ZAMBIA: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
Zambia has made significant progress in economic liberalization and appropriate policies are in place. Since 1991 Zambia has moved from a command economy of total control of all economic activity to a market-determined system. In addition, multi-party politics have become tolerated and for the first time since Independence, Zambians can become actively involved in a participatory political process. Yet, the road to democracy and democratic governance has been rocky and significant parts remain "work in progress" in Zambia. Key concepts have not yet firmly rooted.
Therefore, despite these efforts at liberalization, a lag or gap remains between pointing the country into the right direction and translating this into tangible benefits for the Zambian people. For many Zambians the benefits of the reforms remain elusive and in many instances families are worse off now than they were under the old system; unemployment -- and associated crime -- is increasing, as are poverty levels. In the political arena, the ruling party -- by lack of an effective opposition -- is showing authoritarian tendencies, and Zambia has reverted back to a de facto one-party state, while voters are apathetic, feeling that their vote, one way or the other, makes little or no difference in bettering their situation.
This uneven progress, moreover, is threatened by a number of destabilizing factors. These include: near-term multiparty national and presidential elections, presidential succession uncertainty, continued economic malaise and investor jitters, as well as unresolved and long-festering conflicts in neighboring countries which have made Zambia the host to large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Over the longer term, continued high poverty and unemployment, coupled with negligible progress in job creation, may destabilize the country.
Another important factor is to keep the military out of the political arena. An unsuccessful coup in October 1997 and the subsequent imposition by government of a state-of-emergency demonstrate how even an amateurish armed rebellion and its aftermath can significantly disturb the peace and reverse developmental progress for months afterwards.
However, it is generally believed that the military "have been taken care of" for the immediate future, but that insurrection and civil strife generated by unpaid workers might be a likelier destabilizing scenario. This is especially so in the aftermath of the long-delayed sale of the remaining major assets of the money-losing state-owned mining conglomerate ZCCM, and cash flow problems at RAMCOZ, CEC and ZESCO, as well as ancillary businesses who depend upon them for their economic activities.
Unemployment/underemployment, low salaries and household incomes, in the face of 25 percent per annum inflation and attendant rising prices are inherently destabilizing. Any significant increase in the price of the staple food mealie meal (maize meal) has the potential of sparking unrest, as the food riots on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka in the late 1980s amply illustrated. The lack of job creation and the large accumulation of school leavers without jobs adds to social tensions and the rise in criminality.
Endemic corruption and the tendency for the concentration of growing wealth and power among the political elites and the growth of crony-capitalism bear watching.
An important concern is the concentration of power in the presidency and the executive branch vis a vis the relative weakness of other branches of government. This and the lack of power and autonomy of Zambia's Parliament go back to the days of the old regime, and contribute greatly to the power imbalance. In addition, a less than independent and impartial judiciary makes it currently a comparatively weak branch of government.
The generally low health status of Zambians and the high incidence of HIV/AIDS are important factors which contribute to Zambia's status as one of the world's poorest countries. Also, the high "dependency ratio," a consequence of a population structure where nearly 50 percent of the population is under the age of 15, weighs heavily on Zambia's prospects for development. Environmental problems -- especially in urban areas where 46 percent of the population resides -- and Zambia's high dependence on imports makes it harder to sustain developmental progress.
Zambia is considered to be a problematic structural adjustment performer but used to get high marks (from the World Bank) for its somewhat hasty privatization program, which, until recently, was touted as the best in sub-Saharan Africa. However, whatever progress has been made in privatization and structural adjustment, during which Zambia lost ten percent of its industrial capacity, may also be contributing to the growing poverty which prevails in Zambia (almost 70 percent in 1996; over 73 percent in 1999). In addition, the long-delayed privatization of the money-losing ZCCM copper mining parastatal and the recent announcement by the multinational Lonrho Cotton that it will soon be ceasing cotton production operations in Zambia do not augur well for diversified economic growth in the near-to-mid term.
The unequal distribution of wealth among the population is also an issue causing some concern. Twenty percent of Zambia’s population benefit from 55 percent of its income. There is a very small wealthy class; a small but growing middle class (however, many in this middle class are non-Africans, largely of Asian origin, and predominate as small shopkeepers, traders, or engage in commerce and transport); and a huge lower class with a day-to-day, hand-to-mouth mentality and outlook. The transition to liberalized economic and political systems is causing additional strains on --and some say further marginalization of -- this lower class. There is some question of how much longer the vast majority of the population is willing to patiently wait for the benefits of economic reform. Without substantial and constant increases in savings and private investment, the number of jobs needed to absorb a large mass of the jobless will never be created. These unemployed then fall back on the African system of the extended family, which means that those with incomes will never be able to accumulate the capital necessary to better their own status by profitably investing, because of these large numbers of dependent relatives. Increasing jobs, incomes and purchasing power at the average household level are important in avoiding civil unrest.
Zambia's human rights record remains poor and as such damages its image as an emerging democracy. The police force and security services have been politicized and their first loyalty is to the ruling party government, rather than to society at large. As a result, they are easily deployed on behalf of the ruling party to break up meetings and demonstrations by opposition groups and civil society protesters. Related to this development, the number of arbitrary arrests and detentions without, or long delayed, trial, torture by police and security services, victimization, and deaths in prison due to unhealthy conditions, contribute heavily to this poor record. A growing crime rate and increased mention of Zambia as an easy transit point for drugs and as the regional money laundering center for drugs, weapons and illicit gemstone profits by international criminals are added worries.
