Islam and the Religious Dimension of Conflict in KenyaDavid C. Sperling
The circumstances of Islam in Kenya are so different from those in the Arab world (and in countries with a majority of Muslims) that the prospect of a sustained radical Islamist movement at any time in the foreseeable future is remote. Nevertheless, the past few years have witnessed a number of violent incidents in areas of the country inhabited predominantly by Muslim peoples. These incidents vary widely in makeup, and include: internal conflicts (within a Muslim community or between Muslim communities), anti-government urban riots (as occurred in Mombasa and Lamu in 1992 and 1993), rural protests (as occurred in Diani in February-March 1997), and more recently, beginning in August 1997, violent raiding and arsonry in Likoni and other parts of Kwale District on the southern Kenya coast. Though such instances of conflict can be analyzed in purely political, economic and social terms (minimizing, if not ignoring, the presence and importance of Islam), they differ from other apparently similar instances in that they occur within a Muslim context and may embody a distinct Muslim character.
We must not assume that Muslims in Kenya (or the rest of the world) always, or even usually, promote or provoke the conflict in which they are involved. Because of the constant negative publicity given by the world media to violence in Muslim countries, many persons have come to link the religion of Islam with an ethos of violence.1 Apart from being erroneous, such a presumption is of little practical or analytical help in understanding the origin and nature of such conflict in Kenya (or elsewhere). To assess the role played by Islam, we need to cast a more empirical eye on events, and ask a number of pertinent questions. What kinds of conflict involve Muslims? Who are the protagonists (non- Muslim as well as Muslim) of this conflict, and what are the circumstances that give rise to it? Does such conflict exhibit discernible patterns? Does Islam influence the way in which conflict is expressed and plays itself out?
This paper first looks at the nature of religious conflict and the general circumstances of Islam in Kenya, and then goes on to examine the kinds of religious conflict that involve Muslims, seeking to understand the "Islamic factor" at work, and to assess the causes of such conflict and effective ways of countering those causes.
What is "religious conflict"?
By the term "religious conflict" we do not refer only, or even mainly, to religious or theological disputes between different religions (for example, Islam and Christianity) or within a single religious tradition (for example, the Sunni- Shi`a divide in Islam). Rather we use the term more broadly to designate any conflict that comes to be expressed wholly or partially in religious terms, whether by one or all parties. Since the core issues of many "religious conflicts" are not religious, it would be more correct in such instances to refer to the "religious dimension of conflict", but for convenience of expression we use the shorter term "religious conflict".
The nature and causes of religious conflict
This paper is based on the premise that conflict expressed in religious terms usually reflects other kinds of secular tensions (economic, political, social, racial, ethnic, ideological), and that such conflict more often than not embodies several issues of contention. There is evidence that people tend to express their "secular" grievances in religious terms when such an approach is to their advantage 2
(for example, when religion provides a common unifying bond), when other avenues of protest are blocked or have failed, or as a desperate attempt to protect threatened interests.2
Another basic premise of the paper is that religious conflict arises, as often as not, as a component of broader cultural misunderstanding, involving an unwillingness or inability to comprehend and respect the aspirations, customs and values of an unfamiliar religion and culture. Such misunderstanding can occur between individuals, between peoples, and between a government and a governed people. When a government is perceived by a people to be unsympathetic to their cultural (including religious) traditions and heritage, such antipathy almost inevitably elicits anti-government feeling and action. Religious (and other) conflict is especially difficult to resolve when it takes place along cultural (and ethnic) boundaries. These tend to exacerbate disagreement by re-enforcing a "we-they" attitude. More deleterious still is the fact that cultural diversity can produce quite dissimilar perceptions, not only of the issues that need to be resolved, but of the means of resolution.
Groups in conflict may have real religious differences, but these differences in themselves are usually not sufficient either to explain the conflict taking place or to assess the nature of that conflict. When the basic causes of conflict are only partly religious, the conflict is not fully resolved by some kind of "religious" solution, for example, by giving Muslims in Kenya their own Islamic Religious Education syllabus in secondary schools. A "religious" solution is commendable, for it resolves some aspect of conflict, but it may only be a partial remedy offering temporary conciliation. Comprehensive resolution begins when the key underlying causes of the conflict have been identified and addressed.
