sick and dying will surely grow out of control, putting a heavy strain on the ability of government, communities, and families to provide other social services. The ultimate psychological impact of this disease is also difficult to predict. But it is likely that, with a reduced life expectancy, some elements of society will feel less committed to investing in the future or maintaining a stake in stable economic and political regimes.

Kenya’s youth are increasingly marginalized in both the economic and political arenas, leading to widespread disaffection. As noted above, there are far more young people leaving school to look for work than there are jobs available, leading to disengagement from the economic system. In addition, the failure of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to register more than a fraction of eligible young voters before the 1992 and 1997 elections exacerbated the disaffection of an available pool of largely unhappy (if not angry) youth with very little stake in the political system and available for "hire" as political thugs. The growth and increasing visibility of the Mungiki semi-traditionalist religious sect (that has reportedly begun to recruit across its Kikuyu ethnic boundary) is one expression of the declining credibility of formal institutions and processes among Kenyan youth. The most volatile contingents are university students, who have already earned a reputation for violent displays of disgruntlement, whether regarding campus or wider, national issues, and matatu touts —the "conductors" on Kenya’s fleet of privately owned minibuses.

Ethnic, religious, and class identities constitute the primary fault lines within Kenyan society. Most competition for economic, political, or natural resources occurs along these lines. As competition has increased, these bases of identification with or distinction from others have become increasingly salient. This form of identification does not in itself automatically produce violent conflict. But experience both within Kenya and elsewhere in the region has shown that these identities can be highly subject to manipulation.

Certain regions and communities within the country have consistently been economically and politically marginalized by the government, and often by other Kenyans. Many of the vast pastoral regions of the country receive few government services, even of provisions for basic security. The GOK’s control of large sections of North Eastern Province, for example, is marginal at best.

Kenya lacks the institutional framework necessary to manage the political liberalization underway since the early 1990s. Radical changes have been taking place in the way politics are played in Kenya, as political institutions and the rules of the game have been rewritten. Political liberalization has brought on competitive multiparty elections, constitutional reform, efforts to level the political playing field, freedom of association, an aggressive press, increasing demands for public accountability, and other changes. The same changes have led to great disruption in the political arena, and produced challenges to many entrenched political interests. The ultimate goal of political liberalization should be better opportunities to compete through effective public institutions—rather than repressed competition as in the past. During the transition, many players are competing for the opportunity to define the new rules.

As President Moi’s departure from office approaches, political instability will increase. Primarily for this reason, the ruling KANU party has attempted to resist and, more recently, limit and control the process of constitutional reform over the last several years. Because of its impact on the rules of succession, following his 1997 electoral victory, the President waited fourteen months before appointing George Saitoti as Vice President. This delay, as well as the casual manner of the appointment, was widely interpreted as a refusal to "anoint" Saitoti as Moi’s "heir", leaving the selection of KANU’s next standard-bearer up in the air. Should President Moi die before the end of his term, an unsettled succession within KANU could result in a heated dispute within that party’s hierarchy.

Ongoing wars in several bordering countries have had a profound impact on stability in Kenya. Civil war and lawlessness in Somalia, and accompanying flows of arms and refugees, have seriously undermined stability in neighboring portions of North Eastern Province. Similar problems affect border regions with Sudan. The Ethiopian military frequently conducts cross-border raids against the insurgent Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and complains that Kenyan Borana provide shelter for the OLF. Kenyan security forces have had difficulty repelling or deterring cross-border raids into Kenyan territory and attacks on local populations, particularly along the Somalia border.

The profusion of refugees in Kenya, most of whom are from Somalia and southern Sudan, is another source of tension and occasional instability. Refugees are often perceived by Kenyan citizens as competitors for public services and other resources. Some of the wealthier refugees have been connected to a significant rise in the arms trade in Nairobi. The influx of refugees has exacerbated local clan conflicts, particularly among Somalis.

The increasing availability of weapons in Kenya results in large part from the excess of weapons available in the region due to the many ongoing wars. (The Kenyan government has, at times, distributed small arms to "home guards," especially in pastoral areas). The availability of weapons increased dramatically after the collapse of the Somali state. Although no firm figures are available, various analysts have identified the main sources of such arms and documented their falling prices in a variety of domestic and foreign markets. Unsubstantiated reports about the stockpiling of arms in anticipation of possible political crises raise the specter of a direct threat to national stability. Weapons proliferation is a major factor contributing to crime in urban centers and banditry and the ungovernable nature of remote regions.