The run-up to and the conduct of the 1996 national assembly and presidential elections were considered flawed, and as a result the largest opposition party chose to boycott the elections. Furthermore, the government's recent, politically-motivated, three-year delay in holding local government elections calls into question the sincerity of its commitment to democratic principles. The holding of fair and honest national and presidential elections, according to constitutional provisions, in 2001 will represent another major test of the current government's commitment to democracy. The peaceful transfer of power, through legitimate multiparty elections, to a new president would distinguish Zambia as a continuing democratizing country in Africa.
However, politics in Zambia today seem to be driven more by self-enrichment and hanging on to power at whatever cost, rather than by genuine concerns about development, and equitable growth as a means to poverty alleviation. Zambia’s nascent democratization appears to be threatened by less and less free, fair and transparent processes, and more and more by power plays, intimidation, threat and political bribery.
Possible crisis scenarios include mismanagement of the upcoming electoral process, and increased levels of instability and unresolved fundamental political and economic issues in neighboring Angola, the Congo, and more recently, Zimbabwe, resulting in further inflows of refugees and increased insecurity in Zambia's border regions with these countries. Another scenario is a second military coup, but resulting this time in the toppling of the government. Sudden big hikes in food and energy prices and the cost of living are also elements which figure strongly in possible destabilization. The chaos which might ensue in the case of the untimely death of the current president might be another crisis scenario. Finally, a scenario of economic melt-down, governmnent insolvency, and collateral widespread civil strife sparked by angry workers on the Copperbelt are a possibility in the wake of the mismanaged ZCCM privatization. This could easily reverberate into other industries because of the huge outstanding short-term domestic debts of the mining conglomerate, which government is unable to cover in the short run, and the apparent unfair (unnecessary?) fiscal advantages of ZCCM’s new owners vis a vis ancillary industries on the Copperbelt.
Zambia remains in many respects pivotal to southern Africa's prospects for peace, economic integration and natural resource-based growth. The U.S. interest is primarily to enhance peace, trade and stability in the region. It is therefore in the U.S. national interest to safeguard Zambia's high development potential and keeping the country on its promising long-term liberalization track. This may require treating Zambia as a focus country in terms of its high potential for instability. This is especially so in view of the violent conflicts in its neighboring countries to the north and west, and the large refugee and DP populations this generates. A well-coordinated and well-supported integrated program of private investment, combined with grant-based development (rather than more profligate lending by the international financial institutions), and measured, selective humanitarian and military assistance will be required to maintain Zambia's position as an island of stability in the sub-region. This approach would require a much higher flow of private sector investment and donor resources than is currently the case.
The quality of governance, leadership and enabling environment will be decisive in Zambia's case. Mature, competent and inspiring leadership will be essential to seeing Zambia safely through this difficult transition stage. Such leadership can help quell the growth of despair and loss of hope which often fuel the tensions underlying a rise in instability. Recent events illustrating the disarray of opposition elements, combined with the MMD government's apparent inability to seriously address issues of governance, corruption, transparency and the fundamentals of democratic principles, do not augur well.
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Attached is a limited set of largely non-quantitative indicators for incorporation into an Instability Early Warning System, which can serve to monitor possible threats to stability in Zambia.
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ATTACHMENT 1
STRUCTURAL FACTORS:
POLITICAL
- security expenditure
- human rights abuses
- constitutional abuses
- abuses of power
- illigitimate government
ACCELERATORS
POLITICAL
- dissatisfaction with the management of the state of affairs
- unfulfilled expectations
- general despair
- increased opposition activity/proliferation of opposition groups
- increase in size/cohesion of opposition groups
- large-scale deployment of security forces on the streets
- restrictions on movements of civilians
- political arrests
- trivialization of dissent by government
- disillusionment with the security apparatus by civilians
- declaration of a State Of Emergency
- imposition of curfews
- flight by intellectuals
TRIGGERS
POLITICAL
- curtailed freedom of expression
- curtailed freedom of assembly
- increased tension between regime supporters and opposition
groups
- election fraud
- voter intimidation
- purging of persons of doubtful loyalty
- political positions/ideologies imposed from the top
- new discriminatory policies
- widespread military dissatisfaction/mutiny
- military build-up
- attempted coup
- head-of-state's sudden death or departure
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
ECONOMIC
- prevalence of poverty
- degree of open unemployment
- inflation/upward price instability
- income disparities
- land distribution/access to land by the common people
- environmental degradation
- macro-economic instability
- mismanagement of public entities
- degree of political and public service corruption
ACCELERATORS
ECONOMIC
- capital flight
- management/business ownership flight
- currency instability
- growing domestic public debt/arrears
- depleted foreign exchange reserves
- increasing poverty/economic disparity
- food access problems
- large-scale retrenchment of workers
- droughts/floods
- business failures
- growing numbers of unemployed school-leavers
TRIGGERS
ECONOMIC
- banking system collapses
- severe food shortages
- massive property-grabs by poor peasants and unemployed
- severe fuel shortages
- transport disruption
- demonstations spark wide-spread violence, bloodshed and looting
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
SOCIO-CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
- biased statements by political leadership
- links between people and government deteriorate
ACCELERATORS
SOCIO-CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
- inflammatory statements by political leaders
- ethnic/racial tension
- historical rivalries come to the fore
- shut-down of independent media
TRIGGERS
SOCIO-CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
- widespread ethnic/racial violence
- widespread property damage/loss
- systems collapse