The Muslim peoples of Kenya
"In our country Kenya, Muslims are not few in number, but their condition is weak and they are not prospering at all. No doubt the causes of this state of affairs are weakness of faith and lack of unity." (Shaykh Muhammad Kasim Mazrui, former Chief Kadhi of Kenya) 3
The Muslim peoples of Kenya are a diverse, heterogeneous, minority population weakened by internal divisions. One factor relevant to an understanding of their disunity is the existence of what we may call "ethnic Islam", that is, the existence of numerous distinct Muslim communities, in rural and urban areas, each with its own blend of ethnic, racial and sectarian traits. By drawing attention to this multiplicity of communities we do not discount the existence of a single Muslim umma in Kenya comprising the various Muslim communities scattered throughout the country.4 We wish rather to underscore some of the barriers to achieving unity of faith in practical terms.
Though Muslims constitute a minority population in Kenya (estimates range from 6% to 35%),5 their concentration in the Coast and North Eastern Provinces, where several Districts and towns have a majority Muslim population, makes this region prone to potential religious conflict involving Muslims. Two peoples of this region, the Somali and the Swahili, are exceptional in that they have a tradition of Islam going back many centuries, and their very ethnic identity is deeply Muslim. A third indigenous Muslim people, the Digo, who adopted Islam more recently beginning towards the end of the 19th century, are also exceptional as the only Bantu-speaking people of Kenya to have become Muslim on a 3
large scale. The presence of these three communities, the Somali (in the North Eastern Province), the Swahili (mainly in coastal urban centres) and the Digo (in Kwale District of the Coast Province), gives this region a marked, though not exclusively, Muslim character, quite distinct from other parts of Kenya.
Muslim communities are also found scattered throughout the interior of Kenya, in all the major towns and in a number of rural villages, but nowhere in the interior are they the dominant population. In rural areas they tend to live together in small communal groups, surrounded by their non- Muslim neighbours, with whom they have constant dealings and whose language they share. In Nairobi and the towns, they may be concentrated in certain quarters (for example, Kibera and Riruta Muslim Village in Nairobi), but this does not prevent them from mixing freely and having constant friendly relations with their non-Muslim neighbours.
Summing up, we can say that large areas of the interior of Kenya have few Muslim communities or none at all. Where such communities do exist, whether in rural areas or in urban centres, they tend to be small and physically isolated from the other Muslim communities of Kenya, and like many such communities are often more preoccupied with local concerns than with a national "Muslim agenda". These circumstances may explain why the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) has found little resonance among many upcountry and rural Muslims, except for the younger generation for whom it represents an attractive medium of political protest in a familiar idiom. This is not to say that Muslims in Kenya do not have certain common interests and concerns, as will be discussed below.
Ethnic Islam
The existing pattern of Muslim population distribution is a result of the way Islam spread throughout the interior in the late 19th and 20th century. Only a small number of Africans in the interior came into regular contact with Muslims (usually in trading or administrative centres), and of those who did, only a minority were attracted to Islam. Africans who adopted Islam usually retained traits of their pre-Islamic culture, and various local "ethnic" Muslim communities grew up, in such places as Mumias, Kendu Bay, Kisii, Nyeri, Chuka and Kitui. These communities inherited the dominant attributes of Swahili Islam (Sunni and the Shafi`i school of law), and embraced common traits derived from Swahili culture, notably Swahili cuisine, dress, dances and songs. They also came to use Swahili as the language of Islam, but they continued to speak their vernacular language in daily life, and in dealings with their non-Muslim fellow Africans, with whom they usually had far more frequent relations than with other Muslim communities. The diverse cultural circumstances and localized minority status of these new Muslim communities, many of whom had little regular contact with the wider Muslim world, meant that the umma in Kenya came to be fragmented by internal ethnic boundaries.
Muslims and internal religious conflict
For purposes of analysis it is useful to distinguish between internal religious debate related to Islamic ideology and practice, and discourse among Muslims regarding their relations ad extra with the external non-Muslim world (including the State). A high proportion of religious conflict among Muslims in Kenya involves internal disputes centred on religious institutions or associations, what might be called in academic jargon "the control of religious and 4
ideological space".