Conflict across Kenya’s northwestern border with Uganda has roots in traditional cattle raiding between the Pokot and the Turkana of Kenya and the Karimojong of Uganda. This conflict has at times contributed to tension between the two countries and resulted in the mobilization of security forces on both sides of the border. This phenomenon has recently receded, as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania attempt to reconstruct the basis for economic and political cooperation.

Incidences of violent conflict in Kenya are essentially isolated (though not completely unrelated) local incidents. The current level of conflict is sufficient for serious concern, as it comes at great cost to much of the country. It leaves some areas impoverished and destroys gains made in others, while costing many lives and adversely affecting economic and political confidence in the country.

Of real concern is the possibility that these regional conflicts could become national in scale. Worthy of attention are the actors and issues that might have the power to trigger such an aggregation, and the factors that can help to preserve at least a semblance of stability. Several potential triggers are discussed below.

As the post-Moi era approaches, worry over political instability increases. In the eyes of many Kenyans, the most relevant aspect of the current debate over constitutional reform is its impact on the rules of succession. Primarily for this reason, the ruling party has attempted to resist and, more recently, limit and control the process of constitutional reform over the last several years. An unsettled succession within KANU could result in a heated dispute within the party’s hierarchy in the run-up to the next elections. Moreover, some of those involved in this power struggle have, in the past, demonstrated their willingness to manipulate tensions among communities and to resort to violence. More than one contestant has formed his own private group of thugs, and these may be called out to assist in such a struggle.

Thus, the struggle to inherit the presidency may be too intense for existing institutions to contain, without "down-sizing" the presidency. Without an agreed mode of exit for those most vulnerable to legal retribution for their past abuses of power, the individuals concerned may simply be unwilling to go. Tension could arise from conflicting efforts to raise the election’s democratic standard and guard vested interests that could become highly vulnerable after a transfer of power.

It is hard to predict the likely severity of the violence and disruption that might result from this struggle. A continuation of the current unstable, but not catastrophic, levels of disaggregated conflict and violence is one possibility. A complete systemic breakdown or possibly even a pre-emptive civilian-military intervention, by which the regime would effect its own "overthrow" to accomplish by force a consolidation of power it could not manage any other way is another, possibility. Such an opposite extreme scenario would only develop if the regime’s inner core determined that it could not control the constitutional reform process and/or the succession, that the opposition was likely to win fair elections, and that the regime risked becoming the object of retribution. The cooperation of the Kenyan military in such a scheme is by no means certain. The result of such a pre-emptive intervention would likely be violent opposition leading to an unpredictable security situation.

The GOK’s response to clear public and donor demands for economic reform, increased accountability, and a reduction in corruption has been slow, and the resulting loss of fiscal support from international financial institutions has left the Treasury teetering on the edge of insolvency. Continued severe economic decline could undermine social structure, confidence in government, and the government’s ability to provide services, including security. KANU’s system of patronage also lies in the balance. Entrenched interests and systemic inertia have somewhat impeded true reform of public procurement, expenditures, and accounting, and of the judiciary, all of which are necessary for long-term economic growth.

While the government may succeed in coming to terms with the Bretton Woods Institutions over budgetary support, thus preventing imminent collapse, the pressures of continuing economic decline and persistent demands for reform of economic governance will continue. The country is likely to face severe power and water rationing for the next six months, for example, with significant negative impacts on the economy. Even with the resumption of support from international financial institutions, the GOK is unlikely to have the financial means to pursue an adequate poverty reduction program. While the effects of continuing economic stress might take months to unfold, significant increases in unemployment and poverty could have political consequences, including escalating crime and other conflict, while threats to the economic status of Kenya’s middle class will likely increase further the demands for political and economic reform.