Let us take, for example, the institution of the mosque. In some Muslim countries, such as Egypt, mosques are controlled by the State. The government not only appoints the imam of every mosque, but imams are civil servants, whose salaries are paid by the government, thus ensuring a certain uniformity and government control.6 In Kenya, the institution of the mosque is decentralized. Most Muslim communities in Kenya have their own mosques, built and maintained through the joint effort of members of the community. A local elected committee supervises the running of the mosque, soliciting help as needed from the community and from other benefactors.7 Where a single mosque serves more than one ethnic or racial group, there is always potential for disagreement, particularly if one of the groups, for whatever reason, monopolizes positions of responsibility and control. Local rivalry for the control of the imamship, and membership of the mosque committee, can also arise out of ideological differences. Such rivalry may result in an attempt by one group to take over the mosque and imamship,8 or to the building of a second Friday mosque in the same vicinity,9 or simply to a prolonged state of tension.
The struggle for institutional control usually proceeds behind the scenes quietly and imperceptibly. Occasionally, however, such disputes erupt into public view, and give a glimpse of the kinds of tensions at work, tensions which at times are so intense and protracted that the government has been asked or forced to intervene:
"Over 100 Muslims marched to the District Commissioner's office on Friday afternoon, protesting the arrest of an Imam from Kakamega's Jamia Mosque, Imam Shaykh Sadala. The Muslims suspect that the arrest was prompted by a struggle over who should be the Imam at the mosque. Shaykh Sadala has been Imam for the last six years, but for the last two months a section of the Muslims who are of Somali origin have imposed an Imam on the mosque. The Muslims disclosed that whenever the imposed Imam took over the pulpit, the congregation marched out and left the Muslims of Somali origin to listen. They questioned the legality of this, saying that the trouble which has been simmering reached a peak when the Muslims of Somali origin ordered those who are not of their ethnic group to vacate the compound at the mosque as they wanted to form a new management committee."10
"Muslims in Kibwezi have appealed to the Government to intervene in the on-going wrangles between Africans and Arabs. According to Nadim Feroz din Khan the problem has been going on for three years. The Africans have complained that the Arabs have been blocking them from appointing an African Imam to man the Kibwezi Zahir Mosque, claiming that they (the Africans) are not versed in the teachings of Islam."11
"A fight broke out during Friday prayers at the Aqsa Mosque in Kisauni between the local Muslim community and the officials of the Islamic Foundation after the local Kisauni community numbering more than 300 were forced to listen to a sermon given by a Muslim preacher who does not conform to their cultural values. A local Muslim preacher Ustadh Bampini, who had been invited by the local Muslim community to lead the prayers, was about to mount the stairs to the Minbar (pulpit) to deliver the Friday sermon 5
when he was blocked by an official of the Islamic Foundation. The official told the congregation that Ustadh Bampini had no authority to deliver the sermon. He said that the person who had been delegated the duties of delivering the sermon was Ramadhan Alwa Juma. The congregation who had packed the mosque for Friday prayers then rose up and demanded the removal of the intruder to let Ustadh Bampini lead the prayers."12
The contest over control of the imamship at the Jamia Mosque in the centre of the city of Nairobi has recently received a great deal of attention. The controversy came to the notice of the general public in July 1995 when the Mosque committee declared the incumbent imam, Sheikh Ali Shee, unsuitable for the position and decided not to renew his contract.13 His dismissal led to a public outcry among Muslim worshippers at the mosque. The protracted dispute that ensued for a period of some nine months was featured regularly on the front page of the main daily newspapers, and at one point even elicited a full-page newspaper statement by 66 of Ali Shee's fellow imams in his support.14 The Jamia Mosque committee was restrained from implementing its decision by an injunction of the High Court after a group of Muslims filed a suit against the mosque officials.15 Eventually the court case was withdrawn, and both parties agreed to resolve the dispute through the arbitration of a group of mutually acceptable Muslim scholars (`ulama).16 This episode is an interesting one from many points of view. Given the importance of the Jamia Mosque, as the main mosque of the capital city of Kenya, where many different Muslims congregate for daily and Friday prayers, it is not surprising that the position of the imam generated intense public (Muslim) involvement, and that an amalgam of ethnic, racial, ideological, and personal factors was at play, a kind of microcosmic representation of all the elements of unity and disunity at work throughout the Kenyan umma. As a study in institutional theory, the case shows the ultimate importance of controlling the mosque committee. As an example of conflict resolution, it is instructive, and commendable, that the dispute was in the last analysis resolved internally in a Muslim forum.
The importance given to controlling mosque leadership is evident when one understands that much of the ideological debate within Islam revolves around such religious practices as maulid17 and funeral prayers, which are usually carried out by the imam. These practices, considered bid`a18 by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, have been a part of Swahili Islam, and of the various ethnic varieties of Islam in the interior, for as long as can be remembered. Almost all rural African Muslim communities have had a tradition of celebrating maulid, and many Kenya African Muslims first embraced Islam attracted by the maulid celebrations.19 The celebration of maulid has thus come to symbolize the ideological conflict between "popular" Swahili Islam and Wahhabi Islam.20
Competition for control of ideological space also emerges in relation to the syllabus for teaching Islamic Religious Education in government schools. When Shaykh Abdilahi Nassir, a spokesman for the Shi`a Muslims in Kenya, accused the Kenya Institute of Education (KIE), the government body that supervises curriculum development and the writing of textbooks for primary and secondary schools, of publishing Islamic books with an anti-Shi`a bias, the Director-General of the Islamic Foundation, Mr. Aktar Rao, was quick to defend the KIE against this accusation.21 And parents of children 6
studying Islamic Religious Education have cautioned teachers of religion who have Wahhabi views not to force these views on their students.22 The formation of a Majlis ul `Ulama (a "Council of Learned Scholars") by a number of Kenya Muslim scholars (appointed by the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims) can be viewed as an attempt, not just to control, but to create ideological space. As might have been expected, the initiative to form this Council was quickly condemned as being unrepresentative by those of opposing points of view who were not invited to participate, and eventually failed to work effectively.23
A final point for consideration related to the imamship is the opportunity that it gives religious leaders to comment on all aspects (including the political) of the secular world. Imams of individual mosques are often reported as praying for the President,24 or criticizing opposition leaders.25 Imams are also reported as using their position to criticize the political leadership in the country.26 The most extreme case of such negative commentary to date has been that of Shaykh Abdulaziz Said Rimo, the imam of the Noor Mosque (Ukunda, Kwale District) who was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for sedition, accused of delivering a Friday sermon in which he said that he had no confidence in President Moi and that the government of Kenya should be overthrown.27 In general, such commentary seems to follow an ethnic or political pattern, with imams from areas of the country that support the ruling party commenting positively, and criticism emanating from areas where the ruling party has less support. This trend is consistent with the existence of a fragmented, ethnic Islam referred to earlier in the paper.
What conclusions can we reach with regard to internal Muslim tensions and divisions in Kenya? In Muslim countries like Algeria and Egypt, such religious conflict can have serious public repercussions, since it tends to encompass the entire population, including even those persons not particularly interested in the issues in dispute. In Kenya, if other means of resolution fail, the Muslim parties usually seek government intervention or have recourse to civil courts, and such disputes rarely affect non-Muslims or the public at large. At most the conflict becomes a news item to be read about, as happens with the religious quarrels that occur from time to time in Christian churches. These local conflicts are nothing to be surprised or alarmed about; they come and go in all religions. Where they persist or are especially prevalent or violent, however, they should not be ignored, for they may point to broader deeper divisions and be indicative of more serious discord.
The nature and impact of foreign aid
Sensitive to the needs (and vulnerability) of local Muslim communities, international organizations and foreign Muslim governments have turned Kenya into the venue of an on- going religious "cold war".28 Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries offer scholarships for study overseas, and also sponsor activities, and fund numerous projects and institutions, often in competition with each other. The Iranian Library and Cultural Centre opened in Nairobi in October 1991 is a prime example, as are the medical clinics, and other institutions, sponsored by the International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia throughout Kenya.