The role and political activism of Kenya’s middle class could perhaps become an increasingly decisive factor. Historically, the middle class has been relatively passive, and some key elements have been co-opted by the government. For example, Maendeleo ya Wanawake, the country’s leading women’s organization, maintains close ties to the government at the national-level, although its local member groups often reflect local character and issues. Despite its generally strong interest in preserving peace, the middle class has increasingly felt the pinch of Kenya’s economic decline. In many countries, the middle class has proved a particularly powerful advocate for reform, and the same could be true in Kenya, particularly if civil society leadership, especially religious institutions, can promote nonviolent tactics. Cooperatives of farmers, tea and coffee growers, local women’s organizations and religious groups, and many other representatives of Kenya’s middle class are increasingly manifesting broad discontent with declining standards of living. Experience suggests that a timid middle class will become more vocal and politically active in the face of declining expectations.

Violent conflict, livestock raiding, and banditry in the arid pastoral regions, arising from both local and external sources, show no signs of abating. While this conflict is unlikely to directly threaten the stability of the state, it continues to contribute to the country’s overall decline. Substantial portions of the country remain cut off from real interaction in the economy and continue to produce a large disaffected class of pastoralist Kenyans who are increasingly dependent on state and donor resources for survival. Elements of the northern populations also continue to facilitate the flow—and overall increase—of arms (and perhaps narcotics) within the country and the region, while potential trade with Ethiopia and other neighbors is severely inhibited by this instability.

As Kenya’s population continues to increase at a rapid pace without development of new alternative economic opportunities, the already enormous pressures on land, water, and forest resources will inevitably escalate. To date, this has produced primarily localized—but increasingly severe—violent conflicts, which have proven to be highly amenable to political manipulation. If effective, broadly acceptable means of managing these resources are not put in place soon, the situation will continue to deteriorate. Access to water resources is particularly unregulated by the government. Although some communities have successfully worked together to overcome these problems and—in many cases illegally—collectively manage these resources themselves, this solution will not be easy to achieve on a wider scale. In coming years, the country is likely to see increasing conflict—including violent conflict—over access to and control of resources.

In contrast to the many factors contributing to conflict and the many actors willing to exploit these issues, there are also numerous, potent voices for peace that are active on the Kenyan stage. These include:

The entire Kenyan population is aware of the crises that have affected most of the country’s neighboring states (Zanzibar, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi) at one time or another and have no desire to see widespread violent conflict erupt here. More specifically, while the middle class (including the landed peasantry) has historically been deeply conservative, it increasingly joins in demands for reform, and at the same time rejects violence. The middle class could thus become one of the strongest voices advocating for nonviolent change.

A wide variety of active individuals, civil society organizations, and NGOs promotes nonviolent change, reform processes, and conflict prevention and mitigation. Particularly active are many of the country’s leading religious bodies.

There are reformers in the government who support nonviolent change.

As the capacities of various government institutions and branches to fulfill their roles grows, they can increasingly participate in true balance-of-power politics, and serve as a force for nonviolent change. The Kenyan military, with its recognized professionalism, may have a particularly important role to play in promoting nonviolent change and preserving democratic institutions of governance.

Uganda’s reliance on imports from the port of Mombasa gives it a stake in continued stability in Kenya.

The Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD), the East Africa Community, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, and possibly other intergovernmental bodies of which Kenya is a member all have an interest in preserving peace in Kenya. They are all increasing their efforts to develop means to achieve these aims, for example through IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN), COMESA’s conflict response protocol, and other mechanisms.

The financial and strategic interests of the international community (especially of the United Kingdom and the United States) add ballast to the forces militating against the eruption of violence or breakdown.

USAID/Kenya plays a major role in the United States Mission’s strategy for conflict prevention, mitigation, and response in Kenya and the Greater Horn of Africa. In considering what USAID should do, there are several factors to keep in mind.

First, It is USAID’s job to focus on helping to build Kenya’s capacity to deal with the risks and threats of violent conflict, within the context of supporting efforts in economic development and policy, increasing rural incomes, managing natural resources, and developing institutions of democratic governance. The State Department and other USG agencies have the capacity to focus on short-term political concerns and ensure the attainment of USG specific interests. USAID has some ability to influence processes at risk of causing violent conflict in the short-term, particularly by working with State to encourage Kenyans of all ethnic groups and political affiliations to engage in constructive and peaceful dialogue with one another. But the real strength of USAID’s programs is in their ability to foster the longer-term processes of change and the building of institutions that can manage and channel conflict.