This kind of foreign assistance, which is usually offered quietly with a minimum of publicity, can create a serious dilemma for local Muslim communities. Generous propositions are made to build new mosques or madrasas, and to pay the 7
salaries of the imam and religious teachers, but on condition that the local Muslim community benefitting from the grant hands over control (and sometimes the title deed of the land) of the mosque or madrasa, and allows the donor agency to appoint the imam and teachers. Viewed in this context, the objective of some of the donor agencies seems to be not so much to strengthen local Muslim communities, but rather to increase their own influence and control over those communities. Many Muslim communities have had the chance of acquiring modern mosques and madrasas, together with recurrent financial aid, on a scale far beyond what their own means or local donations could have provided, but the price they have to pay for these facilities is the loss of control over the very Muslim institutions they wished to have. Indeed the decision whether or not to accept foreign aid with such strings attached has itself been the cause of deep division within some Muslim communities.29
Though it is too early to judge the long-term effects of foreign influence and overseas aid, indications are that while such assistance may better the material conditions of a given Muslim community and of the Kenya umma in general, it creates further disharmony among Kenya Muslims. Whereas in the past external Muslim influences were limited in scope and relatively homogeneous, now increasingly the divisions that exist in the broader world of Islam are being imported into Kenya, and Kenya Muslims are coming under the influence of a variety of conflictive Islamic traditions, which not only differ among themselves, but also differ from the practices of Swahili and Somali Islam. The effect of this has been a further weakening of unity and an increase of internal tension and conflict. To what extent this trend will continue, or possibly increase, is difficult to assess. The activity of foreign Muslim organizations is at a relatively early stage, and is itself subject to unpredictable change. Thus, it would be premature to forecast the degree to which their activities will engender more serious conflict in the future.
Islam and the State: in defence of religious integrity
Much of the public agenda of Muslims is aimed at defending their religious and cultural values against secularization and Christianization. These values, which receive the universal support of all Muslim communities in Kenya, constitute a common religious denominator of Muslim identity, and thus provide a common idiom of protest. In this connection, certain key topics have dominated relations between Muslims and the secular authorities of the State: the need to allow Muslims to be governed by Islamic law, respect for the Islamic code of dress, provision of food in government institutions in accordance with required Islamic norms, and public regard and facilities for Muslims (for worship and the celebration of feasts) equal to those accorded to Christians.
Since these are matters on which Muslims are known to hold unanimous views, the government and the President have tended to give them due recognition, using important public occasions to make political capital out of concessions or decisions favorable to Muslims. Thus, towards the end of 1990, when the wearing of the hijab by Muslim girl students became a major public issue, the President himself assured Muslims at a large rally in Mombasa that no one would force Muslim school girls to dress in a way contrary to their faith.30 Shortly afterwards Muslim students at two major boys' schools, in Nairobi and Nakuru, protested that they did 8
not have any place to pray, and they were not allowed to say their prayers as stipulated by their religion.31 Similar issues have been raised by Muslim students at schools in Kiambu and Murang'a Districts, who boycotted meals in the dining halls, claiming that the meat had not been slaughtered in accordance with Muslim ritual.32 Tensions arose at Limuru Girls High School when Muslim students thought that pork was to be introduced into the school menu; a meeting between the parents of the Muslim students and the Board of Governors of the school was necessary to resolve the issue.33 Muslim students in government schools in Nairobi have also complained that they were not given time off to celebrate the Idd festival at the end of Ramadhan.34 Muslim leaders have also been vocal in opposing the promotion of family planning by the government. Individual imams have criticized this as going "against Islamic principles and the family".35 And more recently when Muslim leaders objected to the government policy that Muslim women should remove their veils when being photographed for their identity cards, the government moved quickly to re-assure Muslims that this would not be necessary and that Muslim women could be photographed with their veils.36
A major issue of concern to Muslims is being allowed to follow Islamic Law, particularly as it relates to marriage, divorce and inheritance. When the Law of Succession (Chapter 160 of the Laws of Kenya) came into effect on the 1st July 1981, it applied to all citizens of Kenya irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation. On the 13th December 1990, after numerous requests from Kenya Muslims, the Kenya Parliament amended the Law of Succession to exempt Muslims from the Law and to allow them to follow Islamic law in all matters related to inheritance. President Moi capitalized on this issue by stating publicly, prior to the passing of the amendment, that "there was need to amend the Law to reflect the wishes of the Kenyan Muslim community".37 An indication of the importance attached by Muslims to the matter of inheritance is the fact that as soon as the amendment was passed, Shaykh El-Maawy, a former chairman of the Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya, appealed to the government to review all cases of inheritance that had been dealt with before the Law of Succession had been amended.38 Along similar lines, Muslims have consistently oppposed the draft Marriage Bill (which has never been passed into law), which would bar them from following Islamic marriage law.39 Minor aspects of the law are also the subject of appeal: Muslims have asked the government to amend the use of the word "Mohammedan" by substituting the word "Islamic" in the official title of Kenya laws, for example, the Mohammedan Marriages and Divorces Registration Ordinance (Chapter 155 of the Laws of Kenya).40
Another point of contention between Muslims and the Kenya government has been the failure of the Ministry of Education to register Islamic Teacher Training Colleges in Maragua (Murang'a) and Mikindani (Mombasa), in spite of an acknowledged shortage of teachers for Islamic Religious Education.41 Both the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) issued statements criticizing the government's adamancy in refusing to register the Colleges, and the Chairman of the caretaker committee of IPK even reportedly went so far as to issue a fatwa (a formal legal opinion, in this case an indictment) against the Minister of Education at the Sakina Mosque in Mombasa.42 SUPKEM then formed a committee to approach the government and request that it reconsider its decision not to register the 9
Colleges. Finally, in January 1996, President Moi directed that the Islamic Teacher Training College at Mikindani be registered, but registration of the college at Maragua is still pending.43
No topic is too small to form the basis for protest: when the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) discontinued the only Islamic religious programme and reduced the number of special Ramadhan programmes, the Muslim community reacted.44 The Kisumu Muslim Association rejected the appointment of a non-Muslim headmaster by the Kisumu Municipal Education Authority and refused to hand over the school built by the Muslim community of Kisumu.45 Kenya even has its own case, parallel (though approached quite differently) to the Satanic Verses affair: the Chairman of the Muslim community of Kitale called on the government to ban a book entitled The Quran is not the book of God, claiming that the book will create antagonism between Muslims and Christians.46
Muslim-Christian relations
Though Muslims in Kenya generally get along well with Christians and are not characteristically hostile to Christianity, there are occasional incidents (such as the burning of a Christian church in Siyu in 1990) that reveal Muslim-Christian tensions in specific localities. Several years ago Daystar University College (a private Christian institution in Nairobi) was accused by Muslims of allocating money in its budget to "buy Muslims into the Christian faith". The allegation was promptly denied by the Principal of Daystar, and a formal press statement issued by the College.47 The activities that most promote inter-religious tension seem to be "street preaching" and public religious rallies, whether Christian or Muslim (Jeevanjee Garden or Tononoka style). A recent fight between Muslims and members of the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church in Mumias town (Kakamega District) arose over remarks made by a Christian pastor during a public open-air crusade in the middle of the town.48 Such preaching has been banned in Tanzania (though the ban is not altogether successful), where it had reached much more provocative levels than in Kenya. Christian-Muslim disagreements have also occurred over the burial of persons whose religious affiliation is the subject of dispute.49 And during violence in Kwale District in September 1997, several churches were burnt down.50
One place where Christian-Muslim relations have been particularly strained is the Merti trading centre north of Isiolo, where Christian missionary work has brought about the conversion of a number of Waso Borana families from Islam to Christianity. Recently Muslims have been embroiled in a dispute over the use of land by the Catholic Mission there.51 According to newspaper reports, an "anti-Christian" demonstration was held "threatening to burn all Christians" in the town.52 Such incidents of Christian-Muslim conflict are, however, the exception rather than the rule. And there are some quite remarkable instances of inter-religious cooperation and recognition, as, for example, the letter of Al-Haj Seif Mohamed Seif, congratulating the Catholic Little Sisters for running a home for the destitute, including Muslims without discrimination.53, and the initiative of Muslim imams in the Coast Province who wanted to form a "joint Muslim-Christian alliance to fight for the dignity and rights of all Kenyans".54 And in August 1995, the imam of the Jamia Mosque, Ali Shee, and the Archbishop of Nairobi, Maurice Cardinal Otunga, conducted a joint ceremony in which they condemned the family life education programme of the 10
Kenya government.55 Officials of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims have also come out in support of the call for constitutional reforms made by the Christian churches.56 What can be concluded is that relations between Muslims and Christians are generally congenial and show no signs of changing. There is a long tradition of tolerance and mutual respect between most Muslim and Christian groups of Kenya. Inevitably friction has occurred, and will occur again in particular places over specific issues, but this should not weaken the existing good relationship at any time in the near future.