Secondly, despite the inherent rockiness of the current political reform process, USAID/Kenya knows from its principles and experience that investments in medium- to long-term institution-building are the right investments to make. The Mission must work with Kenyan stakeholders and other donors to monitor the progress of these institution-building activities and test progress against assumptions and hypotheses and to ensure that its combined investments are proportional to the capacity of key institutions and organizations to absorb resources.

Finally, USAID/Kenya must distinguish between those factors causing violent conflict that it can affect and those it cannot.. Unfortunately, many of the key factors that are contributing to the rise in violent conflict are unlikely to be amenable to USAID influence. The Mission can do little, for example, to prevent the proliferation of arms in the region or the decision by powerful individuals to resist reforms or to try to manipulate communal tensions for political ends. But there are many ways in which the Mission can have an impact, particularly through strengthening the many "voices for peace" in Kenyan society and by strengthening institutions that can balance power and channel conflict.

At the regional-level, the Ambassador and key country team members are encouraging President Moi and the government of Kenya to take a leadership role in brokering peace negotiations in Sudan and in encouraging the peaceful settlement of conflicts throughout the region. The Mission also encourages the GOK to continue offering a safe haven for refugees from the strife-torn countries of the region.

Within Kenya, the Embassy stays encourages Kenyans of all ethnic groups and political affiliations to engage in constructive and peaceful dialogue as they negotiate the shoals of political liberalization. Currently the debate on constitutional reform presents the greatest potential for progress and the greatest risk of failure, as the country moves toward the post-Moi era. In support of this dialogue, USAID and the Embassy work closely together to promote civic education for constitutional reform. USAID also recently solicited proposals from U.S. PVOs to help Kenyans define the constitutional issues at stake.

To help Kenyans define their issues and to better understand USG options, the Mission has financed several studies of conflict in Kenya.

The Muticon studies, the key findings of which were disseminated in a workshop, explored a wide range of actual and potential conflicts through a study project that produced 18 case and thematic research papers. Significant themes that emerged from the studies included:

• Most violent conflict in Kenya is over access to resources, particularly land and water.

• Conflict resolution efforts are more likely to succeed when those engaged have significant moral standing within the communities of combatants.

• Competitive multiparty politics often reward leaders who foment, or participate in conflict, rather than rewarding them for resolving or preventing them.

Currently an international consultant is conducting a study of communal conflicts along the borders with Uganda and Sudan.

The USAID/Kenya program of development assistance goes right to the root causes of actual and potential conflict in Kenya. Although one cannot expect to see an immediate reduction in conflict or the risks of conflict, it is important that USAID stay the course. It is through steady progress in these areas that conflict will be avoided in the long run.

The greatest source of conflict in Kenya is that resulting from increased population pressure on the natural resource base, particularly agricultural and grazing land and water. By helping Kenya to reduce its rate of population growth, USAID reduces the rate of pressure increase and thereby reduces the likelihood of conflict over resources.

The political and security implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic are unknown. It is sure that the costs of caring for the rapidly growing rolls of AIDS victims will impose an enormous burden on the country. Less well understood is the psychological impact the killer disease will have on the national psyche. Growing despair could lead to a diminished stake in the future and a reduced commitment to observing the rules of civil behavior that keep society stable. It is conceivable that, unchecked, AIDS could lead to increased crime and communal violence. The USAID program is an important tool to help reduce the chances of such an outcome.

Poverty has been identified as a root cause of conflict in Kenya. USAID’s interventions to increase rural household incomes address this problem directly. USAID’s agriculture program also promotes the sustainable use of natural resources, over which significant conflict is waged.

The surest way to prevent conflict in the long run is to develop the institutions of governance that give people confidence that their differences can be resolved through peaceful means—a representative legislative process, a legal system that delivers justice, local government that is responsive to its citizens, and the honest and efficient delivery of social services. USAID’s new DG strategy will help Kenyan reformers begin to develop such institutions.

USAID, with active participation from the Embassy, manages a program of small democracy and governance (DG) grants aimed at increasing the capacity of grass roots organizations to increase effective demand for constitutional, political, and legal reform. A stronger civil society, better able to advocate for peaceful change, is a powerful force for stability.

A number of the Mission’s small DG grants are directed at monitoring and protecting human rights and promoting the resolution of local disputes. Several of the NGO grantees monitor potential and actual violence and document it for both internal (Mission) and external (public dissemination) purposes. Certain grantees have a monitoring "Early Warning System" capacity that may discourage (or at least raise the cost, through exposure) those considering violent conflict as a strategy to achieve their ends.

Other grantees have been working mainly in post-conflict environments, helping communities rebuild trust following violence and encouraging the commitment to avoid violence in the future, whether the violence was locally fomented or encouraged or sponsored from outside. Still other grantees have sought to bring political leaders (Members of Parliament, District County Council representatives, and others) together to discuss and find solutions to conflict and other issues affecting marginal, pastoralist areas.

Current proposals for new activities include:

• Establishment of an analytical unit or capacity within civil society that can engage in the on-going monitoring of social tensions to provide continuing information and analysis of possible violent situations before they occur.

• Achievement of greater coordination between such "early warning" information and relief efforts, both within the Mission and between the Mission and other donors, taking into account regional (GHAI) concerns as well.

The U.S. Mission’s response to conflict includes major programs of humanitarian assistance to the region, managed from Nairobi. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has its African Regional Office in Nairobi, where it manages humanitarian interventions in conflict and other situations throughout the Greater Horn and the rest of Africa. And REDSO’s Office of Humanitarian Response and Transition Initiatives manages a substantial portfolio of PL 480 food assistance in response to both conflict and natural disasters.

It should be noted that any program promoting fundamental change threatens vested interests in the status quo and can stimulate resistance to that change, sometimes in the form of conflict. USAID’s entire democracy and governance program to date has been designed to increase effective demand for political reform and therefore runs the risk of heightening conflict, at least in the short-term. Indeed, prior to the 1992 elections, President Moi and other KANU leaders used the argument of the threat to national unity inherent in a return to multiparty politics as their strongest argument against the reform program.

But the absolute avoidance of all conflict would require inaction, and no one is suggesting that. USAID, with guidance from the Embassy, continually makes judgments about what changes are important to promote in Kenya and which run too high a risk of promoting unnecessary conflict. The fundamental guiding principal is to assist Kenyan reformers to promote those changes that will result, in the long run, in a prosperous, democratic, and peaceful Kenya, where disputes are routinely resolved nonviolently. In the short run, some advocates for peaceful change may find themselves in conflict with their opponents.

A final consideration is the level of violent conflict that USAID may have to contend with in order to implement its assistance program in Kenya. To date, the gradual escalation of conflict has not approached the point where it would put normal operations in jeopardy.

Because of the rising level of urban crime, especially the recent spate of car-jackings, all USAID staff exercise caution in where and how late they drive at night. American staff are required to carry security radios with them when they are on the roads of Nairobi.

USAID project activities can run afoul of the community violence that flares up from time to time. The microenterprise program, for example, was directly affected by ethnic violence that erupted in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces in 1992 and 1997, when several recipients of microenterprise loans suffered damage or destruction of their business premises, equipment, and inventories.

More significantly, USAID staff must be careful where they travel. Before traveling to the northern half of the country, USAID/Kenya, REDSO, and OFDA officers check with the Embassy’s Regional Security Office to learn of travel advisories. Banditry has become common enough in northern Kenya, that, with the exception of DG grants to indigenous NGOs and PL 480 and humanitarian assistance, the Mission is not considering development activities in the sparsely populated north.

The Ambassador and Country Team have concluded that, while there is a risk that conflict may periodically escalate in Kenya, this is a country in which it is well worth continuing to invest USAID resources. USAID should stay the course in helping Kenyans address the underlying causes of conflict. The period up to and immediately following the next presidential election poses particular opportunities for USAID to help Kenyans lay the foundations for long-term peace and prosperity.

In this time of rapid transition, USAID/Kenya will watch closely for new opportunities to help Kenyan reformers and peacemakers. The Mission will also closely monitor the security situation to avoid putting its staff and partners in harm’s way.

annex