Land disputes: sacred versus secular
During recent years Muslims have been involved in a number of land disputes with organizations or private individuals. Given the large number of land disputes throughout the country arising out of endemic land grabbing, and what seems to be a policy of re-allocating public or community plots to individual persons, such conflict could be viewed as indicative of nation-wide circumstances, and not peculiar to Muslim communities. After all, many non-Muslim groups have faced similar threats to their land, as have Christian communities to their school and church grounds. If we look more closely at land disputes involving Muslims, however, we find that a high proportion of them relate to "sacred" land used for worship (mosques) or for burial of the dead (cemeteries). Muslims have quite understandably been incensed at any manoeuvre that would deprive them of land used for these purposes.
In the last few months the following land disputes have been reported in the press:
1) with Leisure Lodge, a private hotel in Diani, which was allocated a plot adjacent to the hotel on which a mosque stands;57 2) with a private developer at Kibera, who claims land belonging to the Muslim cemetery there;58 3) with the Jua Kali artisans in Nyeri town, who have been allocated part of the local Muslim cemetery;59 4) with the Nairobi City Council over a plot which accommodates owners of curio kiosks behind the Jamia Mosque;60 5) with a private individual (unnamed) who has been allocated 16 acres of the Kongo Mosque site at Diani;61 6) with a private developer in Kabiyet trading centre (Nandi District) who has been allocated a mosque plot in the centre of the town;62 and
7) with an "influential businessman" over a plot in Migori town on which the Muslim community had planned to build a primary school.63 The alienation of land belonging to Muslims had reached such a serious state that the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims requested an audience with President Moi to discuss and present a memorandum on the issue. The memorandum expressed its concern about the fate of "land meant for religious purposes", and stated that "the community has seen its land being stolen and given away without consideration to its legitimate and inalienable right to ownership".64 Subsequent to this meeting, SUPKEM issued a press release publicly expressing its appreciation to the President "for his consideration on the land issues of interest to Muslim institutions such as Mosques, burial sites, madrassas and waqfs", and referring to the President's "directive to the Commissioner of Lands to revoke any title document to such lands issued to other parties and to register the lands in the Muslim institutions' respective names".65
The dispute over the mosque plot allocated to the Leisure Lodge Hotel is a relevant and revealing example of the 11
problem of "cultural misunderstanding" referred to at the beginning of this paper. The hotel has stated that it wishes to demolish the mosque to make way for a golf course. Though evidently acting in good faith -offering to build another mosque for the Muslim community elsewhere- the hotel management has not been sensitive to the Muslim notion of the "sacred", and to the fact that once a mosque has been constructed, the land on which it stands becomes "holy" and should not be used for any secular purpose.66 With the government seen to be favouring the hotel, the dispute has become particularly caustic, bringing government officers and the Muslim community of Diani into direct confrontation. The community, which sought and was granted a court injunction restraining the hotel from demolishing the mosque, has sued the Commissioner of Lands and the Kwale District Planning Officer.67 The arrest by Diani police of two of the more active Muslim leaders of the area, who were later charged in court with abusing President Moi and making seditious remarks against the government, brought angry protests from Muslim residents of Diani, who smashed a bus belonging to Leisure Lodge, burned down a garage and bar, and engaged the police in running battles.68 Subsequently, the Muslim party argued in the High Court that the reason for the violence was because the hotel had already begun to develop part of the plot on which the mosque stands in violation of the restraining order of the Court.69 It remains to be seen whether the June meeting of SUPKEM officials with the President will have any effect on this particular dispute, or whether the case will continue to be heard through the courts.
Islam and politics
"Section 3.1.1.: To serve as a political party committed to the establishment and maintenance of a God conscious constitutional government."
"Section 3.1.2.: To be a consultative, democratic and just political movement that shall seek to transform the people of Kenya into a strong willed, morally and socially committed and tolerant nation that values justice, peace, democracy, unity, love, cooperation and participation of all Kenyans in national development."
(Constitution of the Islamic Party of Kenya, 7th February 1992)70
The violent anti-government protests and riots that broke out in Mombasa in May and September 1992, and in Lamu in September 1992 and August 1993, reflect the deep prevailing frustrations of Muslim coastal communities. Though the government has acceded to many Muslim demands in the fields of education, law, dress code and freedom of worship in schools, Muslims still perceive that many of their social and educational needs are disregarded, that their cultural and religious values continue to be threatened, if not disrespected, under a secular, Christian-dominated government, and that they have been neglected and marginalized politically and economically in the modern Kenya state. Indeed, there is a general feeling among all the peoples of the Coast and North Eastern Provinces, not just among Muslims in those provinces, that they have had less opportunities than people from other Provinces, and that as a consequence they are less well integrated into the modern economy, and have benefitted less than other peoples of Kenya during the post-independence years.71
The feeling of alienation is particularly strong among 12
unemployed Muslim (and non-Muslim) youth at the coast, who see wealth and economic prosperity (whether of up-country Kenyans or tourists) all around them.72 It is not surprising therefore that the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), formed in 1992, appealed in particular to this group and attracted its main support from them.73 Government denial of registration (Kenya Gazette of May 26, 1992), and the ability of the Party to promote active confrontation with the secular power of the State enhanced its standing and prestige.74 In May 1993, the Party called a one-day strike in Mombasa, which effectively paralysed the town, to protest the arrest of their spiritual leader, Sheikh Khalid Balala.75 And then in September 1993, more riots and anti-government demonstrations were held in Malindi and Mombasa.76 In the month of March 1994, several skirmishes took place between the police and Muslim youths in Mombasa.77 At the same time, members of IPK were politically active in parts of upcountry Kenya. For example, Abdulrahman Wandati, the national Secretary-General, campaigned for Burudi Nabwera, the Ford-Kenya candidate for the Lugari parliamentary by-election in February 1994, but this kind of activity has been sporadic and isolated, and is often undertaken by individuals rather than as an activity sanctioned by the Party.78 Tension in Mombasa continued off and on during 1995 and 1996. In August 1995, the police dispersed the annual Maulid gathering before the procession had even started,79 and in April 1996, police arrested hundreds of Muslim youth as Muslims were preparing to celebrate the Idd festival.80 This kind of repressive heavy- handed action seems ill-advised and unnecessary, moreso coinciding with Muslim religious festivals; it is a sure way of alienating Muslims even further, and can only serve to heighten anti-government sentiment, thereby promoting further tension and conflict.
From the name "Islamic", one might be led to believe that the foundation of the Islamic Party of Kenya was the expression of a national Muslim religious consciousness. Indeed, Amos Wako, the Attorney General, stated that the party was denied registration because it was based on religion, contrary to the Constitution.81 Scrutiny of the Constitution of the Party shows, however, that it is essentially a non-sectarian document, which stresses civil and human rights, with reference to Islam appearing only in its name. The fact that IPK has been refused official registration has no doubt greatly hampered its activities, since it has not been able to recruit members actively or hold official meetings and rallies. Nevertheless, the party seems to be unofficially tolerated by the government; it continues to issue statements and the interim officials carry on using their original designations.
Events subsequent to the founding of IPK have shown that a strong Muslim political consciousness does not yet exist in Kenya. The failure of the party to gain broad national support among Kenyan Muslims, or even from some of its own members at the coast, who protested the merger of IPK with Ford-Kenya (one of the official opposition parties) in 1992,82 suggests that the political reality of Islam in Kenya is not so much one of national unity, as of a fragmented multiplicity of ethnic Muslim communities, which are influenced in their political behaviour more by local circumstances than by Islamic values or ideals. During the period leading up to the 1997 elections, the IPK declared an alliance with the National Democratic Party, but again, as in 1992, the party seems to have exerted only minimal national political influence among Kenya Muslims.
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In spite of the many divisions among Kenya Muslims, there are signs that a national Muslim identity may be emerging, as Muslims become more conscious of their common experience as marginalized members of the same secular state. We may be witnessing the beginnings of a growth of Muslim religious "nationalism" in independent Kenya, analogous to the growth of African political nationalism in British colonial Kenya. At present this is a rather spontaneous and intangible phenomenon, whose future development is too uncertain to predict. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the numerous examples given above, the government response to Muslim aspirations seems to be motivated more by diplomacy and political expediency than by a genuine sympathy and concern for the traditions and values of its Muslims citizens. Though President Moi is aware of the political kudos to be gained by making a public display of the government's consideration of Muslim sentiments and practice, one gets the impression that many government officers continue to be insensitive to the special needs of Muslim peoples and ignorant of their culture and traditions, and of the tenets of Islam. The policy and priorities of the Kenya government should be, not just to avoid or minimize conflict with its Muslim peoples, but to do everything possible to respond to their religious and cultural needs, and at the same time foster their full and harmonious integration into all sectors of society and the economy.
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